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ABSTRACT

This document contains chapter 8 of the final report of the Project on Social Architecture in Education. Chapter 8 contains two case studies, set in a large urban district with an entrenched central office bureaucracy and a militant teachers' union. The pressures of a fiscal crisis surrounded both efforts. College High School was intended to serve inner-city students by providing a humane learning environment oriented to "basic skills and beyond." It would draw on the resources of two sponsoring organizations--the school district and a municipal college--and be sited on the campus. The design of the school began to depart from the original vision, because of bureaucratic and union constraints as well as the work style of the planners. The original hopes for Julius Appelbaum High School were to provide innovative learning experiences, linking a strong academic program, business courses, and direct work experience in the offices of the nearby financial and business community. The case is interesting for the sharp discontinuity between planning and implementation and the strong movement toward bureaucratization driven by, as the case puts it, "the key planner's neglect of substance and the key implementer's neglect of human relations." (Author/ML F)

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PROJECT ON

ARCHITECTURE IN EDUCATION

Final Report

Part III: Case Studies

Chapter 6

INNOVATION IN LAKEPORT

Two Case Studies

College High School: a planning case study

Matthew B. Miles, Ellen W. Sullivan and Barry A. Gold

The founding of Julius Appelbaum High School

Sam D. Sieber and Matthew B. Miles

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Center for Policy Research
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Part III: Case Studies

Chapter 8

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From the Final Report to National Institute of Education, Grant NIE-G-74-0051. Designing and Starting Innovative Schools: a Field Study of Social Architecture in Education. Matthew B. Miles, Principal Investigator.

December, 1978

COLLEGE HIGH SCHOOL

A Planning Case Study

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Project on Social Architecture in Education

Introductory Note

This volume is a portion of the Final Report, Grant NIE-G-74-0051, "Designing and Starting Innovative Schools: a Field Study of Social Architecture in Education," Matthew B. Miles, Principal Investigator.

The Final Report contains the following parts:

Part I: Introduction

1. Executive Summary
2. New Schools as a Strategy for Educational Improvement
3. Planning and Implementing New Schools: a General Framework

Part II: Research Methods

4. Project Overview
5. Research Methods
   Appendices

Part III: Case Studies

6. Westgate Schools: a case study of two open-space elementary schools
7. Change and Conflict: educational innovation in community context
8. Innovation in Lakeport
   College High School: a planring case study
   The Founding of Julius Appelbaum High School
9. Arts Co-op: an experimental high school program

Part IV: Conclusions

10. Reflections on the Case Studies
11. Implications and Advice

Part V: Mapping New Schools: a series of new-school planning guides

1. Setting the stage for planning
2. Designing your school
3. Mapping your school's environment
4. Making your school work

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The Project on Social Architecture in Education has engaged the active energies of many people over the past four years. The core research staff responsible for this Final Report were Matthew B. Miles, Ellen W. Sullivan, Barry A. Gold, Beverly Loy Taylor, Sam D. Sieber and David E. Wilder. Their specific writing contributions and their ongoing roles are identified in the Report. The value of four years of satisfying work together goes far beyond any acknowledgement that can be given here.

Dale G. Lake collaborated closely in the creation of the Project and was a strong co-investigator during the first year, with staff members Bunty Ketcham, Denise Burch, and Julie Quain.

We are very grateful for the additional field work efforts of Wynne Galanter, Dan Lauffer, Alaka Wali, Robin Geller, and Wamboi Kironde.

Professor Rein van der Vegt of the University of Nijmegen, as visiting research associate, was especially helpful in conceptualization, instrumentation, project planning, and manuscript review. He also provided generous secretarial and support services at Nijmegen during the spring of 1978.

Joe Lopatin and Peter Abrams of Calculogic, Inc. managed our data processing with competence and speed.

Jolene Vrchota, Thomas Cook, and Joan Charles provided coding and clerical assistance; administrative and secretarial support came from Ann Wechsler, Anita McCabe, and Gay Gaskins. The Final Report was meticulously, even cheerfully, typed by Judy Woolcock, Evelyn Ledyard and Audrey McGhie.

We appreciated very much the competent fiscal and administrative services of Stephanie Clohesy and Sophie Sa of the Center for Policy Research. Parallel thanks to Paul Collins and Jay Sexter of Fordham University, who administered our Teacher Corps funds.

Several dozen colleagues assisted the project with manuscript review, came to our work conferences, and advised on project planning and strategy. They are named at appropriate places in the Report. Here we mention with gratitude those who served in our pool of consultants to school sites: Billie Alban, Marc Bassin, Peter Block, Lloyd Bishop, Bob Chasnoff, Felicia Clark, Al Fitz, Ann Lieberman, Peter Muniz, Saul Pilnick, Herb Shepard, and Mary Hunter Wolf.

We want to express our strong appreciation to William L. Smith, the director of Teacher Corps, who provided warm encouragement and support for our early exploratory work, and for the intensive development of learning materials. And we do not think any project of this sort has ever had better project officers than ours at NIE proved to be: Mary Milne, Charles Thompson, Elisabeth Hansot and Fritz Mulhauser gave thoughtful commentary, steady stimulation, and sustained support.

Perhaps our most helpful collaborators must go unidentified. The several hundred people from our six schools whose work we studied were far from being mere objects of study. Many gave active energy to helping us think through the issues of planning and implementation in new schools. They gave us full and thorough access, and many gave extra time. The study would have been impossible without their help. We know from some, and hope for all, that their learning has been as valuable as ours.

Overview of the Case Studies

Each of the case studies in Part III of the Final Report was based on two to three years' documentation of the planning and implementation of a complete new school for which innovative expectations were held. Our aims were to follow what happened along the way as carefully as possible; to describe, and if possible explain the processes that occurred; and to show how these processes were related to the achievement, revision or abandonment of the original innovative hopes. We believe we have been successful. We hope readers will test that belief carefully as they proceed.

The five case studies include:

Miles, M.B., Westgate Schools: a case study of two open-space elementary schools.

These schools emphasized open education in new open-space settings, in a small, suburban district.

Gold, B.A., with M.B.Miles, Change and conflict: educational innovation in community context.

A new, open-space elementary school came into severe conflict with its suburban community, Lincoln Acres.

Miles, M.B., E.W. Sullivan, and B.A. Gold, College High School: a planning case study.

This experimental high school, involving collaboration between the Lakeport urban school district and a college, was not implemented.

Sieber, S.D., and M.B. Miles, The founding of Julius Appelbaum High School.

A new high school for business careers was set in the same urban school district, reaching out to the local business community.

Sullivan, E.W., Arts Co-op: a case study of an experimental high school program.

This jointly-sponsored school brought practicing artists together with students from an urban and several suburban school districts.

We should express here our warm appreciation to the people whose work we studied during the years of our project. They must remain anonymous through the pseudonyms we have given them, but they are far from anonymous to us. They were not only almost unfailingly cordial and helpful to our efforts, but also supplied useful corrections and interpretations to draft versions of the cases. They taught us a great deal during the course of the project, and we are happy to say that many told us they had learned from the experience themselves.

In drafting the cases from a data base which usually involved several thousand pages of field notes, documents, and questionnaire data, we soon found that they could not be forced into a standard length. Each case is as long as its authors considered necessary for a thorough understanding of what occurred.

The cases were all guided by the general framework of ideas outlined in Part I, although each naturally has some idiosyncratic features.

The case studies have been organized according to a common format to permit easy comparison. Each one provides a general overview of the school as it now exists, then backtracks to its early history. We then see the flow of planning and implementation over time. A summary assessment of each school's success, and our explanations, are followed by commentary from participants in each school, who offer their views on what happened and why.

A Table of Contents at the front of each case is designed to provide an overview of the case structure, and enable rapid access to its parts.

It should be noted that the flow of each case separates sections which describe the events and processes ("Chronology") from those which provide interpretations ("Analysis and Commentary"). Thus the reader can more easily see whether alternative interpretations are possible.

We have already found these cases very productive for teaching and training purposes. It works well to give learners the cases in sequenced segments. They first see a "Chronology" section, then develop their own interpretations, and predictions of what will happen next. Then they receive the "Analysis and Commentary" section before proceeding to the next "Chronology" section, and so on.

The reader interested in general conclusions drawn from all five case studies should refer to Part IV of the Final Report.

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Additional copies of this volume are available at cost from the Center for Policy Research: please remit $14.00 with order.

COLLEGE HIGH SCHOOL*

A Planning Case Study

Overview

College High School was intended to serve "inner city" high school students by providing a humane learning environment oriented to "basic skills and beyond," and drawing on the full resources of two sponsoring organizations--a municipal college and a metropolitan school district. The school would be sited on the Lakeport College campus: college professors and city schoolteachers alike would be the faculty. College High School, or CHS, as its planners rapidly began to call it, was a dream that would bring the distinctive resources of school and university together for a population targeted as requiring remedial educational programs. Beginning with 500 students, CHS would grow to 2,000 and be a sort of representative microcosm of the city's high school population. CHS was to be an innovative learning environment that would serve low-income city youth more effectively than schools and colleges working alone had been able to so far.

But the dream to date has not materialized. CHS is unlike the other case studies in this book: the plans for it have not been implemented as of this writing and the case is a truncated one. Whether one views CHS as an aborted, or a merely postponed, planning effort depends not only on one's predilections for optimism or pessimism, but as we shall see, on detailed knowledge of the context in Lakeport and one's position in relation to the planning effort. At any rate, during the period of our study, the planners failed to accomplish their hopes.[1)] Their failure, we believe, came not just from ineffective planning and group skills, but from the fact that the planners had only an ambiguous "right to plan," lacked power, and existed in a highly uncertain and turbulent environment, including a city fiscal crisis.

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*This case study was prepared from field notes and documents collected by project staff between April 1975 and January 1977. A partial draft was developed by Sullivan and Gold, who were the primary field workers; data were also collected by David E. Wilder and Miles (who wrote the final draft). The account has been distributed to several case participants, and this version incorporates their corrections and commentary.

1) This may reflect a "bad" choice of site on our part. The research proposal stated that we were looking for cases which appeared to have a reasonable chance of success. We "bought into" the planners' version of what was going on before we were able to observe that their possibilities for opening a real school were much slimmer than they had seemed when we began our fieldwork in April 1975.

There is an old Lakeport saying: "If your aunt had wheels, she'd be a trolley car." If the CHS planners had had more skill, more right to plan, and more environmental stability, then CHS would have become a reality. Or would it? The major task of this study is a careful assessment of the causes, nature and consequences of the complex processes that made up the CHS planning effort.

Our Data Base

We began our work with CHS in a meeting with the planning director, Greg Walker, and his associate, Jack Bennett, on April 16, 1975. As in our other sites, we explained that we wished to follow and document the planning process, and the early implementation of the school, as fully as we could. We would not give advice, nor quote people to each other, and would maintain confidentiality and site anonymity. We also promised occasional summary reports, and a modest amount of consultant-supportive matching funds, if the planners wished for expert assistance during their work.

Walker and Bennett, and subsequently the members of the core planning group (the Initial Design Committee) accepted our proposal (though the group did not permit us to tape-record sessions). We had a total of 66 contacts between our first contact and early January 1977, which included most of the planning meetings, occasional subcommittee meetings, occasional phone calls, and longer interviews with Walker and other key group members, Victor Rubin, Sy Hecht, Mike Goodman, and Ora Haas. We also asked for and received copies of all major planning documents.

There were two primary field workers, Sullivan and Gold. Having two data collectors, often appearing at different times, may have made for less trust from the planners, and for problems of continuity and commitment on the part of field workers. But the partnership, we think, more than made up for these problems through its stimulation of new hypotheses and leads for further inquiry.[2)]

Both field workers were in their 20's, younger than most of the planners; both were Jewish, like many of the planners. Sullivan reported that she felt better connected to the women on the planning group than to the (mostly older) men. Both field workers, given what was often (to everyone) a frustrating, puzzlingly-difficult planning process, sometimes felt they were not fully enough "in" the group to probe, to be

---

2) Miles and Wilder's occasional presence at planning meetings, plus their interviews with group members, also provided differing perspectives on what was happening in the planning group and why.

wholly trusted or given sensitive data. When events occurred "behind the scenes," as they sometimes did, group members sometimes disclaimed knowledge of how things had come to pass; field workers were not quite sure sometimes whether respondents genuinely did not know (a real possibility, as we shall see), or were dissembling. So the solidity and completeness of the data are less satisfying than they were, for example, in Gold's study of Lincoln Acres, or Sullivan's of Arts Coop. Still, given the truncated planning process, and (as we shall see) the existence of frequently recurring patterns in the planning, we feel reasonably confident that we have been in touch with the main issues in the CHS story.

Major Actors

The basic planning group, labeled the Initial Design Committee, was composed of representatives from the school district central office, the college, and the teachers' union. Meeting weekly or so, the IDC group reported to and was guided by a Steering Committee composed of high-ranking central board administrators and their appointees, the vice president of the teachers' union, and the Dean of the School of Education of the College. We will describe these groups in more detail a bit further on in our account; here we only list members for later reference purposes.

Chart I

Members of the Initial Design Committee (IDC)

Union representatives:

Mike Goodman--teacher at Horace Mann High School, Chairman of the union's High School Innovation Committee, planner for redesign of Benjamin G. Hall High School.

Helena Karatos--student at Horace Mann High School, brought in by Goodman.

Robert Jamieson--formerly guidance counselor at Horace Mann, at present Assistant Principal for Pupil Personnel Services at Appelbaum High School, member of High School Innovation Committee, and planner for redesign of Benjamin G. Hall H.S.

Benjamin Blau--teacher at Thomas Jefferson High School, member of High School Innovation Committee.

Representatives of the High School Division of the central office:

Seymour Hecht--Director of ACCORD programs at the Board (alternative and college collaboration projects)

Victor Rubin--retired Area B Assistant Superintendent, former principal, teacher, and school planner

College Representatives:

Greg Walker--Professor of Education, CHS Project Director

Jim O'Neill--Professor of Education, internal consultant to the group

Jack Bennett--Chairman, Social Studies Department, School of Education

Abe Gordon--Assistant Professor of Reading, School of Education

Audrey Carter--English Department, Liberal Arts College, SEEK Program

Moira Williams--English Department, Liberal Arts College

Paulo Nara, M.D.--Director of Biomedical program

Diane Levitt--Office of Research and Evaluation

Ora Haas--postdoctoral student at Uptown Medical Center

Larry Jacobson--Professor, Human Services

Chart II

Members of the College High School Steering Committee

Representatives of the Central Office:

Irving Haberman--Executive Director of High Schools

Herman Fine--Acting Director of High Schools for Area A, Sept. 1974-August 1975; principal, Oliver Wendell Holmes High School

Frank Henderson--Director of High Schools for Area A (on sabbatical leave September 1974 - August, 1975)

Felix Frey--Retired Director of Area B High Schools

Norman Bloom--Principal of Lakeview High School

Marty Brown--Principal of Eli Whitney High School

Saul Martin--Principal of Thomas Jefferson High School

George Belin--Principal of Wardour Vocational High School

College Representatives:

Floyd Henson--Dean, School of Education, Lakeport College

Union Representatives:

Charles Caravello--Vice President of Lakeport Federation of Teachers

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The Historical and Political Context

Today Lakeport, a major Great Lakes city, has problems typical of most American cities: downtown deterioration and white flight, severe minority unemployment, inadequacy of major public services including education, a declining tax base, and severe fiscal strains. Still, it has a strong industrial and commercial base, a substantial financial community, and diverse cultural activities; there is enough civic pride and energy in the city that its prospects are basically positive.

The events of our case--and the case of Julius Applebaum High School, which is also located in Lakeport--cannot be fully understood without some appreciation of Lakeport's past, and the current situation, as they impact on the educational system. We provide a brief overview here.

History

The site of Lakeport was first scouted by French explorers in the late seventeenth century. Its river-mouth location by the lake made for rapid development in shipping, commerce and manufacturing: the population in the 1820's was already well over 100,000.

Public education had a slower start in Lakeport than in other American cities of the time: the entrepreneurs and emerging merchant princes had private schools or tutors for their children, and not until 1835 did a real estate tax become imposed for public school financing, pushed by a Public Schools Association. Like New York, Lakeport struggled in the mid-19th century with successive waves of immigration (Irish, German, and a range of what are now called "white ethnics") who overtaxed the flimsy public services and crowded together in the slums. The prevailing public attitude was that the slum dwellers were deprived (and possibly depraved); education was seen as a cure for not only difficulties with English, but for poverty and crime. In short, as elsewhere in America, schools were expected to solve the social problems of urbanization and industrialization.

An increasingly strong, Irish-dominated political machine had become ensconced in power by mid-century; it was based on a local ward organization, and in alliance with the Catholic Church, came into conflict with the Public Schools Association over whether the schools should be centrally managed (because of their tax-supported nature) or decentralized to the ward level. The machine won, but this was only the first round in a continuing conflict between the advocates of decentralization and local control.

As new waves of immigration--German and Russian Jews, Italians, and Balkan peoples--spilled into the city from the East to feed the demands of the industrial revolution, the educational system was even more stressed--and, "progressive" critics charged, corrupt and inefficient to

boot because of its management at the ward level of the Democratic machine. As Katz (1975) has explained for the Northeastern urban context, the rising tide of educational progressivism meant efforts, essentially, to centralize and professionalize public education, make it less "political," and more "scientific" and innovative, not to mention more "humane". The same forces were at work in Lakeport.

By the turn of the century, as in most large American cities, the professionalization of education in Lakeport had been seriously begun. The power of the wards over local schools had given way to a centralized School Department. Normal schools had been created for teacher training and before long they and Lakeport College would eventually become part of the growing municipal university. Higher wages, and a merit system based on qualifying exams (instead of the spoils system) for hiring, firing and promotion were in place, along with centralized financial and curricular control. In the following decades--especially during the period when immigration was sharply restricted after World War I, the consolidation of bureaucratic power was striking. Just as the cult of efficiency and "scientific management" was growing in business, so was it for schools. Testing for ability and achievement led to ability grouping; separate academic and vocational schools were established; class scheduling was reminiscent of factory production processes; central corps of specialists and supervisors grew, and the educational bureaucracy became more and more insulated from the public. This process continued in the remainder of the period between the wars: in essence, what had been the earlier progressive ideas were becoming entrenched in the standardization that was required to manage the increasingly larger Lakeport school system. The "new progressives" of the Progressive Education Association were more often found on university campuses and in their laboratory schools than in metropolitan centers like Lakeport. And, as in New York, the German-Jewish immigrants (who had been mostly middle class--and traditionally oriented to learning--to begin with) turned out to be the inheritors of the system: they became teachers, principals and specialists--not policemen or restauranteurs or construction workers. And they began the process of teacher unionization.

World War II's defense industries, and the postwar boom brought not only Appalachian whites, but an enormous wave of Southern poor blacks to Lakeport in search of jobs and social services. As with earlier immigration contingents, school professionals and the public blamed the newcomers as being illiterate, ineducable, and unmanageable: the conventional wisdom was that the schools were "working well" until the influx--a view that would be repeated as more and more Hispanic newcomers arrived. As in many other Northern cities, white flight to the suburbs was more and more evident, even from traditional ethnic enclaves. And the tax base was weakening.

The Supreme Court's 1954 Brown vs. Topeka decision outlawing segregated schools led to Lakeport school plans for integration--but little was ever done to implement them, given the ebb and flow of interest group politics in the city. The Lakeport school system continued, for example, to build new schools squarely in the middle of residentially segregated neighborhoods, not on their fringes, where integration could have been feasible.

In the mid-60's, as in many other American cities, movement began toward decentralizing the Lakeport educational system. The mayor's interest in getting a larger piece of state aid, the civil rights groups' interest in locally-controlled schools, and educational reformers' interest in loosening the dead hand of the entrenched bureaucracy came together. Federal funds were obtained for some demonstration projects in local control, which proved difficult and turbulent ("our own Ocean Hill-Brownsville," as one principal termed them). The teachers' union fought decentralization (and even struck briefly on the issue, exacerbating ethnic/racial tensions considerably) fearing what might happen if local boards in all-black districts could fire teachers (who were still 90% white) without regard to "merit". But it eventually capitulated to the pro-decentralization coalition (partly because it foresaw that union control of local district elections would be feasible). In 1969, a decentralization law was passed creating 21 local districts, organized into four major "areas" of Lakeport with district superintendents hired by locally-elected boards. The districts were to manage the elementary schools, but the 32 high schools were still under central control, with superintendents for each area. And central specialists would still ply their trades for elementary and high schools alike. So central educational power was still alive and well in spite of the nominal shift.

(The decentralization law also had a provision which allowed the municipal university to operate a high school in each of the city's areas. The idea had come partly out of the earlier demonstration projects, and enabled the planning for College High School to proceed.)

The Current Context

The general situation. All in all, the Lakeport schools were not functioning well as the 1970's opened. Charges of local district corruption and mismanagement were rife; reading scores were dropping; whites were continuing to leave the city; attendance rates were said to be in the 45-60% range in actuality, though they were officially inflated; school security problems, including sporadic riots, violence and drug use were acute; the high school dropout rate was 37%; an HEW report accused the administration of ethnic and racial discrimination in hiring and promotion, confirming widespread charges of racism by minority spokesmen; and most of the school management and curricular innovations of the 1960's had yet to be widely used. (One administrator remarked, "You can get one

principal to adopt almost anything new--it's to his credit. But it will never go anywhere else in the district."[3)]

The interface between the public schools and local institutions of higher education, always uneasy, had become more critical. When the school district instituted the requirement of an 8th grade reading level for high school graduation, university, public and business leaders had expressed horror at the idea that "illiterate" students were leaving the schools. An "open admissions" program in the colleges of the municipal university had already brought many students who badly needed remedial help before their college education could proceed; for many traditionally-oriented faculty members, such students should not be in college at all.

The central administration. We can sketch its general character briefly. Policy direction is officially allotted to a mayor-appointed seven-person Board (which typically has at least one black, one Jew, one Hispanic, one Irish, one Italian member, and two other "white ethnics" spread over the four areas of the city). Board members are not only politically-oriented, but paid and the Board has tended to get deeply involved in administrative matters, including negotiations, contracts, and instructional programming. Board decisions are often terribly delayed as a consequence.

The central administration is headed by Superintendent Norman Stein, a career bureaucrat with nearly 40 years in the system. His leadership has been described as cautious, as that of a talented "political survivor"; few would call it strong.

The flavor of the administration is rather like Rogers' (1968) description of the New York City administration:

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3) The structural characteristics of large metropolitan school systems tend to induce certain sorts of operations. We note for comparative interest Rogers' (1968) comments on innovation in New York City:

> The New York City school system is flooded with demonstration projects and piecemeal innovations, most of which are uncoordinated, overlapping and inadequately evaluated. But virtually none of the techniques that have been tried have worked. The multiple, piecemeal experiments have been in part a technique to absorb protest, whether consciously planned that way or not. (p. 7)

> Its officials are preoccupied with its internal politics and status order. They are at the same time withdrawn from and often suspicious of or arrogant toward outsiders.

We should note that perhaps 90% of Lakeport administrators have "come up through the system," and most teachers are Lakeport products. Cosmopolitanism is not high. When the Council for Economic Growth, a volunteer business coalition, began offering services to the central office in the early 70's, its consultants were appalled at the absence of modern management procedures, problems in coordination, unclear authority, fragmentation and lack of planning, distance from the districts, and near-total insulation from external review and accountability. The central office's authority is also divided with that of City Hall; many elected officials influence school decisions, since so much of the budget stems from the city. In short, the central office's decisions are, at the core, those of a traditional, politically-oriented organization trying to keep afloat in a turbulent environment. Although the work of the Council for Economic Growth resulted after several years in some structural reorganization, and streamlining and modernization of procedures, most observers agreed that the people, the traditions, and the politics of the central office had been left untouched.

The central office tends to be suspicious of local (elementary) districts, while providing little monitoring or assistance. The indicators it is most attentive to are (a) attendance figures, since they regulate reception of state aid; (b) elementary school reading scores, which have become the major means of classifying students (and classifying schools, since the mean scores for each school are published annually); and (c) incidence of disorder, since violence in schools is very visible in the media.

Our characterization of the central office is a corporate one. The office contains more than a few change-oriented, humane, and seriously committed people. But the bureaucracy is so large and unwieldy, and so solidly devoted to survival and status quo maintenance, that persons with reformist tendencies either become coopted or are extruded after a short time.

The teachers' union. We should note too that the teachers' union--the Lakeport Federation of Teachers--plays an important role in Lakeport --largely of a conservative sort. Though unionization began in the 20's and 30's, and stemmed from liberal political hopes and the wish to professionalize teachers further, the basic stance has naturally been protective of teachers' interests. The union, which is AFT-related, was not recognized as the bargaining agent until 1961, but it played a strong part long before then. Teacher salary levels are high (85th percentile in the state), and union-achieved contracts incorporate pro-

tection of teachers' rights (hiring, promotion, teaching time, fringe benefits) that would daze a vulnerable teacher employee of the Public Schools Association of 1830, were she to appear on the scene today. But the contracts also have severe limitations, especially when innovative schools like the ones in our study are being designed and implemented. (For example, principals may not be able to choose teachers, but must accept ones with seniority, regardless of their interest in innovation; extra or after-school meetings are forbidden in spite of the fact that starting a new school usually requires much extra time investment and planning beyond regular classroom preparation.) In general, the union has exercised strong veto power in the Lakeport schools, especially when anything has been proposed to increase district power, heighten teacher accountability, or threaten job security.

(We should note that the Supervisors and Principals' Association (SPA) in Lakeport is not AFT-affiliated. It too tends to be a conservative force, but like most "administrator" unions tends to be less militant and demanding toward "management"--which in fact it is a part of.)

The fiscal crisis. But at the time of our study, the credibility and power of the union was decreasing. During 1975, Lakeport was experiencing a fiscal crisis, which while not as dramatic or visible in the media as New York's, was deep, real and painful. Like Albert Shanker in New York, the union's president, Edward Stein, was forced to authorize use of union pension funds to aid municipal insolvency, and his past strategy of emphasizing fringe benefits and salaries to the exclusion of all else backfired: by the fall of 1976, nearly 2,000 full-time teachers --disproportionately minority ones--had been laid off, and many of those remaining had been transferred to fill vacant spots. Teachers with up to 17 years' experience found themselves teaching "out of certificate": music teachers taught social studies, English teachers taught art. Seniority determined placement.

The fiscal crisis naturally affected the planning of College High School profoundly. The members of the planning committee represented the central school administration, the College, and the union, all of which suffered directly from the crisis. At Lakeport College, there were heavy cutbacks of faculty and programs, an elimination of special remedial programs for black and Hispanic students, and a halt to all construction (including the nearly-complete new School of Education.). The central administration was faced with massive layoffs, swelling class size (to 45-60 students in some cases) and with restriction or termination of many services (including library, art, music, guidance and foreign languages); construction stopped, even for buildings 80% complete. And as we have seen, the union could not protect its members from layoffs, lost its credibility, and tied up its pension funds in city bonds.

The members of the committee were thus faced with deep uncertainty. They had little clear information about the details and likely consequences of the fiscal crisis as it proceeded and deepened, and had no way to get more. The news, when it arrived, was nearly always bad.

Lakeport College. The College was founded by public referendum in 1884. Like the public schools, it was seen initially as a way to guarantee an improving education to the "worthy poor" who had flooded into Lakeport over the preceding decades. Tuition, if not free, was always minimal, usually only 10% of that in comparable private institutions. The College, the transformed normal schools, and by the late 1960's several community colleges, were gradually built into a municipal university, including a graduate school.

Two events in the 1970's had much significance for the university: the "open admissions" policy and the end of the nominal tuition policy. Traditionally selective, the university, following on the wave of civil rights activism of the 60's, agreed to accept any applicant who was a graduate of the Lakeport schools. Many black, Hispanic and white ethnic students flooded in. Up to 1/3 had inadequate reading and writing skills, requiring extensive remediation; traditional faculty, in particular, resented the decision and considered the university ruined.

We can only speculate about whether the problems caused by open admission influenced the college's president, William Cheifitz, in his decision to launch planning for a high school on the College's campus--a kind of laboratory school for the School of Education. It seems likely that he hoped the College's expertise and resources, in collaboration with those of the school district, might (a) actually solve the remediation problems; (b) serve as an optimistic prototype for secondary education in the city. In any case, the fiscal crisis gave the opponents of open admission their chance; restrictions were again imposed in the spring of 1976.

The nominal tuition policy had always been a prized symbol of Lakeport's commitment to universal education and upward mobility; it also helped to keep middle-class families in the city. It was resented by down-state legislators, since some state money was involved, and as the fiscal crisis developed, they and the governor put a good deal of pressure on a reluctant mayor and the Board of the municipal university to increase tuition to a point at least comparable with that charged by the state university. Amid much conflict, including resignations by several Board members who felt that tuition increases combined with the end of open admissions would push the university toward an all-white student body, the Board finally voted for "comparable tuition" in the summer of 1976.

So by the beginning of the academic year in September, the university (and Lakeport College within it) had suffered faculty layoffs (nearly 14%) and a serious reduction in students (estimated at nearly 20%), as higher education became more selective and expensive. To the extent that the planners of College High School were trying to invent improved solutions for the education of deprived inner-city youth, events were outrunning their ability to predict. It could be argued that the changes at the College gave them a stronger mission to plan effective remedial programs at the secondary level. But in another sense the changes left them with even less backing from their traditional colleagues: why should any College faculty member teach in College High School at this point? The incentives had become quite vague.

The P/I Group and its Meta-Plan

The planners. The planning for College High School was a collaborative effort between the High School Division of Lakeport schools and the School of Education of Lakeport College, with the participation of the teachers' union. There were two levels of planning group: the Initial Design Committee, the actual planners for the school, whom we shall refer to as the planning committee) and the Steering Committee, the higher-level actors within each participating constituency, to whom the IDC reported. Ultimately, both groups were responsible to the Lakeport Superintendent of Schools and to the President of Lakeport College.

Since the College had initiated the planning, and since it was to be a campus high school, the College had more representatives to the planning group than the central office or the union. But they did not control the planning. In fact, what had begun as a college-controlled project inthe early 70's ultimately became a central office-controlled effort by 1975/76.

As we have noted, the idea to plan and implement a campus high school resulted from a 1970 school decentralization law (which allowed groups other than the central board to operate high schools); the interest of the College president in an innovative, community-oriented secondary school; mandates to collaborate with elementary and secondary schools from the chairman of the municipal university Board; and the potential of a suitable building's becoming available in the middle of the college campus.[4]

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4) The High School for the Arts, then located on the College campus, was to move to a new building downtown, currently under construction. This would free up the campus building for use by College High School.

The impetus to plan such a school did not come from the community, but rather from the professional bureaucracies of the organizations involved. There had been community pressure for a high school in the south-side black ghetto which would focus especially on basic skills, but the community and the planners never got together successfully.

Legitimacy. Throughout the planning, the Initial Design Committee faced questions about whether--and, indeed, what-- they had the "right to plan." Although an agreement was worked out among the participating organizations and served to guide the planning, that agreement was never signed. And, as originally formulated, the agreement did not even refer to the Initial Design Committee. When Greg Walker, the planning committee director, requested that the IDC be formally named and included in the agreement, Irving Haberman, the Executive Director of High Schools, said "Why? We know there's a planning group."

This comment is reflective of the school district's usual approach to planning (of which we shall say more shortly): an individual or group of persons is assigned to plan a school or program. But there is usually no guarantee that the plans will be used or that the school or program will actually be implemented; the planners typically have little control over such decisions, which are the purview of upper-level central office administrators and sometimes Board of Education members. Thus, from the central office perspective, the Initial Design Committee had a "right to plan" the content of a campus high school, but decisions about allocation of resources and actual implementation were not the IDC's to make.

The IDC's powerlessness was reinforced by Haberman's constitution of a Steering Committee which was heavily weighted with central office people, a retired assistant superintendent, and high school principals. (Floyd Henson, the Dean of the School of Education at Lakeport College was the only College representative, and Charles Caravello, the Vice President of the Lakeport Federation of Teachers, was the only union representative.) The IDC reported to this steering group, but the relationship between the two groups was never very clear. As Sy Hecht of the IDC commented retrospectively,

> The primary problem was that the steering group did not charge this committee and make its charge clear. They did not make clear what the parameters were within which you could work.

Thus, in many ways, the legitimacy of the Initial Design Committee was ambiguous. The Committee itself did not know what kinds of decisions it could and could not make.

Chart 3, on the following page, shows the structure of the planning set-up graphically. Several things--including ambiguities--may be more explicit than before: (1) the durable accountability of members was to their own organizations, while there was only temporary accountability to Greg Walker, the planning director; (2) though the IDC as a whole was defined as temporarily accountable to the Steering Committee, it was not clear to whom the Steering Committee was accountable (Stein only? Stein and Cheifetz? And what of Stern?);[5] (3) Walker's personal accountability was more to Henson and Cheifetz than anyone else, and he had more direct access to them than did Hecht and Rubin to Stein; (4) though the IDC was more fully loaded with College faculty members than those from central office or union, most of them had little influence in the committee; (5) the Steering Committee was dominated by central office members and principals.

Furthermore, the Steering Committee contained the bosses of the majority of the members of the Initial Design Committee, decreasing the likelihood that the IDC would push as far as it could go to find out what the limits were; understandably, they often took the safe, cautious route.

Questions of legitimacy and the right to plan (or the right to stop planning when the project looked dead) plagued the Initial Design Committee throughout a large part of its life.

The planning structure is notable for one major lack: any representation from the community to be served. The planners had no linkages to the community leaders, and the few half-hearted attempts they made to involve parents resulted in no sustained parent membership, along with repeated IDC complaints ("We always invite them, but they never come."). It appeared that the planners were less interested in active community endorsement and participation than in warding off the later eventuality of negative action by the powerful City Parents Association (whom they never approached directly as a source for committee members).

Planning styles in Lakeport. Before we discuss the meta-plan for College High School, we should supply some context. Lakeport is large enough that many new schools have been planned and implemented, especially in the past two decades as old plant deteriorated. Some fairly distinctive planning styles have emerged. One we have labeled "planning for the shelf," where planners either sense from the beginning, or are driven by political and resource problems to realize, that the plans must be set aside until "the time is right." The intervals have varied from five years to

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5) Note too that implementation of plans for the school would ultimately depend on the working relationships among Cheifetz, Stein and Stern, none of whom were particularly close.

Chart III
PLANNING MECHANISMS FOR COLLEGE HIGH SCHOOL



NOTE: In Initial Design Committee, high-influence members have capitalized names.

——→ Regular accountability

- - - → Temporary accountability

"never". Another style, improvisational planning, involves last-minute design, often replacing a carefully-wrought plan which is unacceptable to a key implementer. Horace Mann High School, a genuinely innovative school, was actually redesigned at the last moment in less than ten days by a handful of planners and implementers.

Insulated planning in Lakeport is notable for its avoidance of environmental linkage: planners sometimes proceed with designing as if their vision could be actualized in thin air, taking little adequate action in the bureaucratic and community context. The focus is more on educational/technical matters than on the solution of political problems that may threaten the new school's survival. Under these circumstances, as we shall see in the Appelbaum High School case, a principal unconnected with the planning may naturally depart very substantially from the spirit of the original plans.

Lakeport has occasionally seen venture planning, where dedicated innovators, often with extra outside funding, developed a vision, and with high persistence and a good deal of risk-taking, managed to see it through to implementation. As it turns out, implementation of such schools has typically involved a good deal of manipulation and circumvention of the rules.

What features underlie these various styles? We see several: (1) weak legitimacy and power of planners; (2) weak or absent linkage between planning and implementation which are often sharply-separated processes; (3) primacy of "professional" input, along with underuse of environmental data; (4) absence of precise time lines, and consequent vagueness about the future. It can be argued that all four features are natural when a large and entrenched bureaucratic system is trying to protect itself against failure: one should (1) not give planners a strong license; (2) be sure that implementers will do things the safe way; (3) use the best available technical knowledge, and avoid the disorderliness of non-professional input; (4) cover oneself in case unexpected snags come up, as they usually do. This analysis may sound harsh, but we do not think the CHS (and later Appelbaum) planning can be well understood without knowledge of the Lakeport "planning culture," which differs in some important respects from the planning culture we noted in our two suburban districts, and in the Arts Coop urban-suburban case.

The meta-plan. The meta-plan for CHS, taking place as it did in the Lakeport planning culture, had certain typical features. The planning group was primarily composed of experts and stakeholders from three groups: the College, the central office, and the union. Clients of the school were missing--as were its implementers, who by the rules could not be identified far enough ahead to aid with planning.

As we have seen, the existence of the Steering Committee--a sort of veto group over the IDC's work--cast much doubt on the P/I group's right to plan, and their power to command resources.

The timetable was, for the most part, vague, shifting and often disregarded. In April of 1975, the committee's intention was to get a principal hired by September: he or she could work along with the planning and select a staff during the spring of 1976. An intensive summer workshop would precede the opening of the school in the fall of 1976. But by May it was already clear that the principal could not be selected before November, if then--in part because the Board had not yet acted on a resolution to create a campus high school.[6] As the original timetable became more and more unrealistic, no new opening date was set, and the planners worked without a timeline.[7] In our other sites, the need to work against the time when the school would be a reality was an important motivating force. At CHS this force was lacking, and the planners tended to treat the future as a vague presence into which they were gradually drifting.

The primary data used to steer the work were internal to the group; as we shall see, when environmental uncertainty became acute, there was a great deal of speculation, gossip and rumor, but little concerted effort to get real facts to guide next steps.

As is typical in Lakeport, the central office people assumed from the start that the new school's principal and faculty could not be predicted (the principal would be chosen by routine procedures, and would not necessarily get to choose his or her faculty), and once in place, would have no obligation to utilize the comittee's plans.[8] In short, during the early planning period, though the committee wanted to link its plans to implementation, it was not able to construct any very explicit means for doing so.

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6) Walker said to a researcher in December of 1975 that President Cheifetz had "tried and tried and tried and is still trying" to get an appointment with Superintendent Stein: "The only thing I could say is that he just avoided it." Stein was naturally preoccupied with a teacher strike then going on, but in any case his delay put the planners behind the usual December 1st deadline for confirmation of any school to be open for students in the following fall.

7) At one point, consultants working with CHS noted the lack of a timeline: in response, the planners made up an ad hoc time by which the planning would supposedly be complete. This deadline was superficially-arrived at, with little commitment or rationale behind it.

8) The college members were shocked when this was explained to them, but did little to propose alternative strategies.

And as we shall see, the degree of specificity in the P/I group's plans varied considerably. Some of their plans were detailed down to class groupings and the learning units that students would progress through, but they were almost completely vague on most other matters, such as the organizational structure and governance of the school, how College faculty would fit into it, and indeed the goals of the school in general.

Much of the meta-plan was diffuse and disorganized. But as the planning proceeded, other patterns emerged which came to characterize--and in a sense organize--the planning in the absence of a clearly-defined meta-plan.

Chronology

Prehistory. Our research focused on the planning group formed in 1974. But efforts to plan a college high school dated back to the early '70s, and had their roots in several historical events, to which we have already alluded. These events provided reasons and mandates for starting a high school under the auspices of a university setting.

The 1969 school decentralization law made it possible for groups other than the Lakeport school system to administer public schools. One of its provisions enabled the municipal university to run a high school in each district of the city. The law implied that these would be existing high schools, taken over by the university, rather than new schools, but did not preclude the establishment of new schools. The central office was still responsible for the 32 high schools in the city, but community school boards were given responsibility for elementary and junior high school education.

At about the same time, the municipal university changed its admission policy from very selective admission requirements to a policy of open admissions, opening its doors to any graduate of the Lakeport public school system.

Like the Lakeport school system, the university went through some reorganization. A strengthened university board was created for it, and its new chairman was Richard Campagna, a former chairman of the Board of Education. One of his major priorities when he took office was forming a collaboration between the High School Division and the municipal university. Campagna was keenly aware of the great remediation costs ensuing from open admissions, and naturally felt that remediation should be taken care of by the high schools, not the university. And mindful of the public and business outcry that "kids can't read or write," he reasoned that attaching high schools to colleges could in fact improve the education offered at the high school level. He mandated the launching of collaborative efforts.

At the same time, Lakeport College got a new president, William Cheifetz. Cheifetz, hired in the backwash of late 60's campus protest, was committed to serving the community around the College, and to improving opportunities for inner-city youth. He pushed through a number of innovative programs, including a bio-medical program which compressed the B.A. and M.D. degrees from 8 years into 6. He hoped to do the same with other undergraduate and graduate degree programs, such as law. On the lower end, he saw the opportunity to combine the high school and college degrees, or at least make for better articulation between the two. So the idea of establishing and administering a public high school on the campus of the college fit in very well with Cheifetz' overall educational philosophy and policy thrust.

A committee to investigate and plan a high school on the campus of the college was formed in 1970. Between 1970 and 1973, this committee was dissolved and reestablished several times. The committees were not terribly productive: they were internal to the College, and their membership shifted repeatedly, and their efforts did not seem to cumulate. The project did not take long to develop a "white elephant" reputation on campus, though there were a steadily-working few, like Jack Bennett and Jim O'Neill of the School of Education, who believed that a campus high school was necessary, important--and possible.[9)]

The overall approach to planning by the College changed when the groundbreaking took place for a new High School for the Arts to be located at the Lakefront Arts Center downtown. The current Arts High School was located on the campus of Lakeport College. If Arts High were to move downtown, this would free up the old building for use by the College as its campus high school. Initial conversations between the College and the then superintendent took place,[10)] and intensive negotiations began in 1973. They included the High School Division of the Central Office, the School of Education of Lakeport College, the Lakeport Federation of Teachers, and the supervisors' union. The negotiations went on for 14 months. They were arduous and conflictful, and the agreement that was finally worked out did not have the consent of the supervisory representatives. (The agreement was never signed, but at the time, it was thought the ratification was imminent; thus, it still served to define the parameters of the planning.)

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9) Bennett chaired the 1973 version of the committee, which finally began to reach out to what was happening in the city schools; the members spent time talking with more innovative people who were trying out "alternatives" in the system.

10) Cheifetz cared enough about the project to get Superintendent Stein to commit $18,000 to support released time for planning, and also contributed $6,000 from College overhead funds. As it turned out, actually extracting central office funds was recurrently difficult, and more support came from the College.

In the midst of the negotiations, as a result of an agreement that the College would chair the planning effort, Cheifetz and Henson[11] decided to hire a planning director whose major responsibility would be to plan the College High School.

Greg Walker, a black with years of experience in education and most recently in a position at a major foundation, was appointed to chair the planning committee in September, 1974. Casual, sardonic, articulate, and optimistic, Walker had dozens of contacts and acquaintances in education, city politics, and funding agencies.

Walker told the researchers later that he had been advised not to take the position by people who knew the history of the early committees and were aware of the length of time it was taking to settle an agreement among College, board, and unions. "The politics are incredible," a former committee chairperson told him.

> It's a mess. It's been a mess, and the best thing for you to do is to maneuver yourself out of it as fast as you can and get someone else to take it over.

Another colleague told him, "Get out of it as fast as possible." Others warned him that "the community will be after you because they want this high school."[12]

But these were not exactly revelations to Walker, given his political knowledgeability. He wanted to get into the municipal university. Besides, he saw the school as a good idea, and felt it was "an incredible opportunity" to carry a project through from the beginning.[13] He accepted the job and began working in September 1974.

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11) We should note that Henson, a longtime dean, submitted his resignation in 1974, but the College persuaded him to remain on until a replacement could be located. The search committee, which was to have made a decision in time for Henson to leave in June 1975, did not make progress, and convinced a very reluctant Henson to stay another semester. The effect of having a shortly-departing superior was probably to leave Walker with a less-strong sense of support, even with Cheifetz' commitment.

12) At the time, there was no high school serving the area of the city around the College, a black and Hispanic ghetto. A community committee lobbying for a high school also had its eye on the High School for the Arts building, and for a brief period of time, one of the early college committees met with the community group. But negotiations fell into shouting matches, and the college broke off the collaboration.

13) Walker may have felt more than his usual optimism since Superintendent Stein, after a delay in construction of the new Arts High School

Negotiations among central office, unions and College were still going on. Irving Haberman, the Executive Director for High Schools, who had originally been opposed to the idea of a campus high school, had become an advocate during the course of the negotiations, Interestingly enough, this put him at odds with the SPA (supervisors and principals' association), which he had headed until 1968 as a principal at Lakeview High School. The agreement was finally completed at an October 1974 meeting, but the two SPA representatives refused to have anything further to do with the planning. Greg Walker, who attended the meeting, said the SPA people "thought the schools were doing all they should be doing, and there was no need for a campus high school." Reminding the group of how a private university's recent effort to found a high school had become a fiasco, the SPA representatives walked out.

But this did not stop the planning. Haberman was still the director of the high school division, to whom all high school principals were ultimately accountable. And his roots in the principalship and the SPA itself gave him legitimacy. The remaining participants--central office, teachers' union, and College--were satisfied with the achieved agreement; it now needed only formal endorsement by the top officials of the constituent groups.

Walker spent the first two months of his tenure mostly reading files and talking to people. In November, Haberman called a meeting, wanting to put together his own group of advisors. Walker called a friend of his at the Board and read off the list of people who would be there. His friend said, "Good luck, Greg. He's brought in all the old guard." When the meeting took place, Greg Walker realized that he did not have full autonomy in the planning of this project:

> I found I was not in the driver's seat as I had been at the foundation. Nobody was deferring to anybody there /at the meeting/.

Irving Haberman had brought people to that meeting who might be interested in working on the planning, as well as those who might be willing to act as advisors. They included two retired assistant superintendents (Victor Rubin and Felix Frey), five high school principals (the principal of Wardour High School, the principal of Eli Whitney High School, serving a completely minority population, the principal of Lakeview High School--Haberman's old school--and the principals of Thomas Jefferson High School and Oliver Wendell Holmes High School). In addition, Frank Henderson, the Director of High Schools for Area A, attended, along with Henson from the college and Caravello for the union. Victor Rubin was interested in working directly with the planning, but the others agreed to serve on a Steering Committee.

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in July of 1974, made an oral promise to "find other space in Area A" for College High School. One possibility was the new Medgar Evers Junior High School, just beginning, but with only 500 students in a 3,000-student space. Several other under-utilized high schools were possibilities.

Constituting the Initial Design Committee. Most of the planning committee members were chosen and/or assigned by their superiors to work on this project. On the central office side, Haberman designated Seymour Hecht to serve. Hecht had just come into this position in November, and had previously been an high school English department chairman and a major planner and implementer in starting up the Reynolds College middle school, another college/school collaboration. Rubin was a volunteer.

On the union side, Caravello designated three teachers, Mike Goodman from Horace Mann (a very successful, new and innovative high school), Ben Blau from Thomas Jefferson, and Robert Jamieson, then a guidance counselor at Horace Mann.

From the college side, Jack Bennett continued his involvement. Abe Gordon, a reading professor, was assigned to the project but said, "I don't mind." Generally, said Walker; "the dean didn't go to tenured faculty for this committee." Through some persuasion, Greg managed to get several liberal arts people assigned to the project, including Moira Williams, a specialist in reading and writing, and Audrey Carter, active in a remediation program. President Cheifetz gave them Paulo Nara, a doctor formerly at MIT and Harvard Public Health, and now the head of Cheifetz' flagship program, the Bio-med program. As Walker said, Nara was "a given."

Diane Levitt, a researcher in the College's institutional evaluation office, was not a formal member of the comittee but came to nearly every meeting.

Ora Haas, a postdoctoral fellow, joined the planning as Walker's assistant in the spring of 1975; she was to play an important role in providing continuity and developing coherent documentation of the committee's products.

Connections within the IDC and to the Steering Committee. As we have noted, things in the Lakeport schools get done politically.

Many people involved either in the IDC or the Steering Committee knew one another from previous contacts. Many of those had been through direct hierarchical, line relationships. For example:

> Rubin had been the assistant superintendent for high schools in Area B, and had been Irving Haberman's boss when Haberman was a principal.
>
> Sy Hecht had been in the English Department at Lakeview High School when Haberman was the principal.
>
> Felix Frey had been the Assistant Superintendent for all high schools, and was Victor Rubin's boss when Victor had been Assistant Superintendent for Area B.
>
> When Greg Walker worked for the foundation, he was asked to

> sit in on the meetings of the Council for Economic Growth. They chose two schools for a partnership: Madison High School, whose principal was Victor Rubin, and Holmes High School, whose principal was and is Herman Fine.

The early meetings. The IDC's first sessions were "interesting," Walker said later. Victor Rubin established a strong and influential position early: "a lot of people deferred to him." Quite naturally, members divided along interest group lines. The union representatives were sensitive to any infringement of teacher rights ("Goodman's line was always, 'It's going to take a contract variance,'" said Walker) and central office administrators were sensitive to challenges to the existing structures and procedures of the central office. In early meetings, tensions also existed between the professors and non-professors on the comittee, based historically on resentment by the high school people toward the superiority and condescension of the college people. Essentially what was being worked out was a basis for mutual collaboration, based on exchange: could each group participating gain benefits from its participation in the planning (credit with superiors, career advancement, and even the satisfactions intrinsic in achieving the new school, perhaps) without risking eventualities such as power loss, setting of unwise precedents, or failure?

Eventually, as the planning progressed, and the reality of opening a school came into question, these divisions would recede into the background. Planners took this to mean that the various interest groups represented on the committee had resolved their differences. In fact, it seemed only that individuals had gotten to know one another--and that the diminishing chance that there would ever be a College High School had reduced the pressure to work out conflicting interests. But in these early stages, there was much wariness about each group's interest vis a vis that of the others; as one planner said, "The first meetings were essentially jockeying."

And what to one group were firm boundaries and constraints seemed initially like empty rituals to the other. As Rubin said later:

> When we presented some of the parameters there was a certain feeling of annoyance; they /the College people/ felt the organizational pattern was the tail wagging the dog. You had to educate them to the fact that there are some restrictions...one of the most annoying to them was that we didn't have the free rein of choice of personnel.

In a sense, what gradually began to happen was that each party to the planning tacitly began to accept as real the boundaries regarded as constraints by the other parties, in exchange for continued collaboration. Thus a sort of shared least-common-denominator set of constraints emerged. Merton (1968) has defined "ritualization" in non-sacred terms as what happens when institutionalized means are pursued without simultaneous

attention to goals. While the work of the IDC was far from ritualized at this point, the seeds for it were already sown.

Power in these early meetings began accruing to Victor Rubin because of his past planning experience, his former high position within the educational bureaucracy, and his personal style.

Rubin, also a careerist with the school system, had retired several years earlier from his assistant superintendency post, but had many friends in the system, and was still actively involved in a number of interesting and innovative projects. He had been central to the planning of Horace Mann High School, an innovative, high-quality school in Area B, and to the experimental Metro Academy, as well as a number of less successful efforts. Rubin did get some payment for his post-retirement work, but mainly he did it because he was interested in doing something for kids, as he explained to a researcher:

> I've given so many years to education, more than 45, and I've always been interested in experimentation because I happen to love kids, particularly adolescents.

Less charitably, as one IDC member put it, "Victor likes to meddle." He enjoyed having a finger in many pies, exerting influence.

Victor did a lot of joking and teasing, but was pretty hard-bitten and tough underneath. He had clearly been a member of the inner circle at the central office and still retained much of his status. His information on the workings of the central office, however, was often outdated, and he was no longer privy to the daily intrigues of the Area A schools. As we shall see, Rubin's power increased over the course of planning and he became a central figure.

Reporting back. The IDC was scheduled to make its first report to its parent Steering Committee in February of 1975. Held in the midst of a snowstorm, the meeting began with a "comedy of errors": Haberman's driver could not get him to the meeting because of the snow, he had to take public transportation like an ordinary human being, missed connections with the Committee's car, and trudged on foot to the meeting. After that start, the meeting got worse: Haberman argued with the union's Caravello for "2¼ hours," Walker said, over whether there should be two parents or three (or any students at all) on the planning committee. (Caravello regarded the latter figure as infringing on professionals' prerogatives, since there were only three teachers on the committee.) Though there was finally agreement to

include parents,[14] Haberman went on to pooh-pooh the IDC's request for official recognition of its existence, and ended the meeting with a deprecating, "I expected you would be handing me a curriculum."

The retreat. After the disastrous meeting, Victor said "We've got to get away or they'll kill us." He had had successful experience with intensive planning sessions before, and advocated a weekend retreat away from the city.

The meeting, held in March at a resort hotel ("but none of them saw the swimming pool") and financed by the College, was indeed a success. Jim O'Neill, though not a committee member, came and provided strong facilitative help. Seymour Hecht said later, "There was a kind of team building that I don't think exists in any of the entities internally"; Victor Rubin said, "There was a mutual respect that developed." Walker himself, who earned a reputation as a taskmaster by wielding "a Prussian blue marker" on the newsprint, said:

> The principal thing that came out of it was trust, and agreement that they weren't going to let Caravello and Haberman do their bargaining in front of them at those /Steering Committee/ meetings. There was an incredible willingness to work...The camaraderie was really built up....Audrey, Mike, and Moira got together and wrote the philosophy, and we agreed how to implement a lot of it.

The committee produced, in effect, the beginnings of a vision for the school. It had an 8-point philosophy which began with the importance of "humanizing" the school, stressed "learning to learn," and proposed organizing the school into a series of "families" (smaller student groups, each with shepherding faculty members). The retreat had used drafting subcommittees followed by full-group discussion, and after the retreat, the committees continued work, hashing out the conceptual and operational issues in various aspects of the plan. There were committees on "learning how to learn" (content, approach, integration into the family structure); bilingual education (whether to emphasize mastery of English with a gradual phasing out of native languages or

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14) The committee realized their legitimacy might be enhanced if they involved parents. They were hampered because the school would draw students from all over Area A. And because the school did not exist yet, there was no organized parents' group for it. They finally decided in the late spring to invite a few parents from potential "feeder schools." Caravello vetoed this idea promptly, and the committee subsequently never made more than token efforts to involve parents, complaining that "they wouldn't come."

Finally, by October of that year, a few parents did attend. The committee members did not orient the parents or explain their

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building the two languages equally); and "the family" (its size, structure, content).

In late May, the IDC presented its products to the Steering Committee, who were satisfied and impressed. Walker said later:

> Caravello only objected to one word. Haberman would ask a question, and the committee would say, "That's page 26," and he would say, "Have you guys memorized this?.../Finally/ Haberman said, "I know we've got a budget problem, but this is really important. Proceed as if everything's going to be okay."

With this imprimatur, it looked as if work could continue. There were differences: though Walker felt (and said to the Steering Committee) that "there's now a genuine commitment to develop a school in a collaborative relationship," Sy Hecht thought that the group had by July reached "a kind of plateau" because of growing budgetary uncertainties.. But even he was impressed:[15]

> It's demonstrated that a variety of educational constituencies can cooperate to plan educational facilities. And secondly, we found there is a broad base of agreement concerning substantive issues. The disagreement has not been on the why or the what, but rather on the how.

Of course, disagreements on "how" are never trivial: their resolution ultimately makes actualization of a dream possible or not. But basically, the IDC had accomplished more in the three days of their planning than they had so far--or would over most of the rest of their life together. Members constantly called up the memory of this shared experience; at first, it was to point to elements of the plan or aspects of the basic philosophy. After a while, it became a "myth of the rosy past" in which the committee had functioned efficiently, effectively,

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role, and put on one of their worst displays of confusion and circular discussion (see below). The parents were appalled ("No wonder the schools are in such a mess."), and left, never to return.

15) Hecht had been involved in the successful implementation of Reynolds Middle High School, a high school on the campus of a community college, and as Director of ACCORD had given a lot of thought to the relationship between colleges and high schools. Creative, smart, and innovative, Hecht was not at all the hardened bureaucrat. While he was one of the most influential on the IDC, he was not that high up in the central administration and thus tended to go the safe, personal route rather than buck the system too much.

and produced a product which was highly owned by all. Planners came to blame their current failings on the tensions caused by not being "able" to separate from their daily pressures and spend concentrated, intensive amounts of time on the planning.

The researchers' entry. Our project entered this flow of events in mid-April, with an interview with Greg Walker and Jack Bennett. After reviewing their history and hearing our proposals (non-interventive documentation, some questionnaires, occasional reports, matching funds for consultation, anonymity protected in products), Walker and Bennett said they liked the idea of collaborating with the research project, and would be our advocates at an upcoming meeting, where the decision would need to be made. As Bennett explained:

> This group is not great on decision making; they talk a lot and are not fast on making decisions.

As it turned out, the IDC did spend an hour and a half at its May 9 meeting on this topic. The themes discussed included the nature of consulting assistance (Rubin seemed dubious both about the "process" assistance which Miles said was being offered, and about one of the specific consultants mentioned, Carl Starner, who before his work with the Council for Economic Growth had been the head of a radically innovative alternative high school); the growing size of the committee (Ben Blau used the researchers' potential addition as a diversion into his view that there was insufficient LFT representation),[16] whether meetings should be taped (both Moira Williams and Jack Bennett expressed reservations and Greg activated his earlier-expressed rule ("if anyone objects to taping, we won't do it")); and reservations about on-paper questionnaires (from Sy Hecht). Though no crisp decision was actually reached, Walker acted as if one had been (he had already reassured Blau and Jamieson that adding new union members would be no problem) and the group moved on to the rest of the agenda. A contract agreement was signed by Miles, Walker, Hecht, and Mike Goodman (Walker had suggested the importance of their involvement) on June 6, 1975. Regular access to Steering Committee meetings was not a part of the agreement.

The meetings held during the remainder of the academic year focused on subcommittee presentations, addresses by invited speakers and discussions of the various components of the program for the high school. The year ended in June with a dinner ostensibly arranged for the purpose of attracting parents to participate on the planning committee, but no parents attended.

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16) This seemed in part to stem from the fact that an increasing number of College people, hearing of the success of the retreat, had asked to join the committee: as Blau said, "I feel outnumbered."

By this time, the extent and depth of the citywide fiscal crisis was beginning to make itself felt. The planners began to wonder uneasily what the future of College High School would be.

Planning amid uncertainty. With the resumption of planning in September 1975, the IDC entered a new phase that was to remain largely unaltered until May 1976, when a temporary director of the new school was appointed. The primary feature of this period was increased uncertainty as a result of the fiscal crisis; amid recurrent talk of city "bankruptcy," the planners wondered not only if there would be a College High School, but--at their most apocalyptic--whether there would be a Lakeport.

The uncertainty raised fundamental questions: should the group continue planning? Was it reasonable to expect to open a new school when all school construction in the city had been frozen? Was it even frivolous to think about a new school when high schools in Lakeport were underutilized as it was, and when educational services once thought essential --guidance, art, library, foreign languages--were being curtailed?

There were also more personal concerns: some members, particularly the College faculty members, most of whom were untenured, faced insecurity in the face of a massive "retrenchment" program. As it turned out, only Diane Levitt was laid off (in the summer of 1976), but many were worried.

Increasingly frustrated by spinning their wheels and not moving any closer to implementation, the planners tried to force the issue to a head. To a November 25th Steering Committee meeting, for example, they submitted a report of their work, concluding with this plea:

> The committee has felt hamstrung by the uncertainty and ambiguity of our role in times when new rumors seem to be generated at the rate of one per hour. In order to facilitate our work and to remove the cloud of doubt which is hovering over an activity which will ultimately require more tax-levy finds, we respectfully raise the following questions.

The report then asks whether a temporary facility could be identified given the likelihood that the new Arts High building would not materialize until 1979 or 1980 and raises timetable questions (opening September 1976 or 1977, and when a principal or director, and subject chairmen, would be appointed).

But the report made no specific demands for when, or by whom, such answers should be given. In any case, little happened at the meeting to increase certainty. Felix Frey, the retired director of high schools for Area B, said privately to Walker and Rubin: "You can't stop." He pointed out that virtually every special project he'd been associated with had gone "two steps forward and maybe five steps back," and exhorted them from the perspective of a careerist:

> You keep going, and maybe one day you're going to trick the central office into endorsing something, and then you'll get it. You should not stop, and should not even consider the possibility of affiliating with an existing school /a possibility the IDC had already broached/.

Greg Walker said in the meeting to Haberman:

> Try as we may, it has been very difficult to do any real planning. There is a new horror story every day, and I'm sure it's just as bad for you as it is for us. Everyone on this committee wants to continue work. We need some direction. We need to know if the location will become available.

Though Haberman replied that "in terms of the basic idea, we are very much in favor of it," he was not very committal.

> We would like the thinking to continue on this school, but we're in the same box you are. There is a rumor that there will be judgment in January considering the frozen construction. We will be asking, what is most important? It will depend on how we can shuffle our alternatives.

He then went on to say vaguely:

> Some effort will be made to continue the thinking of this project in the form of a model or design for students...I see many ideas that can be useful even if the worst happens.

But he gave mo real assurances, and only when Floyd Henson asked that the two Boards "act in some way to make this official" and Victor fervently said:

> There's been a pall over our meetings. We're asking "Is this whole thing a charade?" If the Board expressed interest in a written communication, it would give us a feeling of confidence that you are with us.

did Haberman reluctantly offer:

> I will address the note to the Superintendent indicating what you've said. It takes a long time.

But it is unknown whether he actually did so. And no one ever held him to his promise. None of the agreements or understandings reached in these meetings was formalized in signed documents or minutes of the meet-

ings. It had become clear that the IDC did not have control over the right to stop planning. Walker said more than once, "The Superintendent and the President of the College say to keep planning." His tone of voice indicated that the committee had to comply.[17]

The committee's thoughts, and naturally Walker's, turned to questions of obtaining funds elsewhere. President Cheifetz, according to Walker, "went public" and stated that his new $25 million development campaign included support of the effort. But $25 million was a long way off. The Committee spent a good deal of effort on proposal-writing, approaching six different foundations, brokered by Walker's past contacts, without success. No additional planning or operational funds could be found.

Committee working style. From the fall of 1975 straight through to June of 1976--the period during which all of the early planning was completed--the IDC established, and rarely deviated from, what we came to realize was a "circular" pattern of work. Decisions were made, unmade, remade, forgotten, abandoned, resuscitated; everything was connected to everything else; the planning process felt like that involved in attacking an endless bowl of spaghetti with a rubber teaspoon.

It is not easy to communicate this flavor via single excerpts, but here are some samples from the September 28, 1975 meeting, the IDC's first after the summer break, during a discussion of "the family":

Abe: What excites me is the family, but nobody seems to know what we're talking about....We should form, for a change, our concept of the family.

Sy: We shouldn't be hamstrung by what's being done now. If you take class size as it is now, it's too large.

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17) The reader should not necessarily conclude that delays by Haberman and Stein were personally caused. In addition to the normal political tensions, now exacerbated by the fiscal issues and the construction freeze, the building of new schools in Lakeport typically involved coordination among two major central office divisions (for school planning and school construction), district school boards, the city planning commission, the mayor's office, the city budget bureau, the city's interagency site selection committee, and more than a dozen other agencies and groups. Many of these agencies were outside the school system's central office, and several could exert veto power. So, delay was normal.

Victor: Yes and no.

Abe: ...We have to work on our concept of the family: what it can do, its size, the nuts and bolts.

Moira: Would it be possible to simulate this in the spring with some 8th grade students?

Victor: It's premature....We have to set up the general plan and the functions to implement it. There's no sense in beginning to study a process without knowing what your end purpose is...

...

Abe: What makes the family unique is the opportunity to demonstrate organizational and communication skills. The teachers are usually only concerned with content. We could have a time every week to work on this.

Victor: Forget periods. Once you set up the family, there's no such thing as a period. The teachers set up the time schedule unto themselves.

Abe: Okay, but you're still dealing with 220 minutes of instruction. They can't cut it up any way they like...

Jack: Abe, aren't you going into functions when Victor is talking about organization? The problem is how are we going to use teacher and student time.

Paulo: You're into new subjects.

Victor: Abe was saying we'll have teachers teach all subjects...

Mike: You're alluding to a more basic problem. Teachers are assigned on the basis of 34 to 1; unless arranged contractually, you can't get the number of teachers /being proposed/.

Jack: The teacher's time responsibility is not equivalent to the family. Each teacher has to teach beyond the family.

Jim: I'm a little confused. There are four teachers in each family, and three subjects assigned to a family. What does that other teacher do?

Victor: Good question. I think if we get bogged down with the shape or sharp refinements, we'll never understand it...

Mike: As I envisioned it, the fourth teacher would be rotated.

Victor: My immediate reaction is that the fourth teacher circulates or would be in music.

...

Paulo: By contract, for every 50 minutes and 34 students you have to have one teacher.

Mike: Multiplied by five.

Sy: I don't understand it. I'm lost.

Paulo: You have 4 teachers and 200 minutes, 8:00 to 11:40, right?

Mike: You're now into another problem...A teacher can't be required to have 200 straight minutes of instruction.

...

Diane: Maybe this kind of family set-up is wrong. We want to create an atmosphere of responsibility toward each other. Do we have to work it around subjects at all?...the family could be thought of as a well-supervised project. They do nothing but work on student problems.

Mike: On a daily basis?

Diane: Maybe 2 or 3 times a week?

Victor & Mike: Why not both? /subjects and problems/

Diane: That sounds like last spring: we're back and forth with teacher time, subject matter, state requirements. If you have a particular time set aside, they can work together.

Victor: That sounds so amorphous--I can't even put my teeth into it.

...

Mike: We're losing sight of the goal...we have become so obsessed with the family that we don't take into account that they might become tired of each other, they might need to meet other people.

Victor: The problem is too much time together.

Diane: I'd like to go back to the idea that I thought the family was to build in responsibility, build in time to serve the progress of the students.

Victor: For what?

Diane: Periodically to work in a relationship of students and teachers.

Victor: Periodically they can work on anything, because it's a flexible program.

Diane: They can handle student problems.

Victor & Mike: That's what we have been saying. That's the purpose of the family. We're losing the purpose of the family.

Diane: I'm not sure that I see that anymore.

In a break after this exchange, Paulo saw the researcher in the men's room and said:

> It's an exercise in futility. They just go around in circles.

The researcher's reflections at the end of the day were:

> They are not manageable; they roam all over the place; no firm decisions are made. They can't eliminate contingencies to the point they can make decisions. The family scheme looks good on paper, but when it gets to the point of group discussion, they seem to go right back to where they began... The participants lack power: they all have to rely on second, third and fourth parties, and don't know how they will respond. Seems to me that until they get these basic issues straightened out, they'll just keep going around in circles.

The other researcher at this meeting reflected:

> It was a terribly depressing meeting...the amount of uncertainty was tremendous. They were not dealing well with the uncertainty, nor did they seem willing to face some of the most basic questions that confronted them....They spent a lot of time going around in circles....I knew damn well they were going to get hung up in the family for hours as they had in the past, yet it surprised me that Greg as a leader didn't restrict the discussion...the discussion was the same thing that they had been discussing since the beginning of the committee. They hadn't really made progress on it....They are floundering, in desperate need of

> consulting help...someone to take them in hand and say, "Wait a minute, your priorities are all screwed up..." and help in answering basic questions about when to open, what to do in the face of all the uncertainty, what kinds of sites would completely kill the objectives and what ones could be gotten around to make it work.

That even two relatively dispassionate researchers could get this frustrated by the committee's working style may say something about members' feelings: they were often frustrated and upset, complaining of circularity and unproductivity, and of loss of original ideas.

We have already noted that massive fiscal uncertainty, and the relatively weak power base of the IDC: these factors undoubtedly encouraged circular discussions. So did the generally vague and non-specific meta-plan, which was never formulated in "what if..." contingency terms. But there were also problems internal to the committee, including the leadership styles of key people and what seemed like a generally low level of group meeting skill.

Greg Walker's style tended to be passive and non-directive; he usually did not attempt to focus the group's work or improve the structure of planning activities. Indeed, his only comment was an occasional: "Here we go again," when the group became hopelessly enmeshed in a circular discussion. His "laid back" style--he even sometimes wandered around the group taking pictures with his Nikon--was in sharp contrast to the "Prussian blue" characterization of the retreat--a role which he had assumed mainly because of group interest and involvement. He sometimes came a half hour or more late for the start of meetings. It is possible his interest was waning: during the winter of 1976 he was one of several candidates for the position being vacated by Dean Henson of the School of Education.[8]

Victor Rubin exerted a good deal of informal leadership. But it seemed mainly devoted to getting his own way amid all the confusion, not to group accomplishment. During meetings, he often successfully introduced "instant agenda" items--topics that were of interest to him but not necessarily relevant to the group discussion at the moment. He also interrupted often, used teasing ("you missed my words of wisdom") and ridicule (for example, referring to people who disagreed with him as "barbarians"), and acknowledged his own centrality humorously ("After my presentation, you'll be so enlightened that we won't have any trouble reaching a decision."). He often seemed not to listen to others, and was a master of the argumentative fine distinction that left others confused.

The power structure of the planning group was based to a large extent on ability to control the flow of discussion by any means, disruptive or not. There was often plenty of disorganization: Abe Gordon

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8) After reading this, Walker wrote:

> I take exception to the statement that I became more interested in becoming the Dean than in carrying through

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sometimes interrupted discussion with the virtuous comment, "I'm fighting chaos here." But he was nearly as often the user of the "instant agenda" ploy as was Victor.

Sy Hecht had many innovative ideas, but tended to stifle much of the potential creativity of the committee as well as its ability to move forward with a problem because of his constant admonition to avoid breaking bureaucratic rules and to consider the proper protocol before acting. Of course, Hecht's information could have facilitated planning, but instead it tended to interact with the other constraints and diversions of the group in a non-constructive way.

The women members of the group were generally less powerful than the men. Diane Levitt, who was perhaps the most influential of the women (after Moira Williams left), found herself in strong disagreement with the plans and actions contemplated by the men. After exhausting discussions that frequently bordered on angry arguments, Diane's suggestions were usually ignored. Though Ora, Audrey and Helena were all highly interested in and devoted to the basic ideas of a campus high school, they found themselves in weak positions for influencing the plan. But they voiced their displeasure with the planning process in the corridors, in the ladies' room, and over lunch--rarely during the meetings.

The planning committee reflected the distribution of power in American society: the most powerful members were old, "experienced" men and the least powerful were young, "inexperienced" women.

The members of the IDC were not as foolish as these characterizations may make them sound. Individually they were bright, and initially possessed of a good deal of commitment to the ideas they had developed at the retreat. But they were not particularly skilled in group decision-making, and they now had little support from their formal leader. On top of this, we speculate that the environmental uncertainty had induced a sort of loss of meaning: ideas they thought in the flush of trusting success at the retreat were clear and exciting had lost their sparkle, or turned out to have hidden disagreements in them, or both: they fell to bickering. And the uncertainty probably reactivated people's old concerns for status maintenance: if the group's task was now unclear, then individuals might as well occupy themselves with who was winning and who losing.

So in general the committee gave itself little opportunity for orderly discussion, systematic reflection on the events around it, or even voting on decisions. The pattern that evolved, along with the circularity, might be termed a "chaotic tyranny," with the strongest influence over the few decisions that did emerge coming from Victor Rubin.

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> on this particular project...As it is stated...it would appear that I was spending my time politicking for the position when that was not possible to do since the Search Committee was particularly painstaking and slow in its work. All I could do was wait.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Walker's comments is the implication that "politicking" would have been the natural thing for him to do in the circumstances.

Consultant intervention. In November, noting that few of the research sites in the over-all project had availed themselves of the matching consultant funds available to them, Miles suggested to several consultants at a meeting that they experiment with approaching planning groups to offer their services. Two of the consultants, Edward Karnes and Louisa Barrett, decided to call Greg Walker; Miles had discussed them as early as July with Greg Walker, who did not initiate.

We detail here the history of their work with the group, because it provides an additional perspective on what was happening, from the point of view of outsiders who were attempting to be helpful.

At a meeting with Karnes and Barrett in early December, Walker welcomed the consultants' assistance, saying that they could well be useful to the committee in reducing "pessimism," aiding stronger task orientation and better planning, though he did not minimize the severe uncertainties. Karnes and Barrett said they would rather come to the committee and make a collaborative diagnosis with them (though they did not hesitate to get into an extended discussion with Walker of cooperative and competitive ways of organizing classrooms when he began speaking about the "family" proposal, and got quite involved with the need for "start-up" training for the new school, not to mention linkage between the planners and the final implementers). Walker pointed out that he could not "impose" the consultants on the group, and they would have to make a working contract with the group; Karnes and Barrett accepted this.

At a December 15 meeting, Karnes said he could be a "process consultant" to the group, "raising what's on everyone's mind.../perhaps/ focusing on who in the group has power to make a decision." Not surprisingly, Victor objected almost immediately, saying that process commentary "wouldn't be productive"; Karnes' riposte ("Now we see how this group makes decisions.") did not help him with Victor. Karnes offered to make up an evaluation questionnaire for use at the end of the meeting, but when he produced it later, the group did not fill it out (Abe said, "I don't think it would work.") and Victor said he "didn't think your observations were accurate" when Karnes commented that the ideas of a new college-student member had not been used.

At the next meeting in mid-January, Louisa Barrett presented a broader band of types of consulting help she might offer, including planning skills, problem-solving, alternative organizational forms, and even the content of programs (such as bilingual education); this seemed to trigger the committee into a long, stocktaking listing of issues they needed to deal with, including the use of subcommittees, clarification of their tasks (such as "learning to learn"), the current conception of the "family" aspect of the school, and community participation. Barrett drew a graphic picture on the newsprint to show that schools had such features as administrative systems, curriculum, incentives and structure and objectives--while existing in an external environment (Board, superintendent, etc.). But after some responsive

discussion, the group fell into confused, circular wrangling over what subcommittees should do. Karnes pointed out:

> One of the things that's been happening here is instant agenda. Every point that has been brought up is valid, but it is like playing a volleyball game with a baseball bat.

Abe said, "You're right--and you're doing it right now." Finally the group moved toward constituting new subcommittees to deal with the various problem areas. But when Karnes asked how he and Barrett could be helpful to the subcommittees, Victor said:

> I'll tell you what you can do, you can go to the library for us, be a gofer.

A fieldworker's view, expressed in her notes after this meeting, was:

> I think Karnes is regarded with great suspicion. Barrett was listened to but nobody took her advice.... The committee seemed to be worried that the consultants would take them off the track. They don't realize at all how off the track they have been for months... I wonder whether a process consultant can be of any use to people who don't understand how a consultant works.

The consultants came to two more meetings: Karnes to a subcommittee meeting on "learning how to learn" on January 26, and both he and Barrett to a general meeting on March 1. Karnes felt frustrated: his efforts to point out that the committee's procedures were confusing to him were treated as criticism, and Audrey, the chairman, resisted his comments. He abruptly tried to offer a short "learning exercise," which was rejected, and the group left without deciding whether he should come to their next meeting.

At the March 1 meeting, devoted to the subcommittee report and other issues, both consultants made various comments and suggestions, including the idea that the subcommittee tasks had not been clearly defined (denied by Victor), that the audience needed to be clear for the report (Audrey said it was), and that the group needed to be clearer on its "social architecture" and avoid "instant agenda"; Karnes also tried to reflect and summarize areas of agreement and disagreement on the "learning to learn" topic. The question of future use of the consultants was put off to the next meeting. But they were not asked back, though Greg promised Karnes, "I'll bring it up."[18]

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18) When he did later on, several IDC members expressed shock at the consultants' daily fee ($200)--underlining their view that no help had been received.

In reflecting on the experience later, Karnes gave his diagnosis to a researcher:

> My hypothesis is that they do not have a clear mechanism as to how they're going about planning this...every day they get together is like their first day...there's no continuity...they're taking old stuff they've done before and saying, okay, let's put that together here. I'm not prepared to say flatly that they're doing problem-solving poorly: maybe they've got a gismo I don't see. /But/ they present prefabricated, individualistic opinions. There's very little collaborative work going on, really...I tell you what I've always believed, you tell me what you've always believed, and that's it....I find myself very thirsty to be able to answer the question of what motivates them to keep coming.

When asked how he felt about his consulting efforts, Karnes joked, "They don't very much listen to each other, so they don't listen to us either." His view of the causes of the group's working style had three parts:

> The vacuum of /Greg's/ leadership /though he had mentioned Seymour and Victor as "power brokers"/; all the ambiguities and odds; the differing work cultures /central office and College/.

Barrett stressed a somewhat different set of issues.

> Those people were working under enormous constraints. No. 1, working on a project, the funding of which seemed absolutely in the realm of...fantasy...a black cloud which existed all the time. No. 2, the chairman is also interested in getting the deanship...and a lot of energy was going into that. No. 3, the people there are not even sure of their own careers in terms of how fiscally certain they could be about their futures. No. 4...it was hard to understand what their original charge was. No. 5, in industry, I have never seen a situation where the person who was going to run it was not there for the planning...otherwise it is an exercise in futility.

She also commented that "they are planning in much greater detail than is necessary," and like Karnes, noted that "you never knew who was going to be there and there was no continuity."

So it seemed that the consultant most concerned with environmental issues had made the least intervention, partly because she seemed more at home with industrial rather than educational clients. And the consultant most preoccupied with the group's ineffective internal functioning

had tried the most to help, often with what looked like vague or unskillful interventions. Neither had much useful effect, perhaps because, skillful or not, both were tacitly inviting increased commitment and problem-solving energy in a setting where their unwilling clients had nearly concluded that their situation was unworkable.

Planning continues. Despite the persistent and fundamental problems of the enterprise at the "macro" level, the IDC continued work, in its circular style, at the micro level. There was a running debate: should they simply outline the plan and leave room for implementers, or should they be very detailed, try to "teacher-proof" the design? Mostly they opted for specifics, but seemed to make little progress. They were also recurrently preoccupied with the site: should they consider starting the program off-campus somewhere in a temporary accommodation--or would that damage the "campus" concept too severely?

Why did the planners keep coming to meetings and going through the motions? Why had their meetings become essentially ritualistic, empty of anything but their own recurring forms? There are several possible reasons. First, most of the members had been assigned to work on the project by their superiors, and they had the "time in their program." And since they had been told that they should "keep planning," there was no question of actually disbanding the committee.

The more powerful members of the committee, like Victor Rubin and Seymour Hecht, were accustomed to "planning for the shelf." They knew of numerous situations where such plans had eventually been implemented. While this is not to say that they would choose this model over others, they did have some confidence that if they continued, something might come of it.

Certainly, for the men at least, the group provided a certain kind of camaraderie. They joked and laughed, went out to lunch together and exchanged gossip and information. They didn't include the women in this intimacy, and sometimes their joking was embarrassing and sexist.

So there were ritualistic, socio-emotional gains from continuing to "plan," along with the ritualistic instrumental comfort of the "planning for the shelf" model.

There is no doubt that each individual on the committee had a certain genuine commitment to the project--and each had skills which theoretically could have contributed tremendously to the school's development, had they been properly drawn out and integrated.

Finally, there were also potential opportunities for various members of the committee contained in the planning. For some, there was the possibility of a position with the school. Others had projects they

hoped they could get into the school: Abe Gordon, for example, wanted to include his specially-developed reading and writing program as a prototype for remedial efforts.

A new planning director. In mid-March 1976, the search committee decided on Greg Walker to replace Floyd Henson as the new Dean of the School of Education. Walker, who would begin work as Dean in July, did not choose a successor immediately, and told the committee that he might remain as project director. By April, however, Walker had settled on a suitable replacement, Walter Jackson, a young black professor of elementary education whom Sy Hecht had known in graduate school. This decision was made behind closed doors and handed down to the committee; members had little or no opportunity to participate in the selection (though Hecht's favorable opinion of Jackson was known to Walker).

Walker did little to orient Jackson, however, and often continued, as we shall see, to exert a good deal of influence outside of meetings on key decisions. Jackson, who initially gave promise of acting more vigorously and managerially than had Walker, tended to pull back. He had only half time to give the committee, and as late as September had difficulty remembering the names of key committee members in an interview with a researcher. And, as Sy Hecht mused later:

> I think Walter was more in a position where he felt it was necessary to take his cues from Greg and probably from superintendent Henderson as well.

A temporary site surfaces. Unexpectedly, in late April 1976, after a personal initiative from Victor Rubin, Herman Fine, principal of Holmes High School, agreed to allow College High School to open on the top floor of the Oliver Wendell Holmes High School Annex during the following academic year. This alternative site, located near Lakefront Arts Center, had first been proposed and rejected as early as September 1975 because of its non-campus, non-autonomous nature.

Fine, one of the most senior principals in Lakeport, was highly thought of by central office people, administrators, the union, and some outsiders to the system (for example, the Council for Economic Growth). Known to run "a tight ship," Fine was happy to get back to his school after a one-year term as the acting Superintendent of High Schools for Area A, directly under Haberman, in the role regularly occupied by Frank Henderson.

Although the annex plan had been agreed to by Haberman, Henderson, now back in his regular position, suggested that the IDC consider another site, Eli Whitney High School, for the innovation, on the basis that there was a greater need there. Henderson felt that Holmes already had many extra enrichment programs, and that the school was a showcase, not a

disaster in need of aid.[19] In fact, Whitney was all-black and Hispanic, and faced with many more problems than Holmes.

To comply with Henderson's request (actually, demand), the IDC organized excursions to both schools--in part to discover whether it took longer to get to Whitney by public transportation, a factor which they felt might concern College faculty members. There were strong advocates for Whitney on the committee, including Walter Jackson, the newly named committee director. But Victor, aided by the usual lack of organization, persisted: he respected Fine and wanted the school there. The group finally moved into considering Holmes preferable--partly because the Whitney department heads were traditional, and opposed the project. The question of whether faculty members thought "other" faculty members would be uneasy with the trip through deteriorating areas of the city to Whitney, rather than the direct (but no briefer, it turned out) ride to Lakefront, never surfaced very directly.

Haberman was informed of the decision, and approved it--though not in writing. He wanted a September opening, but the planners, worried about time pressure, succeeded in moving the date to February, 1977.

So College High School had a site, even though it was temporary; it was not on the campus, and was part of another school.

In June, Mike Goodman[20] was appointed the Acting Director of College High School. We shall review this decision, along with the Holmes site

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19) Henderson, who had been on sabbatical leave from September 1974 until August 1975, had been involved in the early work of the IDC, including negotiating the agreement between central office, the College & the uniors. A black man who was considered fairly conservative on the subject of innovative projects, Henderson was not actively re-involved by the IDC when he returned to his position in September 1975. It was suggested by planning participants that Henderson might have been miffed at having been ignored in the discussions about alternative sites for the CHS, especially in view of the planners' desire to locate in Area A, Henderson's area of jurisdiction.

20) Goodman, not yet 30,* had been a social studies teacher at Horace Mann High School, where he had been since the new, innovative school opened in 1971 in Area B. Active on the LFT's committee on innovation, Goodman had worked with Rubin on the completion of the Horace Mann plan, and with Rubin and Robert Jamieson on the redesign of Benjamin G. Hall High School, an integration effort. Goodman was realistic about the constraints, but had also seen that an Area A high school could be innovative and humane. Fast-talking, aggressive, and on his way up, Goodman's influence in the committee had increased as time wore on.

*After reading this, Ora Haas recalled:

> I remember his celebrating his 29th birthday during the planning. It made a deep impression on me, because I had always assumed he was older.

decision, shortly. Here we only point out that the appointment of Goodman, like that of Jackson, was done without consulting the full committee. To our knowledge, only Walker,[21] Rubin, Hecht and Goodman himself were finally involved. Haberman approved the decision--once again, informally. This action concluded what we have labelled the Early Planning Period.

Key Goals, Aspects of the Vision

So far, we have emphasized the processual aspects of the planning. What had been achieved, substantively speaking, by this point?

Although there was often disagreement over the means to achieving the innovative goals, there was reasonable consensus that the chief--if rather abstract--goal was to create a "humane" school environment, one that would foster a highly supportive socio-emotional climate and respond to needs of the target population of low-income black and Hispanic students. This was the underpinning of the educational philosophy of the school formulated at the retreat in March of 1975.

The primary organizational device for creating a "humane" school was the "family". The "family" was described in planning documents as follows:

> If a large urban high school is to be a humane institution, it is essential that each student have a small, relatively stable group of staff and students with whom he can relate on a continuous basis. The student's identification with this group provides the bridge between his own private world and the larger institution. It gives him a sense of belonging to the school and provides him with a forum for expressing his individual interests, frustrations, and views.

The committee also developed a range of academic programs. A basic skills program with the target of eliminating functional illiteracy was envisioned as aimed at the core teaching objective of the school. Along with this, students would be encouraged to "learn how to learn," that is, acquire study habits and critical abilities and understand the use of information. Other programs envisioned for the school were: moral education, community-oriented learning opportunities outside of the school, bilingual education, and career education (bio-medical, engineering, etc.)

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21) As early as December of 1975, Walker had thought that Robert Jamieson would be "ideal". We do not know why he moved away from this position, but Jamieson's new appointment as a potential assistant principal at Appelbaum High School may have been a factor.

Typically, the committee spent almost all its time on generating specific instructional components, such as those just named--and very little time on how they would be actualized in a real, living, breathing organization called a school, especially a school which was to link two parent institutions. This had severe consequences.

For one thing, the "family" itself went through many vicissitudes. It was originally seen as a home-base group involving no more than 25 students, a few faculty members, guidance counselors and paraprofessionals, which would integrate the learning experiences from other program components. But when Victor belatedly discovered clauses in the union contract forbidding some aspects of what was proposed, the "family" eventually ballooned to include 136 students and four faculty members, a structure that did not seem especially "humane". Not surprisingly, this shift left a lot of residual disagreement among the group. And from the beginning it was never quite clear how the various programs and "the family" would interface.

To illustrate this disagreement, we include here some extended excerpts from a May 19, 1975 planning meeting. The excerpt also shows usefully how the substance becomes terribly confused and mixed in this case, largely because of Victor's tenacious insistence on his view (that teachers could not legally be asked to teach with others more than 3 hours daily) and his blocking and ridiculing of others' views. The group had invited a principal from an Area C school who was currently using "clusters". But he was quickly forgotten.

Victor: I'm confused about the overlapping of clusters, and the question of whether these are actually independent schools.

Sy: I think that the house /cluster/ should exist for governance.

...

Victor: The only way to realize this is through a mini-school set-up...my proposal is that we have a mini-school for part of the day, two hours....One other possibility is to set it up like a flexible unit...I can't see this family set-up crossing grade lines.

Helena: You can't?

Diane: (shows chart) During the morning we would have English, math and social studies. And kids would eat lunch with their teachers in their family.

Victor: Independently the faculty and kids function as a separate school of 400.

Sy: I can't get any sense of identity out of 400 kids in one place. It's no different from 4,000. Even 125 is stretching it.

Helena: The idea of 400 kids scares me.

Victor: Express yourself, express yourself, but I'll hit you over the head!

Walker: Even with a house plan of 400, we still can't have it self-contained.

Victor: Are you following this? I'm bewildered. I can't keep all the plans straight. /Begins drawing on newsprint: clusters of 100, staying with one set of teachers for a subject area for two hours./

Helena: What happened to the affective aspects we were talking about?

Victor: We're only dealing with the organizational aspects now.

...

Sy: We've been hung up assuming that kids will take traditional classes...With the kids at the top of the spectrum we maybe need individualized instruction, a different kind of teaching. We still need to develop a model for learning how to learn.

Walker: With all the budget cuts and transfers, how the hell are you going to get a different kind of teacher?

Victor: You're right.

Sy: We need a generalist in skills.

Victor: Can't do it.

Sy: Then why don't we just throw in the towel now?

...

Audrey: One of the problems I had with your model is that it doesn't allow for differentiated skills.

Victor: Yes it does within each group, because you divide them up according to your special needs.

Robert: Why can't there be flexibility within the family?

Victor: I said that.

Ora: How about the lowest reading kids?

Victor: Take them and give them remedial reading skills.

Ora: Take them out of the family?

Victor: Can't have your cake and eat it too.

Ora: I'm trying to find out what part of the cake I can't have.

...

Sy: Can we spend the first year breaking out of traditional subject categories?

Victor: How do you teach people to think without a content area? There's whole books on decision-making.

Audrey: The original model we presented at the retreat was that the family would meet 3 times a week. It would be a completely heterogeneous group. We discarded that model because we didn't have a curriculum in mind, but now we can focus on things like decision-making, logic. It means rejecting the model that Victor's presenting.

Victor: Not necessarily, if we agree that the family will take 2 hours, then the teachers can decide what they're going to teach.

Sy: I don't think the teachers or kids alone should decide what's going to be taught. We're looking for cognitive information in a wholesome, affective atmosphere.

Victor: Wholesome and affective are contradictory.

This discussion took place only a few meetings after the retreat, and we should certainly not expect coherence (which in fact did not begin to emerge on this topic until the late fall). But the chaotic and confused character of the discussion, like the September meeting excerpted earlier, is typical of many IDC planning meetings.[22)]

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22) We reject the view that all group discussions are necessarily this incoherent--a view sometimes expressed by IDC members. The reader should examine the description of the P/I group's work in the Arts Coop case for an exhibit of clear, thorough planning methods. Group processes in P/I groups are not mere "froth": they do make a difference in the quality and ownership of planning decisions.

Disagreement on the "family," which was ultimately disagreement on what it would look like organizationally speaking, was not the only substantive problem. Surprisingly, though College High School was to use College resources, the planners did not make any explicit provision for just how professors would be affiliated with the school, to whom they would be accountable, what their roles would be, or what incentives they might have for participating. Somehow it was assumed they would work with "programs," or connect with the "family," but the organizational supports involved were left unspecified.

While the planners were often confused in their discussions of what the school would look like, single spokespersons for the planning could often produce a coherent-sounding plan for the newspapers or for reports to the Steering Committee.[23] In one such article, published after the planning halted, Greg Walker explained the goals and design of the program to a reporter:

> College High School would be financed, like any other city school, by the central office, with some additional support from the college...
>
> Discussing the general goals of the proposed school, Dr. Walker said its innovations would include a 'cluster' or 'family' system in which students would be divided into relatively small groups, each of which would have its own teachers in various subjects. In this way, a student's weaknesses and talents could receive attention from all his teachers. And, 'it would eliminate the anonymity one encounters in most city schools.'
>
> During the freshman and sophomore years, the focus of a student's education would be on basic skills such as reading, writing and mathematics. In the junior and senior years, the focus would be on career education.
>
> Thus, the clusters during the least two years would reflect interest in a particular subject. However, Dr. Walker said, no student would be under pressure

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23) Individual committee members were bright and able, so that on-paper plans for CHS were always quite articulate and well-stated. Ora Haas's hard work between meetings usually resulted in well-written documents. But any given planning document was repeatedly re-discussed and reviewed for elements that had never quite gotten agreed on in reality. The paper plans never revealed this uncertainty. Furthermore, Walker had a gift for presenting a rosy, optimistic picture of the present situation and future possibilities.

to make any commitment about his ultimate vocation.

Students could take advantage of a variety of programs and facilities on the campus, including, for example, the college centers for legal education and for biomedical education.

Also planned is an internship program. A student might work off-campus, or become a trainee on, say, a college newspaper, or work with a professor in the student's field of interest.

Lakeport World, April 19, 1977

Described this way, the vision for College High School seems plausible and attractive. But the fact was that its planners did not even have a sketch of what the organization of the school would look like.

Analysis and Commentary

What can we say about the primary tasks with which the planners were faced, and how they coped with them?

Political stabilization. The primary political strategy that emerged might be labeled "personal politics"--reliance on informal arrangements among people familiar with one another within the educational bureaucracy of Lakeport. A formal agreement on the constitution of the IDC and Steering Committee was never signed, nor was a resolution authorizing (or even favoring) the school. Promises that "space would be found," were obtained personally and orally from the Superintendent; promises to request the Superintendent to firm things up were obtained personally and orally from Haberman. Similarly, when the question arose of whether planning should proceed or not, members of the Steering Committee gave personal assurances to members of the IDC that continued planning would not be pointless. The decision to approach Fine for use of Holmes and the final decision to open the school in the annex were made by three old friends: Rubin, Fine, and Haberman, without involving the entire committee.

Such political arrangements were fairly weak; they were not based on the express wishes of the groups involved but rather on informal arrangements between certain actors; sanctions for non-followthrough could not be invoked. The consequences of this are discussed further below when we review key decisions.

Victor Rubin was often involved in the "personal politics" style, and the weak problem-solving procedures of the group probably permitted him such strategies, just as they permitted him to exert high influence during meetings. From the committee's point of view, Rubin's decisions

and actions often seemed like the "only" alternatives; the combination of his influence tactics and his substantial prior experience in new-school planning was impressive. But reliance on handshakes, oral or literal, as we have seen in the Arts Coop case study, is not enough. Furthermore, when one or another group member assures the rest that he or she can smooth the way personally and effectively with key actors in the environment, it encourages lack of attention to political diagnosis, strategic planning, and the building of a genuine power base.

Personal politics was probably a useful style in keeping outside actors informed, and putting the best possible face on what the committee was producing. We should note that the occasional alternative used (bringing key figures to the committee) backfired several times. The committee's chaotic procedures and internal conflicts were terribly evident to the visiting parents, and the IDC put on a confused show when Herman Fine came to a meeting in March while he was discussing the annex possibility with Rubin.[23]

Knowledge utilization. The IDC's use of expert knowledge tended to be weak. They tended to share the typical Lakeport assumption that there was no need to look outside for special information and knowledge. All of the speakers they invited were from inside the city system and the College, and when they went to conferences, the tendency upon return was to discount the ideas noted as inapplicable to their "special situation."

The committee also did a less than effective job at using the expertise of its own members, which was objectively substantial. Sy Hecht had helped create another campus high school; Rubin had planned many schools; Goodman and Jamieson had aided him; Moira Williams had developed a remedial reading/writing program that received national attention; Ora Haas had done scholarly work on moral education; Walker had been actively involved in many innovative projects at his foundation. But the expertise seemed somehow mutually-cancelling. Williams left the planning in September 1975, with little residue from her work evident; Paulo Nara's strong experience with the biomedical program never got into the discussions, where his suggestions were regularly ignored. There were many other examples. Part of this under-utilization stemmed from the fact that many members defined themselves as experts, and as thus entitled to question the ideas of others while

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23) When we asked Rubin if he thought that this might have damaged the project somewhat in Fine's eyes, Victor replied, "No," because Fine "knew enough about how committees function not to take it too seriously." Still, we cannot discount the possibility that Fine was at best unimpressed.

maintaining their own opinions and their commitment to past experience untouched. And part seemed to come from the absence of work procedures that would help problem-solving be cumulative.

The potential expertise offered by the two outside consultants was largely ignored or derided. Some of this was justifiably due to the consultants' lack of skill in making entry, to their getting trapped in the very difficulties they were hoping to correct, and to misdiagnosis. But part of the result was prefigured in Walker's remark to the consultants:

> The reaction is going to be, well all right, we'll see. But if they can't do us any good, we are not going to waste our time.

The group was skeptical of expert help--particularly, we surmise, expert help that might surface their difficulties, and the lopsided power structure of the group, for corrective examination.[24]

So, in general, the IDC solved the dilemma of knowledge utilization by relying on their own knowledge and past experience--or at least the small portion of that knowledge and experience which survived the mutually-cancelling aspects of their meetings.

Vision development. The image of what the school should be wavered along with the planners' estimation of the prospects that the school could actually open. At times there was also disagreement over the basic mission of the school--for example, whether it would primarily prepare inner-city students for College-oriented careers or simply use the resources of the college for the improvement of general education. Conflict also surfaced over whether the "family" structure could actually perform the humanizing function by itself, and as we have noted, the structure itself was swollen so far after a few meetings that it seemed dubious whether it would work. The committee ignored the implications of the "family" label pointed out by Audrey Carter: the word, and the designated task of providing a supportive, affectively-oriented inte-

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24) We need to explain the exception: Jim O'Neill's successful facilitation at the retreat. We believe (a) O'Neill was closely knowledgeable about the history of the planning, and friendly with many of the College members and thus not an "outsider"; (b) his interventions took place in a setting of commitment, which the IDC had entered at their own request for serious work; (c) his work supported (and was supported by) the exercise of an active leadership role on Walker's part. All these conditions were missing for Karnes and Barrett.

grative environment made a basic assumption about black and Hispanic students, namely, that they lacked primary group affiliations. Even if political sensibilities were not aroused by the label, and if the assumption were correct, it was not clear (a) that the "family" structure could in fact be made to deliver such support by "non-specialized" teachers; (b) that even if such support were delivered, that improved achievement would necessarily result. But this chain of suppositions was never fully traced out by the committee.

Ritualized behavior. We have already alluded to the idea that much of what the IDC did seemed to be repetitive "going through the motions." Some of the repetition, like the circular pattern of group discussions, was generated by lack of group skills and mutual supportiveness. Some of it seemed like "fall-back" behavior: it was comforting to reassure oneself with the view that this project was, like many others, a perfectly workable "planning for the shelf" enterprise, or with the view that things would work out all right if the standard rules were followed.

But as we have noted, ritualized behavior implies means without goal commitment. Is it likely that goal commitment was in fact low in the IDC? The ambiguities of the fiscal crisis probably pushed members in that direction. But high-committed group members would more likely have made contingency plans, been more proactive, thought of circumventive ways around their dilemmas.

If we look carefully at the varying institutional and personal stakes of the participants, there is some evidence for the possibility of low investment in the idea of a successful College High School. If CHS succeeded, it would be satisfying to the College members--but if it failed, they had little to lose; they would simply fall back on their regular teaching. A CHS success would be a feather in Victor's cap, and strengthen Seymour Hecht's hand at the central office. But if it failed, they were not blameable--it was all a matter of the fiscal crisis, the lack of space. A successful school, or a failing one, meant little as far as the basic union concerns were involved. A successful CHS would give Greg a boost--but he had already achieved his objective of entry into the municipal university and could let go of the idea of "seeing a project all the way through."

So union and central office, in particular, adopted a stance of "semi-relaxed wariness": getting the school in place would be fine, but it should be done in such a way as not to make waves, or jeopardize existing stakes. Procedures should be followed. College members, who could not fully understand or initally accept these constraints, finally came to do so as well--we surmise because they too were quite willing to hold the idea of the school "lightly."

So our view here is that the IDC members, for different reasons, pre-defined the "failure" of the College High School planning effort as relatively inconsequential, and had less than passionate commitment

to its success. Under these circumstances, and with the massive environmental uncertainty they were facing, it was easy to fall into ritualized use of stock procedures, both externally (following the rules rather than trying to circumvent them) and internally (repetitive arguing and non-problem-solving; the myth that they could only work well in a "retreat"; locked-in roles, Greg's withdrawal, Victor's argumentativeness, the women's submissiveness); and continuation of planning when it seemed to make little sense.

Key Decisions and Non-Decisions

Dozens of decisions were made, unmade, remade--and non-made--during the early planning period. We review a few here that seemed to have most import for the enterprise.

A basic political decision was to accept--and continue accepting--the charge to plan a school in the absence of a formal agreement. The decision signalled the planners' willingness to proceed and their tacit acceptance of uncertainty. A formal agreement might have provided more power--though that is far from clear; the lack of one did recurrently cast the group's legitimacy in doubt. Probably the vagueness benefited the participating institutions--leaving them with flexibility and not requiring firm resource allocation in a difficult time--in the same measure as it discomfitted the planners. Repeated decisions to "continue planning" reconfirmed the planners' powerlessness, and probably served to heighten the idea that they were just maintaining their positions in their own organizations and increasingly "going through the motions" as far as CHS itself was concerned.

The central design decision was that of placing the burden of humanizing the school on "the family." Almost all discussions returned to the family and ways in which programs--including basic skills, bilingual education and career choices--could be incorporated into the family. This centrality prevented flexibility, masked much basic disagreement, and tended to add to the "circular" format in planning meetings.

As we have noted, an area marked by inaction that presumably should have been the target of thoughtful decision-making was the question of the relationship between the college and the high school. Organizational structures and processes supporting the use of college faculty (or facilities) were never discussed as far as we know.[25] We speculate that

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25) On Nov. 25, 1975, a memo to the Steering Committee listed 49 issues for IDC decision under eight major headings: structure and organization, curriculum, new subject matter, student life, staff preparation and support, community-school relations, evaluation, job descriptions, and recruitment of faculty and students. Only one of the issues was "college-high school interactions." As late as June

(cont'd)

the topic may have been avoided as a way to bypass conflict: it was easier to argue about the scheduling of the family than to face up to questions of whether college faculty would actually want to work in the school--and if they did, what their influence and role would be, and who would pay. It is also possible that the planners simply had little idea of what the problems of interfacing two systems in the arena of CHS would actually be like.

We should also review two rather basic implementation decisions, made during the spring and fall of 1976: the choice of temporary site, and of the temporary director. We provide more detail here because they exemplify the group's decision-making style, and the way "personal politics" fed decisions.

1. The decision to start CHS in the Holmes Annex. In September 1975, planning members had begun to suspect that the designated building on the Lakeport College campus might not become available for a campus high school for several years at least. At that time, it was proposed that they consider using space in an existing high school. (Haberman had always urged this option.) Victor Rubin mentioned that Herman Fine might be persuaded to hand over the annex to Oliver Wendell Holmes High School. The committee firmly rejected the idea, on the basis that it would undermine the goal of having a campus high school.

But when it began to be a question of opening in temporary, existing space versus not having a school at all, the planners changed their attitude. In March 1976, Victor Rubin initiated negotiations with Herman Fine, and reported to the committee that Fine "was agreeable" to housing the CHS. Victor did not report what he had told Fine or what conditions, if any, Fine had laid down.

Haberman quickly agreed, phoning Fine from the meeting of Rubin, Walker, Hecht and Goodman that was taking place in his office. A verbal agreement was reached, and Haberman tried to convince the planners to open in September 1976. Goodman (already likely as the director) held out for a February 1977 opening; this was granted.

(cont'd)

1976, though a committee member pointed out "I don't think there will be any participation from the College faculty unless money is funnelled into the department the person comes from," such arrangements had not been cleared.

And by January of 1977, Seymour Hecht said:

> Probably the majority of the faculty at the College knows nothing about it, doesn't even know it's being planned...and would be shocked if in fact we did bring 125 kids onto the campus because we couldn't find a site for it.

But Frank Henderson, the Director for High Schools in Area A, felt that Holmes already had numerous enrichment programs and did not need another one. Other high schools, such as Eli Whitney were, Henderson felt, much better candidates for improvement and experimentation. Whitney, mostly black and Hispanic, had been the scene of various disturbances and was considered a "bad school" (poor attendance, student violence, poor student achievement). Henderson insisted that the planners consider Whitney as well as Holmes before making a final decision, and agreed to abide by the conclusions of the college representatives on this issue, since it was their interests that were most affected by an off-campus site.

The committee met on May 28, 1976. There was very strong pressure to go to Holmes from Victor Rubin. The committee tended to agree, for a variety of reasons: (1) Victor and several others knew and highly respected Fine as a principal; (2) Holmes was on a direct public transit line from Lakeport College; (3) Holmes was located near Lakefront Arts Center, while Whitney was in a deteriorated ghetto; committee members felt it would be more difficult to get college faculty to go to Whitney, and that traveling time would be "exorbitant"; (4) Whitney had a bad reputation and the planners feared their project would be saddled with the Whitney name and (5) Whitney might not represent a true "cross-section" of the Area A population.[26]

At first, the committee was inclined to make a sham of considering the two alternatives. But Abe Gordon pushed the committee to really think about Whitney versus Holmes. Since their other objections to Whitney were somewhat flimsy or gossipy, the travel time was the major reason they could give Henderson for their Holmes preference. To prove

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26) Some of these statements may have been code phrases for other, less "acceptable" feelings. For instance, there was the feeling that Lakeport College faculty members would not want to go to Whitney because of the bad neighborhood and fear for their own safety. Committee members expressed the view that this was one of the worst streets in the city, and there was a six-block walk from public transportation to the school.

As for the question of the population and cross-section, the planners did not want a school that was completely black and Hispanic, nor did the central office want to be accused again, as they had been in the past, of opening a new school that was completely segregated. Whitney had almost no white students, while Holmes had a much more diverse student body.

that this would indeed be a burden, the committee organized two trips (by Walter, Greg, Ora and Abe) from the steps of Lakeport College, one to either school. The trips took exactly the same amount of time. Almost as an afterthought, the excursion parties spoke with department chairmen, teachers, and the principals, observed classes and got a feel for the school. At least two planning members who had seen both schools vastly preferred the atmosphere in Whitney and felt that Holmes was traditional and rigid, and would be more difficult to work in.

At a June 21 meeting, the IDC reviewed the pro's and con's. The prospect of a real site--if a limited one--seemed to energize the group. They could even share laughter over their past:

Walter: What is the decision-making process in this group?

(sustained laughter)

Ora: A decision has never been made, in my memory.

Diane: No, one--to have the family.

Victor: Right.

Ora: At the CPR research meeting there was a discussion on the designs the various new schools had. Mike and I turned to each other and said, "What design? We have no design!"

(laughter)

The group decided to have a second round of more thorough visits,* to look at space, the attitudes of principals and teachers, attitudes toward innovation and a number of other issues. They also decided to ask President Cheifetz for one or more rooms at the College as a sort of place-holder for the idea of CHS.

A week later, Walter, Mike, Victor, Ora and Audrey made the visits. The Holmes physical setting was "terrible," with antiquated, bolted-down desks; even so, Mike said later, he was much impressed with the idea that CHS could take over a "floor a year," eventually occupying the complete annex. And as others pointed out, it was near Lakefront Arts Center, an attractive place for students and traveling college faculty alike.

The department chairmen at Holmes seemed lukewarm. Mike said later "They were neither turned on or turned off; they simply limped with it because Herman Fine is a very strong man." Ora said afterward that some chairmen were worried about whether CHS would "split off" good students, or have reduced class size from the 50-to-1 ratio expected

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*Ora Haas noted after reading this that she could not remember having made two rounds of visits. They are well-documented in field notes: the interesting thing is that even Ora, who was conscientious and hard-working, shared with many other committee members a tendency to get confused and mixed up about what the committee had done and not done. Both the external uncertainty and the chaotic planning style of the group took their toll.

for next year. (Victor's promise that this would not happen simply heightened the likelihood that CHS classes would also be at 50 to 1.) Herman Fine seemed supportive, but wanted to be sure that the plan was not set, and could be modified. And he said, "If Mike comes along with it, I would be interested."

The visit to Whitney turned up more problems. Ora Haas recalled later:

> It's a school under siege. They all have the feeling like their fingers are in the dike, and it's all going to collapse onto them, and it probably is.

Frank Henderson, the Area A superintendent of high schools, who had been belatedly involved by the committee (and felt bypassed) had pressed hard for Whitney. Mike Goodman recalled later:

> Whitney's a dying school in terms of student population. He said he would give us the entire plant, take it over, it's yours. He said he'd "try to throw all these /present/ kids out and you'll start with a fresh group. /But/ the administration that exists in that building would have to exist.
>
> A group of department heads were back in the 40's and really frightened by the concept of change--and these were the curriculum leaders. Total opposition /to us/.

The vociferous opposition of some department chairmen was a factor that convinced members who said "maybe we should go to Whitney because it needs us more"; they felt the chairmen, some with reputations as "troublemakers," would "just poison it." So though Marty Brown, the black principal, was very positive and CHS would initially have had a complete wing of its own, with much autonomy, the five committee members, standing in the parking lot at Whitney, decided to go for Holmes, assuming that it could be negotiated for a committee member to be the acting director, and that autonomy from Holmes rules could be reasonably assured.

This decision reflects some of the major ambivalences of the planning. Was the mission of the school to cater to inner-city students, alienated and stifled by inhumane or anonymous institutions? If so, then Eli Whitney, in the middle of the ghetto, would seem a far better choice than Holmes. Or was the mission only to get college resources into a high school program? If so, then making it easy for faculty members to participate was a key issue. But it seems that the Holmes decision represented not only a "temporary" abandonment of the very idea of a campus high school, but a retreat from the original, ambitious mission.

As Seymour Hecht pointed out to a researcher, the program would be a "compromise" (no real director, not on the campus) aimed at "keeping the idea alive," and would not really be a new school, but a "re-tooled" one using existing Holmes staff. So a good deal had been lost from the original vision.

2. The appointment of Mike Goodman as acting director of College High School.

As we have noted, this decision is an instance of the "personal politics" strategy frequently employed by the planning group. It appears that Victor Rubin was the initiating force in this choice. He said afterward to an interviewer:

> ...When it came down to the particulars as to starting the thing going and it looked as though we had it, I said to Walker that I thought Mike was the ideal choice. Abe Gordon supported my position.

It was clearly in the planners' interest to circumvent the normal procedures for selecting a principal, since (a) they would have little or no control over such a process; (b) the formal channels could easily use up the better part of a year; (c) there was no guarantee that they would get a principal who had any commitment to their plans or concepts. Furthermore, they preferred a director from within the ranks of the planners, and Mike Goodman was, in many ways, suited to the position. But Goodman lacked some of the necessary qualifications for a principalship, including a sufficient number of years of supervisory experience, and thus would not qualify within a formal selection process. It was likely, however, that once the project became established and a full principal chosen, that Goodman could become the assistant principal for administration, thereby providing continuity between planning and implementation. The decision to avoid the regular process was implicitly made somewhere during the 1975-76 planning year.[27]

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27) An interesting comment on the workings of the group is that the committee had originally planned to go through the formal process. In meetings in the spring of 1975, planners discussed advertising the position in June and hiring a principal ten months in advance of the school's opening, in November 1975. It was not until the fall of 1975 that some of the more seasoned administrators disabused the college representatives of the notion that the selection process was fair and rational. Audrey Carter and Ora Haas were shocked to realize that they would have no control in that selection, and that they could "get stuck for good." The central office representatives had also let the others labor under the delusion that the central office would abide by their timeline.

Choosing Mike took place behind the scenes. While it seems that the committee agreed with and supported the choice, it was never discussed with the whole committee in any formal manner. When we asked Sy Hecht, one of the most influential members of the committee, if Victor had come to him to ask his opinion, Hecht replied:

> No, he understood that I would support it because Mike is closest to it and of all the people involved he was the one most likely to understand and be in a position to do it.

Finally, Herman Fine had been told in the initial negotiations that Goodman was the choice for acting director; acceptability to Fine further legitimized the appointment.

The planners did not, as far as we know, consider alternatives to Mike. Hecht commented that the director had to come "from the high school people," because they needed "someone who was already on the payroll." A college person was not considered as a director because of feelings that (a) college people did not really know how to run a Lakeport high school, especially one with an inherited staff and student body and a new, imposed program; and (b) the college people were too politically naive with regard to the bureaucracy to negotiate the ins and outs of public school politics in the city. Besides, the original agreement (signed or not, it operated to define roles in the planning) specified that the high school division would be responsible for staffing.

What happened next is not completely clear. It appears that Greg Walker spoke to Irv Haberman, who agreed to the arrangement with Mike. Again, this was not put into writing.

These agreements were made sometime between March and May, 1976. Apparently Goodman was not completely certain that he wanted the job. At the May 28 meeting, where the Holmes vs. Whitney decision was considered, Greg intimated to the committee for the first time that Mike would be the project coordinator. Mike said, "We'll see," and Greg said, "You're not going to back out on me now." Goodman might not have gone along had the committee chosen Whitney, because it was perceived that Whitney would be a bigger and riskier undertaking, and could have hurt his budding career. When the Holmes choice was made, Mike firmed up his commitment. Just after Labor Day, Mike explained later, Haberman called up Mike and asked if he would be "interested." When Mike said yes, Haberman asked him to get Greg Walker (not Walter) to confirm the College's approval. Greg did so, and "Boom, I was appointed."

It seemed to be understood by all parties that Mike could not be the final principal, since he lacked the required supervisory experience. But he might eventually become the assistant principal for administration,

or for guidance.[28] For now, he was considered a "liaison" for planning the implementation that would take place in the Holmes Annex.

At some levels, the decision to choose Goodman was very sensible: it enabled at least a reasonable hope for planning-implementation linkage, and he had the skills and knowledge the job would require. But, like most other committee decisions, it was not fully legitimized in any formal sense, either by the full committee's participation or by anything in writing. As we shall see, the informality of these two basic decisions --for the site and for the director--offered little protection to the CHS plan when the dust began to fly. And the plan itself would begin to drift away from the stated goals of the project when it encountered a real faculty in a real school--even with the presence of Goodman.

Decision quality and ownership. Assessing the technical "goodness" of committee decisions is not easy, but more than one key decision was a poor, distorted embodiment of original hopes (e.g., the family's size, the move to Holmes away from the campus), and many needed decisions were never produced (the college faculty's relationship to the school's community-school relationship structures).

The degree of ownership of decisions varied: many members--usually the women--had serious reservations about the way aspects of the plan were agreed upon, and worried about unmade decisions, but were unable to persuade the leaders to consider alternatives. And the making of key decisions behind closed doors did nothing to increase decision ownership, which was probably vested mainly in Victor, Greg, Mike, Seymour, and possibly Abe.

P/I group capabilities. The political skills of the planners must be counted as insufficient for the situation they faced. In spite of their positions in the various bureaucracies and their personal connections to people in powerful places, the planners did not seem to have a way of using the power that they possessed. They were rarely "proactive" in their stance; the influential members of the committee typically stopped any move toward fighting to get what they wanted, and relied instead on the good will and good relationships of their personal connections. While this was not necessarily a bad strategy, several

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28) Mike reported later that the A.P. now in charge of the annex, Harvey Janes, was worried about what would happen if CHS became an independent school. And:

> We were getting along very nicely, and we decided that if that were to happen, both of us would apply for the job, and whoever got it, got it. We began to joke.

factors combined to weaken its effectiveness. The Steering Committee wanted several things from the IDC, not all of them clear and not all of them in line with the Initial Design Committee's goals: The Steering Committee wanted the IDC to plan a prototypical model of education for inner city youth, and to plan "for the shelf" if a site could not be found. The IDC wanted to plan a real school for real students that would open imminently. Furthermore, Haberman's early suggestion that they take space in an existing high school was met with fear by the College representatives that Haberman did not really understand (or perhaps accept) what they wanted if he could so readily substitute a floor in a high school for a separate campus location.

A fair number of influential committee members had something to lose by fighting too hard; they were in career lines directly controlled by the superior(s) to whom they were reporting in the planning and on the Steering Committee. It was not to their advantage to rock the boat too much. This was true of Walker, Goodman, and Hecht. When we add Rubin, whose friendships at the central office were important to him, we see that the four most powerful members of the committee were not willing to apply any real pressure where--or when--it counted.

This unwillingness also applied to the basic question of legitimacy development: the group did not--perhaps could not--establish its right to plan in a way that could seriously influence implementation.

The group's meta-planning capabilities were not strong, either. The early meta-plan was vague, and even that fell apart when the fiscal crisis deepened in the spring of 1976. There was no redesigned meta-plan, based on a realistic assessment of what would happen when; arbitrary deadlines were set and ignored; and the sudden movement into Holmes was opportunistic, it seemed. In general, the committee did not cope well with uncertainty: indecision about site and money led to circular discussions and avoidance, rather than to contingency planning and proactive action, as evidenced, for example, in the Arts Coop case.

Finally, the planners' reflexivity was infrequent and weak. Internally, apart from occasional deprecatory comments like "Here we go again" or "I'm fighting chaos"[29] they did little reflecting about what they were doing. Part of this stemmed from stereotypes about "process": Victor professed to see nothing operating other than the task-oriented content, and resisted efforts to surface feelings about what was going on (as during the consultant's visits); others felt time should not be spent on "evaluation" but on moving ahead--

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29) Abe Gordon once told a visitor, "You don't know this committee. We could spend a whole afternoon arguing about how to spell 'teacher education'."

which was not occurring either. Lower-power members of the group did dislike what was happening, but made few successful influence efforts.

And even when reflexive comments (not just brief complaints) were made, the group seemed unable to act on them in a self-corrective way.[30]

Externally, the data used to steer planning were (1) purported directives from above ("keep planning"; "we're trying to find a site"); (2) newspaper reports about the fiscal crisis; and (3) rumors, gossip, and speculation. None of these gave the planners a 'jump' on what was going on outside and what they should do on the inside. They could not see a way to improve data quality, and fell back to a passive, following mode.

We have already alluded to the group's difficulties with decision-making: it seemed they had little ability to engage in a coherent, sustained flow of problem-solving activity.

A gloomy picture, on the face of it. We do not mean to sound overly critical, but the reality seemed to be that the group had insufficient capability to cope with its turbulent environment. Its individual members were capable and intelligent. But, as we have noted, at some level they may not have cared enough, institutionally speaking, to make the efforts of will and skill that would have been required for success. That is not reprehensible, and investing less in the enterprise may well have been the most sensible, least risky--and, perversely, possibly the most potentially successful--strategy the P/I group could have followed, given all the imponderables they were facing.

Ora Haas pointed out later that

> My tendency would have been to say, "Look, it's dumb to plan. /But/ they might not have gotten anywhere. Someone might have said, "OK, forget the project." I think...the project has a credibility now, just for having existed for so long....No one cares what we have produced as much as the fact that it's just been around a long time...It's now become an entrenched interest...something has a right to exist, just because it's existed for so long.

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30) One instance was the May 28, 1976 meeting, where the committee bemoaned the non-involvement of the parents and community in the planning, with the usual refrain, "We tried to get them, but they wouldn't come." Ora Haas and Abe Gordon confronted the rationalization, saying the committee hadn't really tried very hard and was not assessing the situation very honestly. Still, no improved action decisions re parents ensued.

And she felt that Haberman had changed from an indulgent, critical stance toward CHS to "real partisanship" for this very reason.

Intermediate Outcomes

After months of floundering and diminishing hope that a location for the school would be obtained, the planning group unexpectedly found that opening a school would be a reality. What had they accomplished to this point? First, the outline of a plan existed. As we have noted above, several critical pieces of it were missing--for instance, the relationship with the college--but in the six months before the school was to open these could presumably be worked on. Secondly, the existence of a location increased interest on the part of the members; there was some optimism concerning the future. But as we have seen already, ownership of the plans was low for many members. Third, several relevant parts of the environment endorsed the move to the temporary site, including the College, the central office and the principal whose school was going to be used. But no parents or students had shown interest, and none had been given the opportunity to influence the planning.

The adequacy of obtained financial resources was dubious for the original plan: attempts for foundation support had been ineffective. Whether there would be enough school-system and College funding to enable adequate final planning and early implementation at Holmes was not clear. To pronounce the words "fiscal crisis" again, as the planners often did, does not obscure the fact that they had not succeeded so far in obtianing needed financial resources.

On balance, the P/I group, for many understandable reasons, had done its job safely, minimally, and inefficiently--but might be about to recoup with the move to a temporary site, with a sympathetic acting director in place. What would happen?

The Later Planning Period

Changes in the P/I Group and Its Meta-Plan

When planning resumed in the fall of 1976, several key changes had taken place in the group and its meta-plan. First, of course, there was a temporary location for the school (Holmes annex) and meetings were now held there. Second, Mike Goodman was in place as acting director of the to-be-implemented school, working with a volunteer group of teachers. Greg Walker was only peripherally involved. Though Walter Jackson was the new planning director, as it developed, Mike assumed formal leadership and ran the meetings held during the fall.

The rest of the IDC group stayed intact, and a member was added: Larry Jacobson, a college professor who had developed a human services program that would form part of the CHS curriculum.

The major change in the meta-plan was that a target date for opening the school existed: February 1977. At last, a real deadline! The linkages between planning and implementation had also become clearer. First, Mike Goodman, the acting director of the school, was a member of the early planning committee. Second, teachers were to be voluntarily recruited from the Holmes faculty and 45 minutes was provided at the end of each school day for them to work on planning. So a core group of faculty--an addition to the P/I group--would provide an added linkage between planning and implementation. Despite these positive steps, some critical areas remained unattended. The already unclear role of the IDC became even more uncertain; it was never discussed whether they or the new director would now be in charge of planning. It was not initially clear who was now leading the planning: Mike Goodman, the temporary director of the school, or Walter Jackson, the chairman of the IDC. Consequently, in the IDC meetings during the early stages of moving into Holmes, there was some tension between Goodman and Jackson about who really should control the proceedings. Goodman's power gradually increased, and he began to chair meetings of the IDC. But he did not seem wholly certain of the extent of his authority: he did not know whether he was bound by IDC decisions, should seek their advice, or only need to inform them of actions he had taken independently. Furthermore, it was somewhat ambiguous just how much influence the new faculty group should be having.

The data used for planning came primarily from the IDC's past products, along with the perceptions, needs and wishes of Goodman, the IDC, and the new faculty; the views of Herman Fine and his administrative staff were also naturally sought.

Under the pressure of a February opening, the planning naturally had to become more specific, and the sense was that the altered P/I group was beginning to make a future, rather than anxiously worrying about what future others' actions would place them in.

Brief Chronology

The first meeting with the Holmes faculty to explain the plans for the CHS was held in mid-September, 1976. At the meeting, about half of the 40 annex faculty demonstrated interest in participating in the planning. After a few more faculty planning meetings, which were held during the last period of the school day, a core of approximately ten teachers interested in the idea of an innovative school emerged; a few students were also asked to join.

During the first week, in his capacity as temporary director, Mike Goodman also spent a considerable amount of time with Harvey Janes, the assistant principal in charge of the annex. Their major task was to specify the relationship between the CHS, which would occupy the fourth floor of the building, and the rest of the school. Mike raised a list of "ten points" with Janes. The outcome was positive: Janes, with Herman Fine's approval, said he would permit Goodman to formulate rules, policies and procedures according to the needs of the new school. The only school-wide rule that had to be followed was the immediate expulsion and arrest of a student in possession of drugs. For all practical purposes, Goodman concluded, the CHS could function independently of the regular school.

Mike also went to the central office, accompanied by Walter and the energetic new IDC member Larry Jacobson, who was bringing a human services program to CHS--a program Herman Fine was already favorable to. A central office curriculum administrator was very cordial and cooperative, offering available materials warehoused nearby and even promising to try to get money.

Some IDC members began coming to the planning sessions. Ora Haas was one: she was beginning to get excited. The work with teachers was "on a totally different level" than what had gone on before. As she reflected later:

> They were typical Lakeport teachers--not very innovative. They accept their lot; they're not rebelling. But they do have dissatisfactions...they are very aware they could be doing a better job, and it was the process of coming in with ideas that were in some way radical to them--but also vague and bull-shitty--and having to clarify those ideas and make them more acceptable to people, a very interesting process.
>
> It changed me and made me think a lot more about what teachers are like, what we could ask them to do and what we couldn't. It changed them...certain people's ideas about education changed...a process was started... we were making those teachers feel it was legitimate to ask questions like: why is the bell ringing? Why are you teaching that? What are students really like? Some of them are just beginning to let their imaginations go.
>
> I didn't think anything was /actually/ going to happen by February, but the process itself was good and healthy and honest.

As the planning continued, Goodman reported to the IDC: he felt things were going well generally. He then explained to the committee that he had told the volunteer teacher-planners that the student body would be selected according to reading levels, with 2/3 above grade level and 1/3 either on or below grade level. This piece of information immediately raised concern among key members of the planning group; the proportion of reading scores that Goodman presented was strongly weighted toward the academically adept, not the population found in the average city high school which the committee had envisioned.[31] How could CHS be a prototype for inner-city education this way?

But after prolonged discussion--in the familiar circular style--the IDC agreed on a slightly revised formula for student selection. It still would produce a student body substantially above the city average. When it was presented to the teachers that afternoon, they naturally found it acceptable--their interest was clearly to have the most able students they could get. It seems that Goodman understood this well: the 2/3-1/3 proposal had been a strong selling

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31) Sy Hecht had already told the committee that a recent survey showed that only 25% of Area A high school students were reading at or above grade level.

The question of reading test scores in high schools is not easy to disentangle. In December of 1976, when district-wide reading test scores were released as usual to the public, on a school-by-school basis, Haberman explained that to release high school scores would invite "invidious and simplistic comparisons." State law requires only that elementary and junior-high data be published.

However, to the best of our current information, there was no standard reading testing across all city high schools beyond the 9th grade at this time, so Haberman was being less than explicit.

The data for 9th-grade students, from tests given in March 1976 are, however, relevant to the discussion above. In Area A, 25.3% were reading at or above grade level. At Holmes in particular, only 11.8% of 9th graders were reading at or above grade level--so Holmes' "elite" image was possibly being threatened by the qualities of its freshman class. The figure at Whitney was 7.4%.

The city-wide figure for 9th graders was 33.2%. So even if Mike had succeeded in getting "city-wide" recruiting (see below), a representative population would still have been far less capable than the 2/3 figure he had proposed to the teachers.

We might note in passing that the figure for "at or above" grade level states things optimistically. In Area A, fully 51.2% of 9th graders were reading two years or more below grade level.

point.[32] So yet another aspect of the original vision was being set aside.

With the central question of the type of student to be recruited for the school settled, Goodman continued to hold daily meetings with the faculty. A variety of committees were formed to begin fleshing out the organization, curriculum, and other areas of the school. Goodman thought he was making progress, even though teachers often came late. In the 45 minutes of the last period they also "had to"

> complete their roll books, get their hats and coats, go to the bathroom, read their mail, fill out forms --so we had a net time of a half hour, sometimes 20 minutes.

And, he said, Herman Fine was beginning to affect the planning negatively.

> He came and spoke with the faculty and told them that they may never see this to fruition, that they may be banging their heads against the wall, that they may not be the ones to implement it, that the College High School might pick up and move tomorrow to the College. That wasn't helpful.

The group of teachers who came regularly dwindled to a handful.

So something was wrong as far as Herman Fine was concerned. Abruptly, in a meeting on October 13, he told Mike that the project was unacceptable since it would be leaving Holmes at some point, taking good students and teachers along. Goodman tried to work out an agreement so that teachers who wanted to leave when CHS left could do so, and others could stay. But Fine said:

> Look at the teachers you're working with. You're working with my youngest and brightest. They are the ones that chase kids up and down the hallways; the old ones never get involved with that.

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32) Mike justified this later by saying that he thought the student body should be a "random, stratified representation of the city student body," and should draw from all four areas of the city. Since Area A was most heavily black and Hispanic, and the other areas had many more middle-class whites, the net effect would be to recruit a select group. But, he acknowledged, the IDC had never agreed to city-wide recruiting. Of the teachers, he said:

> They were looking for a school representative of Wichita or Peoria. I can't blame them--if you are going to teach in a school, you want the best kids you can teach.

Herman told Mike there would be a meeting at the central office the next day, where Haberman and Henderson would make a formal decision. But Mike knew it was over.[33)]

> He /Herman/ thought it would be a program in Holmes. We thought we would have a higher degree of autonomy. But the ground rules are changing in the middle of the game. Part of the reason is that nobody sat down at the beginning and defined what they would be.
>
> It's a shame as I think of this. The expectations were raised so high and now they're bashed. It's amazing. We're back in June again. Welcome to June with 50° weather.

In the meeting at the central office on October 14, attended by Mike, Sy, Ora, Greg, Victor, Frank Henderson and Irving Haberman, the boom was lowered. Haberman began by outlining four "alternatives": stay in Holmes, take over Holmes entirely, find an alternative site, or shelve the project completely.

Herman Fine said flatly, "Well, we don't want the project at Holmes." Ora reported later:

> No one questioned him; no one tried to convince him. Herman Fine was a very powerful person, and no one was going to question, ask or cajole.

The discussion quickly moved to alternative sites. They included several junior high schools, including Medgar Evers School. But Frank Henderson was discouraging: the alternatives would involve

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33) Fine had attended a meeting of the IDC in early October with some foundation personnel to seek funds. A foundation officer asked "Wasn't it the plan to have your own building on the campus of the College?" Victor replied, "Yes, that's still our plan."

Herman Fine tactfully waited until the foundation people had left. Then he confronted Victor:

> What are you talking about, Victor, "it's still your plan"? What did you mean by that?
>
> Victor: Well, you know, not in the foreseeable future, but whenever it becomes available.
>
> Herman: Well, <u>wait</u>...

As Mike said later, "Herman is a wise man; he reads between the lines; he knew what was happening. He didn't want to host us on a temporary basis."

severe political problems, either with community school boards, or with militant parents at Evers. Furthermore, he said, he did not believe in "sharing buildings." Henderson, who still felt irritated at the way he had been bypassed, and who still wanted CHS at Whitney, did not sound as if he would be a very strong advocate for new sites[34] --even though, as Mike Goodman pointed out, all the planners wanted was "five classrooms and an office."

Ora Haas felt depressed. She told a researcher:

> At this point there's no more use in planning...It doesn't make any sense...Everything's in complete abeyance.

She thought that Walter might decide to "go public" with such strategies as talking to the Area A commissioner (a political position in the city), or "calling a press conference" to air the reasons for abandonment of the project. But this was quite uncertain.

The meeting concluded with Haberman and Henderson's promising to institute a search for another site and report back in three weeks. Mike was to be retained as "the full-time planner," probably working out of Sy Hecht's office. But the probability of the school's opening in February seemed to be almost nil; even if a site were found, the problems of locating students and staff, let along designing a workable program, were almost unsolvable between Thanksgiving and February.

In fact, no site was proposed, and the project lay dormant. The inaction was probably caused in part by a prospective change in President Cheifetz' status, who had handed in his resignation. As one central office member remarked:

> Cheifetz was leaving and everyone knew he was leaving... There was no real pressure on the central office. The real pressure on them has always come from Cheifetz. He travels in circles where he can effect some things we can't. So when he was leaving, a lot of the steam went out.

Why had Fine reacted as he had? From Walter Jackson's perspective, the primary difficulty was that Goodman assumed not only the responsibilities but the style of a principal, which threatened Fine's authority. According to him, a "personality clash" between Goodman and Fine accounted for

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34) There were objective problems too, as Hecht pointed out later:

> In essence the central office would be saying to local boards, "Well, you have only 300 students in a school that can accommodate 1,000, therefore we're taking it away from you and giving it to the high school division, which is going to open it with 300 students!"

the rapid termination. It was also Jackson's opinion that not having signed agreements was a mistake; had there been a written agreement the CHS could have retained Holmes as a site, or at least not have been so easily expelled.

Mike Goodman viewed the rapid departure from Holmes as stemming from Victor Rubin's failure to clearly inform Fine of the fact that Holmes was to be a temporary site ("I love Victor, but he blew it."). Victor himself acknowledged in an interview later:

> I think I'm guilty because I don't think I made it clear to Herman that this would be the beginning of an eventual takeover /becoming independent/. As a matter of fact, I apologized to him...I think Herman actually thought CHS would become a sort of segment, an alternative program of Holmes and that would be wonderful for Holmes, a tremendous boost.

It does seem that the issue was more than a "personality clash," or a matter of Fine's suspicions,[35] or his wanting to keep control (and credit) for CHS. Quite sensibly, he was worried that the program would attract not only his best teachers but his best students, who would then leave when the school departed for its permanent home, weakening Holmes and leaving those who stayed there resentful. Underutilization of the annex after CHS' departure would also be undesirable.

In summary, as Sy Hecht recalled:

> Herman made it very clear that he wanted to depart as friends, that it was nothing he had against any particular individual or constituency, but he thought it would redound negatively on his school to take it and then have it aborted.

In some senses, the committee--especially the College members--misestimated both Fine's incentives for hosting CHS, and his power. He was not only the most senior high school principal in the city, and had replaced Henderson as Area A high school superintendent during his sabbatical, but was rumored to be socially friendly with the Area A Commissioner, and to play golf Sundays with Superintendent Stein.

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35) The question of whether Fine had been deliberately misled is ambiguous. Victor did say several times, "Don't give too much information /to Fine/ until he asks." In any case, it is clear that no formal agreement was ever drawn up. And Victor, reflecting later, mused:

> As I look back at it, we hadn't even thought that far ahead /taking out students and teachers when Arts High became available/. All we were looking for at that moment was a home.

The Emerging Organizational Design

When the planners had been thinking in terms of a whole building on the campus of Lakeport College, they had had a vision of an autonomous, innovative institution which would be a high school with all the advantages and resources of an intimate relationship with a top-quality college. In their decision to move into an existing school, away from the campus, the planners essentially abandoned this vision.

The elements of the plan, as presented to the faculty by Goodman, did not differ from the basic plan formulated by the IDC, with the important exception that the student population became, in effect, an elite group. The family structure of four teachers to 136 students remained the focal unit of organization in the school. Within the family, students would "learn how to learn" in addition to, or as part of, their major subjects, taught by the four family teachers. There would be an external learning component for work and experience outside the school, as well as moral education, bilingual education, and cross-cultural learning. Relationships with college programs like the Biomedical and the Human Services programs would be established.

The scale of the program was not clear, but it almost certainly would not have included the 500 students originally envisioned, given the small number of Holmes staff who were volunteering to participate.

In the short time that CHS was scheduled for the Holmes annex, little concrete was added to the design. It was clear that in order to interest the faculty and develop ownership of the project, the teachers would have to have an opportunity to influence the plans.

Early in their meetings with teachers, Mike Goodman and the other planners who were working with him at the school, Ora Haas and Larry Jacobson, had the teachers respond to a questionnaire about what they disliked about their current situation; time was spent getting the teachers to dream about what they would like. It was difficult at first to get the teachers to free themselves from the regular ways of thinking about and doing things in the city school system. But no sooner had they begun to envision possibilities than CHS was evicted from the Holmes annex.

Analysis and Commentary

Political stabilization. The course of action taken by the committee--more correctly, by several members of the committee--was, as in previous instances, one of "personal politics." The decision to initiate discussions with Fine for the use of the Holmes annex, the terms of use of the annex, and the appointment of Mike Goodman as director were all done through informal arrangements among old friends.

Politically this saved time, effort and the entanglements that ordinarily would go along with these actions. For example, the appointment of a principal is a long procedure that ordinarily involves parents, the central office, and the union and often does not produce the candidate that the school planners would prefer (cf. our Appelbaum case). But soon after the move to Holmes was made, the instability of this political strategy became apparent; misunderstandings between two key actors led to the demise of the entire arrangement.

Overall, the course of least resistance was followed; the perils of the turbulent environment and bureaucratic constraints were avoided. At the same time, however, the lack of clear, documented agreements made the handshakes extremely fragile. As the outcomes of the planning clearly indicate, the task of political stabilization, although attempted, was not performed successfully.

Knowledge utilization. The pattern did not shift: the planners continued to rely on their own experience rather than invoking expert knowledge outside their group. This is perhaps reasonable, given the problems of gaining teachers' acceptance and involving them in the final design: the task, as Ora's comments earlier imply, was more one of "unfreezing" their commitments to what they already took for granted about schools and entertaining new possibilities--which were only beginning to emerge when the axe fell.

Vision development. Little further happened to expand the vision, and there were contractions and goal-incongruent changes. The contractions were ones of scale (starting small, expanding a year at a time). The main shift in the vision was the loss of the "prototype" model, speaking to the needs of representative inner-city students.

There was a good deal of irony in the fact that shifting toward better students--a strategy aimed in part at coopting the teachers, we speculate--not only moved the CHS actuality away from the original hope to "be a model for inner-city education," applicable to a cross-section of students, but lost the school completely. As Mike Goodman said,

> Area A is a jungle of high schools that are competing for the top kids...We might be siphoning off the top. That's the fear that exists. The schools that do receive the top right now in Area A include Holmes. It's probably number one.
>
> Researcher: So Fine would have been taking kids from himself to give to you.
>
> Goodman: Precisely.

There were other additions: Abe Gordon viewed the school as a place to continue his research and experimentation with reading instruction, and Larry Jacobson was enthusiastically committed to getting his human services program built in. But these were perhaps more private visions tied to individuals' career paths than part of a shared vision.

Social-architectural design. No further work was done to clear up the confusion about the family, or to relieve the family of sole responsibility for "humanizing" the school. Inevitably, these issues would have come up had CHS remained in Holmes. The planners would certainly have had to adapt their humanizing goals and strategies to being a part of a regular, traditional, Lakeport High School.

And there was no further work done to hook in College faculty. Though Greg Walker spoke vaguely of the College's supplying funding, and of "special relations" with engineering and other professional schools, and said student-teacher programs and "staff development" would involve faculty, he admitted:

> I don't think I'll be able to recast the budget for curriculum development there. There is no problem with the faculty, but to get them heavily connected will not be easy.[36]

Key Decisions

As we have noted, the common ingredient underlying the important decisions in the later planning period is "personal politics." This strategy proved to have serious liabilities: the basic unanticipated consequence was that decisions could be as easily abrogated as they could be made.

Informal handshakes sealed the following agreements: Fine's initial acceptance of Rubin's proposal; Haberman's acceptance of the plan to move into the Holmes annex; Fine's agreement to accept CHS in the annex as a project which operated independently; the appointment of Mike Goodman as coordinator and Acting Director of the CHS; the acceptance by the Assistant Principal in charge of the annex of the "10 points of concern" raised by Mike Goodman; Haberman and Henderson's promise to find alternate sites The eventual outcome of all this personal politicking was that the planners had no protection against eviction from Holmes when Fine realized the planners' intent was to

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36) As several committee members pointed out, Greg's becoming the dean did not automatically mean that he could wield more clout for CHS, or even pay sustained attention to it. "We were just one of many things on his desk."

move the program--teachers and students included--to the campus building within the next few years. It had been to Fine and Haberman's advantage to keep arrangements informal, since it left them the option of backing out. This may also have been a rationale for the planners, but it is equally likely that the personal politics strategy was employed because (a) it conveniently circumvented arduous bureaucratic procedures and would get the planners what they wanted (or so they thought) and (b) they were used to doing things that way.[37]

Goodman's decision to shift the population of the school from inner-city low achievers to elite, high-scoring students demonstrates a basic weakness of the planning venture. The dedication to alienated near-dropout students was supposedly one of the cornerstones of the entire plan. That Goodman, a member of the committee which had been talking for two years about meeting the needs of these students, felt free enough to abandon this part of the vision--with the IDC's concurrence--indicates that the vision did not have very much power--was not really owned.

Had Goodman not been chosen through behind-the-scenes personal politics, but instead by the full committee, this "adaptation" might not have been so easy to carry off. Goodman was presumably using the elite population as a strategy for interesting teachers (and also possibly as an expression of his own preferences). He made the offer of elite students to the teachers, and <u>then</u> informed the IDC. He appeared to be operating almost independently of the committee and its plans. Had the committee been formally included in his selection, and/or if alternatives to Mike had been considered, he might have felt more compelled to retain pieces of the plan until <u>after</u> he had consulted the committee. As it was, continuity between planning and implementation was far from supported.

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37) In some ironic, retrospective sense, the casual agreements served to protect CHS from what was probably an undesirable compromise move. Given an "on-the-shelf" planning model, and the longer time perspectives of people like Sy Hecht (and to some extent Victor), the enterprise was probably better off <u>not</u> in Holmes.

In January, for example, Hecht said:

> I don't think it's dead because I really feel that Mr. Haberman would like to see it go and I feel Cheifetz would like to see it go. I think both of them are going to lay back for one more year...I honestly feel that we're at a plateau. I would see it /CHS/ as a very important possibility. I don't think it will be for a while...once they have their new building on the College campus they may free up sufficient space.

Planning-implementation linkage weakness was partly deliberate, it appears. Seymour Hecht said later:

> You needed some of the key actors, the people who were going to implement. You reached a point by which to go beyond this was unfair, because you were determining the philosophy, the administration, the day-to-day functioning of the operation without ...involving the people who would be living in that environment...There was the desire to move and yet the realization you shouldn't move; /it/ made the work style of the committee very erratic. /It was like/ I'd open the door, stick out my foot and drag it along the ground to try to slow it down...if we move any faster we are going to have the programming done and you'll have people walking into the situation that don't have a decision left to make.

Hecht's reluctance to move too far in program design is understandable, but it may well have contributed to a state of affairs in which implementation of the over-all vision and philosophy of the program was less probable.

What were the consequences of the decision to choose the Holmes annex over Eli Whitney as a temporary site? Whitney, Haberman indicated, could be taken over ultimately by the College High School, and they could start by clearing one entire grade out. This would have been more in line with what the planners had envisioned. Principal Brown was supportive--and so was Superintendent Henderson--and the students were exactly what the planners had been talking about. They could have abandoned their requirement of campus location temporarily, and had considerably more autonomy. But the strong opposition of the troublesome assistant principals, and the veiled problem of College faculty reluctance to enter a "bad neighborhood" won out. It is possible, of course, that the planners were simply afraid of failing at Whitney, as the reality there collided with their optimistic vision.*

P/I group capabilities. Little happened to enhance the group's ability to cope; in fact, it probably became weaker; attendance was sporadic. Many members even arrived late to the critical meeting where the Holmes-Whitney decision was to be made.

There was a tendency, naturally, for members to disclaim responsibility. One said:

> In the beginning I tended to ascribe very nefarious motives to these people, and now I see it as a series of unfortunate coincidences, blunders, or whatever. Like people not thinking through what it would mean to affiliate with Holmes, I probably thought about it more than other people, but I certainly didn't voice it, and I think that's just the way people are.

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*After reading this, Ora Haas said she concurred with this speculation. The fact that the planners did not reconsider the Whitney possibility after being evicted from Holmes lends further weight to the idea that they saw the Whitney barriers to success as too high; it was not just a "second choice."

And, said another:

> The thing that disturbs me is that everything that could have gone wrong went wrong with the College High School. Little bits and pieces happen in every school that's planned. /But here/ everything fell down and collapsed. The major problem--look, if there was a school /building/ the planners would have been given the right and the opportunity to plan a school to be implemented in that building, and that building would have been the CHS...a simple, cut and dried procedure. Without a building we fell apart.

Other members spoke of the lack of a time-line, the fiscal crisis, the lack of planners' power, the failure of top decision makers to act. All were correct, and harshly speaking, all were ignoring the fact that the capabilities of the P/I group were not equal to the task they faced in the environment as it existed.

Outcomes

The low ownership and quality of critical decisions (such as that of going into Holmes) along with a reactive and passive stance toward the environment and the use of personal politics rather than more pro-active, explicit strategies, contributed to the compromise of meta-goals (campus location, college faculty involvement, and elite rather than cross-sectional student representation). So goal-congruent implementation was rendered unlikely.

The financial resources obtained were not adequate. Though the central office paid Mike's salary, it was "on the lowest line," and there were no add-on funds available from the College or the central office to enable faculty input or a good start-up--or, as seemed likely in the event of an opening postponed to September of 1977, for serious planning. Efforts to get foundation funds were unsuccessful.

The lack of outside funds was a severe handicap: it probably reduced bargaining power in the weak effort that was made to get space at the College, and it--along with the decision to go to Holmes--allowed the project, in effect, to be captured by the high school division of the central office. Though a few college people were still working actively with the project, high school people were calling the shots, and would receive the credit if CHS succeeded. And, as we have noted earlier, if it failed, no one would seriously be the worse.

To what degree was there "environmental endorsement" of the school at this point? College faculty awareness was probably minimal; the principal at the temporary site had declined to continue his acceptance.

The plans were unknown to the general public. A few key actors--Haberman, Cheifetz, and probably Dean Walker--were said to be on board and still committed. Time would tell.

Subsequent Events

Following the October eviction from Holmes, the project seemed to come to a halt. Mike Goodman said later that he actually felt "extremely relieved," because the dwindling energy of the teacher planners and Herman's evident lack of enthusiasm was taking a toll.

> We went off half-cocked. Let's do it right the second time. Go into another building, choose our own faculty, plan with those people, open the school. If we couldn't get that, I don't want to go into any school at all. If it would have meant going in as we did in Holmes, I suggested that we shelve the plans until we have a greater commitment on the part of the high school division and the College.

Within about three weeks, Mike accepted an assignment to work on a special program in the high school division.

Victor reported in December:

> We began groping around for some place that would be an independent home. Well, we've come up with nothing, and that's frustrating. We're stymied.

The fact that a complete junior high school was standing empty at the time in Area A was some indication, he felt, of a "battle of responsibilities, vested rights"--and, we infer, Frank Henderson's lack of enthusiasm for pushing the project in the face of the political difficulties that might be involved with local boards, who controlled junior high schools.

Our fieldwork and observations ceased, except for occasional phone calls, and most information came from three articles which were published in the Lakeport World between February and May 1977.

On February 22, an article appeared in the World which said that the High School for the Arts would "leave the site it has occupied since its founding in 1939," and move to Medgar Evers High School, a facility at Lakefront Arts Center. The plan, unveiled by Irving Haberman, would

> call for the 2,400 students at Medgar Evers, virtually all of them black and Puerto Rican.../to be/ transfered to the South Park School.

South Park was located a few blocks away. The move would free up the Arts High building on the campus, presumably for use by the College High School. But parents of Medgar Evers students objected strongly to the proposal and requested a meeting with Frank Henderson, who told them he did not have room on his schedule.[38]

On April 19th, the World ran an article headed:

> Central Office Joins Lakeport College in Planning Experimental High School. "Lakeport College and the Central Office are planning a new experimental high school that would open next fall at the site of the High School for the Arts /on the College campus/.

The article, quoting Greg Walker throughout, described the school and the plan in its most coherent and ideal form. The timeline, according to Walker, would be to open in September for 9th and 10th grades with 500 students and 20-25 teachers.

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38) This incident typifies the attitudes and logic of the Lakeport central office. Medgar Evers School has high prestige. It was built in the early '70s and is architecturally striking; a modern memorial sculpture dedicated to the late martyred civil rights leader highlights the entrance to the plaza. The school, which has a thrust toward social sciences and law, has an innovative program and curriculum. It was planned and built with heavy community direction and was one of the few positive marks on the board's record of providing services for black and Hispanic students. If the central office were to go through with the transfer plan, the name of the school and the memorial sculpture would both present a problem. One couldn't change the name of the school to Arts High and leave the Medgar Evers sculpture there. Haberman reported that they were considering two alternatives: either moving the sculpture to the South Park building and changing its name to the Medgar Evers High School (although the sculpture was designed in conjunction with the current Medgar Evers building); or changing the name of the Lakefront Arts Center facility to the Medgar Evers High School for the Arts (even though Arts High is one of Lakeport's elite schools, and has no relation to the black and Hispanic community which supported the development of Evers, nor indeed to the symbol of the school as an acknowledgment of the civil rights struggle).

The April article creates the general impression that the school will open. But one sentence gives a more accurate picture of the real possibilities:

> There are reports that the plans will be announced this week. But Irving Haberman, head of the school system's high school division, would say only that the central office was "still considering all the pieces" and that "I'm hopeful of a decision very shortly."

Still, the article was written with the focus on the college this time, and the plan had resumed the form it took before the Holmes adaptation.

On May 9, a third article appeared. Superintendent Stein had made a small concession to parent demands and agreed to postpone the Medgar Evers phase-out for another year. This agreement followed after a demonstration by Evers parents and students in which "scores of students raced through the corridors" of the central office.

This seemed to finish off the dream of opening a college high school in the foreseeable future. It is unclear to us exactly what the strategies behind the news articles were. One hypothesis is that someone (Haberman, Rubin) suggested the complicated moving proposal. Rubin was always making up these proposals for playing "musical schools" during the planning (only half in jest). The first article might have been designed as a trial balloon, to see whether there would be any groundswell of resistance from the Medgar Evers people. If not, things would proceed; if yes, then we would see. It may also have come from a separate plan to move Evers students out, which Walker and Jackson seized on as a platform on which to "go public." In any event, the strategy did not work to the advantage of the College High School project.

A similar effort to shuffle schools occurred in the spring of 1978, when the central office proposed moving Arts High into DeSoto High School, not far from Lakefront Center, and transferring DeSoto students to South Park. But Arts High faculty and students not only mobilized demonstrations at the central office, but were successful in getting cultural leaders in the arts to lobby the new mayor and the City Council for passage of a $35 million budget item for finishing the "$3 million hole in the ground" (the already-poured foundation at Lakefront Center). And pending action of that sort, they refused to move from the College campus. As Victorremarked:

> The one thing I learned with all of this stuff is you don't count your chickens before they hatch... So I would say, "Until it's there, it <u>ain't</u>."

Summing Up

Implementation Success

College High School was not implemented, either in its original form, or in the cut-down, incongruent form it began to assume at Holmes. The project is officially on hold. But it does not have a mobilized constituency, and most key actors have dispersed. As we write, there is a new city superintendent nominated by a new mayor after Stein's retirement; Sy Hecht has taken a nearby suburban principalship; Greg Walker is in the presidency of a community college in the municipal university; Mike Goodman is a high school assistant principal. Abe Gordon's contract was not renewed by the College. Even Irving Haberman is gone, fired by the new superintendent. It seems unlikely that a college high school of the sort the planners envisioned will materialize.[39]

Explanations

What might account for this final outcome? We shall review the case using the general set of categories in our conceptual framework.

Political stabilization. The most critical period in the planning for College High School occurred in the context of a chaotic fiscal crisis which severely threatened Lakeport and its public education system. Within an atmosphere of rumors, gossip, total uncertainty, and new dire predictions daily, the planners attempted to gain funding, secure a site, and get their superiors to come to some kind of closure on the implementation possibilities.

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39) Though it is in principle possible. As we write (October 1978), the university Board has passed a resolution favoring the school, and Floyd Henson, back temporarily in the deanship, said the planning committee had a "new lease on life." He hoped that a regular principal would be appointed through regular central office channels, subject to College veto, by February 1979, "though there was some uncertainty," and that a new full-time faculty-school liaison person could also be hired by then. Though Walter Jackson was still nominally the planning committee leader, Henson stressed that he (Henson) was taking the primary initiative.

Though the CHS faculty would be regular Lakeport High schoolteachers, he hoped that College faculty could help with curriculum development, special projects, and even "team teaching," as well as consulting with the teachers.

Henson expected that a school for 300 students would open in the fall of 1979 in temporary quarters on the campus. The old Arts High facility would be available "two years down the pike."

But such expectations had been raised and dashed many times before in the history of CHS. We concur with Victor's pronouncement above.

But the Initial Design Committee did not do a very successful job in the face of these very real outside pressures. Their environmental relations were characterized by avoidance; their inability or refusal to deal with their environment in a proactive or constructive manner helped push them into their circular patterns of discussion and decision-making. They avoided confronting and making the difficult decisions that faced the planning. They did not come up with contingency plans or alternative proposals when the planning seemed stymied by the fiscal problems. They went over and over their plans, and the more they did, the more confused they got. If the Arts High building had been available, if implementation on the campus had seemed imminent, the planners might not have gotten so entangled in their own words and ideas.

The famed February 1975 retreat is symbolic of the IDC's approach to its environment. At the time of the retreat, getting away from the members' immediate surroundings and bosses was a valid withdrawal mechanism, a rational choice of action. It was early in the group's life, and provided an important group-building function. Socio-emotional contacts were established, and important tasks (like development of philosophy and major vision) were accomplished in the intensive weekend. The "temporary system" setting (Miles, 1964) may have provided a new arena where familiar, ritualized behavior was unnecessary, even inappropriate, and where task accomplishment could flourish. But the committee never grew out of the retreat. They invoked its spirit in a mythic fashion and explained their difficulties as stemming from insufficient working time together.[40] And they continued to avoid confronting their environment, reacting to rather than acting toward their superiors. The use of personal politics avoided confronting the more conflictual issues or taking a harder line when it might have been suitable. Circumvention techniques were sometimes successful in the immediate sense, as with the appointment of Goodman, which aided planning-implementation linkage. But in the long run, the informality and "friendliness" of the agreements left College High School very vulnerable.[41]

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40) The IDC held one "off-site" meeting all day at Diane Levitt's house, and said it had gone much better than usual. But a field worker who observed the session could see no real difference from their usual meetings.

41) An energetic and skilled group of planners can sometimes use informal agreements for <u>their</u> advantage. The IDC did not.

At bottom, the IDC's right to plan was ambiguous; they had little sense of legitimacy. This appeared at two levels: there was no firm site, hence no firm timeline for planning and implementation, and more basically, the committee lacked the power it needed. As Ora reflected afterward:

> The committee's analysis of itself was right; we were pawns in a game. The big cop-out that everyone used didn't prove to be a cop-out; everybody was in fact waiting for all the big higher-ups to make a decision. There wasn't so much the committee could do and it really didn't have any power.

Furthermore, the planners did not make use of the mandates and legitimizers which did exist. Greg Walker occasionally referred to the decentralization law, which permitted but did not require that the municipal university could operate a high school in each area, and he sometimes mentioned Cheifetz' commitment. But in contrast to Arts Co-op, where Jane Sobel steadily used the numerous mandates as justifications and explanations of the need for the Arts Co-op project, the CHS planners rarely made a case for their school in this way. They relied instead on philosophical statements of need. Interestingly, the planners never considered the relatively recent open admissions policy of Lakeport College in their discussions (which was admittedly creating great problems for the College because many of the students came in with poor basic skills). Nor was there any discussion of the idea that this might be an underlying motivation for the College's interest, one that could be played on for support. Perhaps there was a reluctance to surface the issue because it was an implicit criticism of city high schools, which might threaten the cooperation among the interest groups involved in the planning.

In addition to avoiding contact with their institutional and municipal contexts, the IDC also kept distance from the "community"; they were not insistent in their efforts to involve parents, accepted constraints posed by Caravello, the LFT official, and never seriously considered what role parents might play, successfully turning off the few parents who did show up. By and large, this did not hamper their technical planning for the school, but it certainly turned out to be hurtful when the game of "musical schools" began. Had they had a strong and articulate parent constituency, as did the parents at Medgar Evers, they might well have been able to collar space for the school.[42]

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42) The enterprise, unlike both Arts High and Evers, also lacked a student constituency. That is natural for a new school, but the only student involved (Helena Karatos) tended to be treated as a token, and the few students involved were hardly listened to during the planning at Holmes.

We should reiterate here that at a basic level, what seemed to be occurring was a half-hearted, poorly coordinated effort at collaboration and exchange between two institutions--the central office and the College, with the wary, self-protective participation of a third--the union. Initially, there was plenty of mutual suspicion, which gave way to trust and mutual understanding among individuals after the retreat. But the understanding was never deep,[43] and the institutional stakes were never quite explicit.

It was not just a case of professional and political stakes being in conflict, as Sy Hecht suggested:

> As an educator I say of course you must have preplanning, the project can't live if you don't have preplanning. As a representer of the division I say, "But we don't have money, the preplanning must come out of the teachers' time." You are constantly torn between what you feel as a professional and what in reality you know the constituency you represent wants.

It was more that no one, personally or institutionally, seemed willing to make commitments, to lay their lives on the line for CHS. If the school could materialize without jeopardizing anyone's interests, fine. But if it were to fail, nothing would be lost except some half-held hopes.

Vision development. The Initial Design Committee developed a vision of College High School at the retreat. But the vision was clouded by a combination of bureaucratic constraints, unavailability of resources, and poor group skills.

There was an indication that large areas of disagreement might exist about underlying assumptions of the vision. But these, (such as what the IDC really meant by 'inner city youth,' or the ideas about the family structure of blacks and Hispanic students) were rarely broached; time was spent instead on supposedly figuring out how to implement aspects of the plan. Thus there seemed to be little or no shared vision below the surface of the rhetoric. This disagreement showed up especially in the IDC's presentation to visitors at meetings. The lightly-owned, confusing vision ultimately made it easy for Goodman to revise the target population goal in order to interest the annex teachers. But in so doing, he compromised a meta-goal and went against the mandate of

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43) Greg Walker, for example, was "amazed" at the power wielded by Herman Fine near the end of our story, though he had had repeated contact with Fine and many central office personnel.

the Steering Committee which Felix Frey had articulated months before. The goal shift was not trivial, as Sy Hecht recollected later:

> It /CHS/ was a politically motivated project designed to attract the best, the cream of Area A, in one school at Lakeport College. It's seen that way by people in both systems to this day.

He went on to say that the inclusion of the biomedical program during the early planning had in his view a political motivation for the College, which wanted to get a medical school under its wing. That issue never emerged in the committee, which was "operating wi good faith that this was going to be a cross-section." Whether or not his assessment is right, it did seem that the case for ministering to all inner-city students somehow lacked a strong constituency.

Social-architectural design. The original design for the school, roughed out at the retreat, was potentially congruent with over-all goals, and constituted a reasonable means for achieving them. But the congruence of goals and organizational means gradually evaporated because the planners had sacrificed the small family cluster of 25 students to the union contract regulations, emerging with a group of 136. They placed the main burden for making the CHS a humane institution on this hugely extended "family."

It was not only that one interest group's innovative solution stepped on another group's contractual constraints. It seemed that it was hard for committee members not to take the familiar choice: they often thought primarily in terms of "courses" and "subjects," for example, rather than in terms of designing a radically new learning environment.

The expertise and the experience of the committee members limited outside knowledge utilization and left them arguing about their own, often familiar solutions. Committee members who lacked particular expertise had to take the worth of these solutions on faith.

The reluctance to question constraints contributed to the circularity syndrome. Not very open to considering a variety of alternatives, and lacking good management for focused group discussion, the group tended to choose solutions which (a) were presented by the more influential committee members, and (b) which were more concretely discussable. The "numbers game" re the size of the family is a good example.

We should note that the centrality of the family was a design aspect which made life quite difficult. Since the group had connected everything to the family organization, shifting its size meant that they had to unmake and remake many decisions which had been made before;

with the larger grouping, the basic intent of the family was disturbed. At the same time, though, the larger grouping protected, if not the intent, then the structure of the other elements of the plan. This contradiction resulted in endless confusion and disagreement about both the means and ends of the family.

Finally, one major component of the plan, the relationship of the college to the high school, was never discussed in any but the most abstract terms. The high school division members seemed to have a very vague view of the "resources" the college faculty had to offer to a high school. There was no mention of any details--how regularly college faculty would teach, if they would have administrative roles, teaching roles, or consulting roles; how the school would be governed (outside of the traditional principal/assistant principal control) so that college interests could be included and protected; exactly how the high school students would have access to college programs, facilities, and personnel; how college faculty would be paid; whether only a high school division person could be the principal or director; and so on. Lacking any decisive work on this subject, the College High School could easily have become another high school totally run by the high school division, and not a true collaboration as envisioned in the early planning days.

Actualization. The first steps at Holmes toward bringing the school into reality encountered a typical--and painful--dilemma. Should the planners' goals be adhered to, or was revision realistically necessary to adapt the plan to existing faculty in an existing school? The choice was between adhering to the original target population goal of a cross-section student population, risking loss of faculty support among the teachers at the annex; or revising that goal by recruiting a higher-achieving and more elite group of students, a big selling point for making the school an attractive place to teach. Perhaps because the original goal was not fully owned, and because the planners had never made clear to themselves--or others--which aspects of their vision were "core" (could not be altered without losing the basic intent of the school), goal revision was the choice. In some ultimate sense, it did not matter, because there was a hidden whipsaw: better students would satisfy the teachers, but a successful CHS, moving out to its own site with its elite students, would be unacceptable to Herman Fine.

The dilemma of constraining the implementers vs. allowing them autonomy was real one for some members--notably Sy Hecht, who said:

> Actually we were beginning to feel we mustn't have it done by X date, because if we have it done by X date we will have been unprofessional...you had to drag, and the easiest way to drag was with this other concern of representing your constituents.

As we have seen, he was concerned not to over-design without involvement of implementers. Even so, the IDC probably did get into a good deal of

detailed curriculum planning, while worrying about making things "teacher-proof" (since they realized they could not select teachers) versus the importance of teacher involvement.

The informality of the arrangement with Mike, as the chief implementer, had unanticipated side effects. There was already a relationship between Goodman and the IDC, and when the CHS moved into the annex, the changes in this relationship were not really worked out. No clear channels of control or communication were set up between the IDC and the implementation group. The IDC did push Goodman to alter the student population decision somewhat, but he had already promised the teachers an elite group of students; to retract that completely might have caused a serious credibility gap with the newly interested teachers. The IDC had perhaps enough investment in seeing some actualization of their vision that they seemed quite willing to "let Mike do it," even if important things got lost.

P/I Group Capabilities

In general, the Initial Design Committee did not cope very well with the tasks and dilemmas associated with planning and implementing a new, innovative school. There were many assets they had which they did not capitalize on, and they were unwilling to admit they might be lacking in certain skills.

Legitimacy development. The IDC had a right to plan, insofar as there was a planning group whose superiors had assigned them to the project. But the planners did not do very much to gather endorsement from their environment, and did not make use of the legitimizers and mandates which existed and which could have been exploited to their advantage (such as the decentralization law, the open admissions policy, and Cheifetz' commitment). They could have established a much more solid position for themselves by emphasizing the unfulfilled need as expressed in formal mandates. Instead, they relied on the legitimacy "granted" by Haberman, the Steering Committee, and the unsigned agreement.

As we have emphasized, the IDC did not have clear control over the right to plan a campus high school. They definitely felt they did not have the right to stop planning, and had to rely on their superiors for the important decisions. The IDC could not proceed (in its own view) until these decisions from above were handed down. Furthermore, the white elephant reputation of the committee on the Lakeport College campus did not contribute to the legitimacy of the planning effort. For the central office, this was just another planning attempt which, if successful, would be a good mark on their record of providing alternatives. If, however, the difficulties appeared to outweigh these benefits, the project could be easily scrapped or shelved. The only

genuinely committed party, dedicated to the notion of the college high school, was William Cheifetz, president of Lakeport College, and he did not hold the reins over Norman Stein, Superintendent of the Lakeport school system.[44]

Political skills. The IDC contained people who had dealt with and been members of the bureaucracies involved for years. Sy Hecht and Victor Rubin especially had experience and knowledge about the workings of the central board. They had both successfully maneuvered through the system for their own careers.

But rather than helping the committee be "street-wise" about the bureaucracy, their experience might have actually prevented the IDC from being politically sharp in its dealings with its environment. The seasoned central office people relied on their personal connections and friendships for information and action. Their compliance with bureaucratic constraints usually pushed toward changing the plans to suit the constraint, rather than trying to circumvent it. All in all, prior political experience may have inhibited the planners from taking pro-active, imaginative, or politically effective action; the other planning members, lacking in this experience but perhaps better able to fight for the campus high school, could not really take action above the heads or without the consent of the powerful members of the committee

Meta-planning. The Initial Design Committee had a rough "plan for planning" when they began. But when unanticipated events began to occur, they did not revise or re-think this overall plan in any systematic fashion. Their attempt to map out the future in the September 22, 1975 meeting took them off on a tangent of trying to schedule the family so as to get around the union contract constraint. They did make assignments and work got done, but the postponement of implementation left them spinning their wheels and redoing the same plans which had not been very clear to begin with.

The very powerlessness, uncertainty, conflicting institutional stakes and poor meetings management which made planning difficult, seemed to make meta-planning even more so. What the group lacked most was perspective, the ability to back off, confront the absurdity of what they were doing, and get their corporate life under more control.

Decision-making. We have said a good deal about the IDC's decision-making style: its circularity, confusion, and susceptibility to "instant agenda" influence attempts by more-powerful and persistent members.

---

44) At Greg Walker's and the committee's request, Cheifetz, beginning in September 1975, tried to set up a meeting with Stein to settle the realities of the possibility of implementation. Stein was extremely difficult to reach; the meeting finally took place in March 1976 and provided more of the same vague assurances.

There was little systematic management or leadership. No minutes were kept of meetings and decisions. Written documents looked impressive, but often contained sections which did not reflect committee agreement. Basically, the IDC had no coherent work procedures, and no agreed-on format for decision-making: "consensus" was often invoked, but there were no clear guidelines for what would constitute a "made" decision, or how the group was to get to it.

This anarchy did not exist in a vacuum: it was undoubtedly fed and driven by the external uncertainty. (For example, Greg said that once he got into the deanship he noticed that in his faculty meetings he "got out the blue marker again...it felt good."). With a clear right to plan, the more-managerial inclinations of Walter might have made a difference; perhaps group members who seemed absurdly incompetent at group discussion to observers might have learned to discipline themselves in the service of desired task accomplishment.

We might also note that while Greg's weak internal leadership and the apparent indifference his repeated lateness to meetings suggested were often frustrating to IDC members, they may not have been the qualities that mattered, given the surroundings. Walker looked good and sounded good to Cheifetz, Henson, Haberman and the foundations--and kept being optimistic. Perhaps all that was needed was a place-holder, someone to keep the planning moving--even if it were moving in circles. Without a planning group, there would be no school. With a planning group, there might be a school. And his style not only allowed influential members of the committee to exercise their influence happily, but was congruent with the "personal politics" model.

In some sense, too, the vagueness and poor decision-making of the committee did not matter. Mike Goodman, thinking over the work at Holmes, said:

> There was a lot of contradictory stuff we agreed on /during the early planning/, but I had a philosophical framework, I had an idea of what the school should look like. And it gave the faculty sufficient leverage to feel that they had some ownership...it gave them something to work towards. Simply handing them a document saying "Here it is, finished and written: implement it," doesn't work.

But Mike's comment seems a bit self-serving. A clearer, coherent vision for the school could have been produced by better group decision-making (just as the increased power they needed might have been garnered if they could have gotten organized enough to do some serious strategic planning). And such a vision could just as plausibly have increased the teachers' security and ownership, rather than reducing it.

We do not wish to seem harsh. The members of the IDC did feel frustrated, did work hard, both in sub-groups and in general meetings, and showed that they cared about the school. None of them could be characterized as "bad people." But together they were people who--for a variety of personal and institutional reasons--accepted a weak mandate from a turbulent environment, and could not muster the energy either to "get off the boat," or go outside the frame.

Many people had hopes for CHS:

> You can't stop...It would be a prototype for what can be done with all our inner-city youth.
>
> (Felix Frey)

> There has to be something that happens to the culture of the high schools that makes the approach to the student more open...breaking the custodial pattern to make education more powerful, enabling people to accept the responsibility for their own lives.
>
> (Seymour Hecht)

> I've given so many years to education, more than 45, and I've always been interested in experimentation...I want the satisfaction of developing an innovative program that will do something for kids.
>
> (Victor Rubin)

> I think it was innovative simply because of the college's tie-in; that was a biggie. The family would have been unique for Lakeport. I think I would have pushed very, very hard to make sure that there were things happening in the classroom that don't happen in traditional classrooms.
>
> (Mike Goodman)

But hopes like these require the courage and imagination to go outside the frame, to take power where it is not granted, and to deal with the uncertainty and despair that such efforts generate. Those requirements were not met, and the hopes are on the shelf.

They may or may not come off the shelf; in any case, that is not the proper location for hopes.

Participants' Reactions to the Case

Reactions to Feedback of the Case

Semi-final drafts of the case were sent to Greg Walker, Ora Haas, and Seymour Hecht in October 1978. All three had taken jobs outside the planning effort: Walker as president of a community college in the Lakeport municipal university; Haas as a project coordinator in a west coast college; and Hecht as principal of a nearby surburban high school.[45]

The case was accompanied by a letter inviting correction of factual errors, and alternative interpretations, which would be included with the final version.

All three returned their suggestions (which were few) within a ten-day period, in some contrast to the drawn-out process which occurred in most of our other sites. We might infer that these readers' new external status made them less inclined to invest large amounts of energy in the process, and less vulnerable and defensive about the case's interpretations as they might bear on their careers or reputations.

Concluding Comments from Participants

Ora Haas. I found it to be fascinating reading, a well-written and very fair account of a very complex story. I really don't differ with your interpretation in any way, except that I am, of course, less detached and less charitable in my estimation of people's motives. As is natural, I suppose, I found myself getting angry all over again at all the wasted time, and at the fact that the people involved continue to rise higher and higher in their respective bureaucracies. This case could serve as a trenchant indictment of both the college's and the central office's incredible inefficiency and waste; there's a part of me that wishes you had written it up this way, though, of course, I understand why you did not.

Again, thanks for sharing the document with me. I found it a really good summary of my experience. I am currently working as the coordinator of a museum education project, and I've come to realize that I did learn a lot from those two years, if only how not to plan!

---

45) We chose these respondents deliberately: we did not want to get into the wrangling that we expected would ensue had we asked persons such as Victor and Mike, who still had a good deal of stake in the Lakeport schools, to review the case.

Seymour Hecht. I've made no comments in the margins because if I were to proceed from the "given" from which the "case study of planning" does begin, I imagine that my conclusions and perceptions would be very similar to those reported.

However, the "given" from which I was operating was far different. At no point did Haberman ever communicate to me that the College High School was in concept or fact approved by either Lakeport's Board of Education or Superintendent Stein. While I have no documentation, my perception is that Haberman was directed by Stein to make no commitments but to give every semblance of cooperation in order to avoid political pressure or embarrassment for either Stein or the members of the Board of Education. Cheifetz was politically powerful, respected in the college community, and had easy access to the media; however, his own initial attempts to create College High School through a groundswell of local sentiment which would neutralize both Stein and the Lakeport Board resulted in a chaotic meeting in which local residents demanded their own high school, including rights of governance and total autonomy.

From that point on, the project was a political hot potato. That event may explain why not a single member of the university's Board or Lakeport's Board of Education became actively involved in supporting the project. If my recollection is correct, Cheifetz attempted to get Lakeport's Board to pass a resolution supporting the project and was unsuccessful.

In the light of this brief history, "planning for the shelf" was a highly optimistic procedure.

Greg Walker. I do not share some of the conclusions which you drew and I am especially concerned about your interpretation that the committee was itself responsible for some of the problems in which it found itself embroiled. The very basic problem, in my judgment, was that the administration at the central office was never enthusiastic about the project. Lip service was constantly given, but I believe the record would show that wherever bureaucrats of central headquarters could have facilitated, they attempted to thwart. Some of that is excusable, given the very serious financial plight that both institutions were experiencing.

You neglect to point out in your document that I became very much involved in the planning for the budget cuts that were going to take place and that my involvement was as a faculty member and not as a Dean or as a Dean-elect. Knowing the level of cuts that might come and knowing the level for which the administration had to plan, is it any wonder that I could not enter negotiations for any new high school with any degree of enthusiasm? It seems to me that somewhere in your document the very deep cuts which were taken by both institutions should be pointed out and you

might then conclude that it was virtually impossible to plan for something new at a time when draconian cuts were looming over both institutions.

Neither institution has fully recovered, and yet some four years after I became involved in the College High School there are efforts being made to recruit a senior professor to handle the college coordination role and there are moves now being made for the recruitment of a principal. It is interesting that a brand-new high school is going to be opened in a part of the city where there are already 10,000 pupil vacancies in senior high schools. It is further interesting that the basic idea remains alive.

It seems to me that if there is any lesson to be learned from what happened, it is that it is almost impossible to plan something new when one of the parties of interest is less than enthusiastic while the other is overly enthusiastic. Perhaps all that happens is that those people who were involved in the effort somehow manage to go on to bigger and better things.

I hope these comments are frank enough for you and indicate where I might part company with some of the conclusions that have been drawn in your document.

Comment from the Authors

Though Ora Haas spent much energy on the planning, she was in effect marginal to the two primary systems (College and central office) involved, and her current position is distantly removed from the scene. It is of interest that she tends to concur with our analysis, acknowledging the planners' fallibilities. Both Hecht and Walker, however, who were more centrally involved, hold the view that the planners' skills and motives were, in effect, beside the point: that lack of support at the highest level in the central office was the key issue. Thus, in their view, no amount of skill and dedication by the planners could have made any difference.

While this view is attractive in its simplicity, we are somewhat inclined to temper it, if only to be fair to Hecht and Walker. For if their retrospective assessment is correct, they were being disingenuous at best with the committee (Hecht never communicated the view of Haberman and Stein he describes here to the committee, as far as we know, and Walker sternly said, "The Superintendent and the President say to keep planning.") And Hecht had said to the researchers as late as January 1977 that "I really feel that Mr. Haberman would like to see it go"; there seemed little reason for him to dissemble with us.

In short, we are inclined to the view that--as unsupportive as key central office people may well have been--the planning was something more than the "charade" that Victor worried it might be. And a corollary of this view is that the actions and participation of the planners cannot be discounted in explaining consequences. We stressed the idea that the planners' capabilities were not equal to the task they faced. At the moment we are not prepared to conclude--as Hecht and Walker seem to be implying-- that no one could have mustered the needed capabilities, given the basic lack of support from the top.

We should comment further that Walker, as the respondent now closest to the original setting (working in the municipal university, though not in the College), seems relatively most inclined to defend his actions. His view that financial pressures, the resulting cuts and their aftermath were explanatory of the planning failure does not square very clearly with his noting the "interesting" fact that the institutions, which "have not fully recovered", are now reconsidering College High School. Perhaps he was implying by the latter that a new superintendent and a new high school division director were finally saying yes to College High School.

In our perspective, the day-to-day behavior of the planners, and the decisions they made and did not make, were naturally on center stage. We, like most of the planners, had limited access to what was happening in the wings and backstage, so we may have underemphasized the place of politics in the city, the central office and the university. But politics are engaged in by people, including the planners whose work we were trying to understand. It does them no credit to imply that the conclusion was foregone from the beginning.

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THE FOUNDING OF
JULIUS APPELBAUM HIGH SCHOOL

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From the final Report to National Institute of Education, Grant NIE-G-74-0051. Designing and Starting Innovative Schools: a Field Study of Social Architecture in Education. Matthew B. Miles, Principal Investigator.

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Introductory Note

This volume is a portion of the Final Report, Grant NIE-G-74-0051, "Designing and Starting Innovative Schools: a Field Study of Social Architecture in Education," Matthew B. Miles, Principal Investigator.

The Final Report contains the following parts:

Part I: Introduction

1. Executive Summary
2. New Schools as a Strategy for Educational Improvement
3. Planning and Implementing New Schools: a General Framework

Part II: Research Methods

4. Project Overview
5. Research Methods
   Appendices

Part III: Case Studies

6. Westgate Schools: a case study of two open-space elementary schools
7. Change and Conflict: educational innovation in community context
8. Innovation in Lakeport
   College High School: a planning case study
   The Founding of Julius Appelbaum High School
9. Arts Co-op: an experimental high school program

Part IV: Conclusions

10. Reflections on the Case Studies
11. Implications and Advice

Part V: Mapping New Schools: a series of new-school planning guides

1. Setting the stage for planning
2. Designing your school
3. Mapping your school's environment
4. Making your school work

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Dale G. Lake collaborated closely in the creation of the Project and was a strong co-investigator during the first year, with staff members Bunty Ketcham, Denise Burch, and Julie Quain.

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We appreciated very much the competent fiscal and administrative services of Stephanie Clohesy and Sophie Sa of the Center for Policy Research. Parallel thanks to Paul Collins and Jay Sexter of Fordham University, who administered our Teacher Corps funds.

Several dozen colleagues assisted the project with manuscript review, came to our work conferences, and advised on project planning and strategy. They are named at appropriate places in the Report. Here we mention with gratitude those who served in our pool of consultants to school sites: Billie Alban, Marc Bassin, Peter Block, Lloyd Bishop, Bob Chasnoff, Felicia Clark, Al Fitz, Ann Lieberman, Peter Muniz, Saul Pilnick,Herb Shepard, and Mary Hunter Wolf.

We want to express our strong appreciation to William L. Smith, the director of Teacher Corps, who provided warm encouragement and support for our early exploratory work, and for the intensive development of learning materials. And we do not think any project of this sort has ever had better project officers than ours at NIE proved to be: Mary Milne, Charles Thompson, Elisabeth Hansot and Fritz Mulhauser gave thoughtful commentary, steady stimulation, and sustained support.

Perhaps our most helpful collaborators must go unidentified. The several hundred people from our six schools whose work we studied were far from being mere objects of study. Many gave active energy to helping us think through the issues of planning and implementation in new schools. They gave us full and thorough access, and many gave extra time. The study would have been impossible without their help. We know from some, and hope for all, that their learning has been as valuable as ours.

Overview of the Case Studies

Each of the case studies in Part III of the Final Report was based on two to three years' documentation of the planning and implementation of a complete new school for which innovative expectations were held. Our aims were to follow what happened along the way as carefully as possible; to describe, and if possible explain the processes that occurred; and to show how these processes were related to the achievement, revision or abandonment of the original innovative hopes. We believe we have been successful. We hope readers will test that belief carefully as they proceed.

The five case studies include:

Miles, M.B., Westgate Schools: a case study of two open-space elementary schools.

These schools emphasized open education in new open-space settings, in a small, suburban district.

Gold, B.A., with M.B.Miles, Change and conflict: educational innovation in community context.

A new, open-space elementary school came into severe conflict with its suburban community, Lincoln Acres.

Miles, M.B., E.W. Sullivan, and B.A. Gold, College High School: a planning case study.

This experimental high school, involving collaboration between the Lakeport urban school district and a college, was not implemented.

Sieber, S.D., and M.B. Miles, The founding of Julius Appelbaum High School.

A new high school for business careers was set in the same urban school district, reaching out to the local business community.

Sullivan, E.W., Arts Co-op: a case study of an experimental high school program.

This jointly-sponsored school brought practicing artists together with students from an urban and several suburban school districts.

We should express here our warm appreciation to the people whose work we studied during the years of our project. They must remain anonymous through the pseudonyms we have given them, but they are far from anonymous to us. They were not only almost unfailingly cordial and helpful to our efforts, but also supplied useful corrections and interpretations to draft versions of the cases. They taught us a great deal during the course of the project, and we are happy to say that many told us they had learned from the experience themselves.

In drafting the cases from a data base which usually involved several thousand pages of field notes, documents, and questionnaire data, we soon found that they could not be forced into a standard length. Each case is as long as its authors considered necessary for a thorough understanding of what occurred.

The cases were all guided by the general framework of ideas outlined in Part I, although each naturally has some idiosyncratic features.

The case studies have been organized according to a common format to permit easy comparison. Each one provides a general overview of the school as it now exists, then backtracks to its early history. We then see the flow of planning and implementation over time. A summary assessment of each school's success, and our explanations, are followed by commentary from participants in each school, who offer their views on what happened and why.

A Table of Contents at the front of each case is designed to provide an overview of the case structure, and enable rapid access to its parts.

It should be noted that the flow of each case separates sections which describe the events and processes ("Chronology") from those which provide interpretations ("Analysis and Commentary"). Thus the reader can more easily see whether alternative interpretations are possible.

We have already found these cases very productive for teaching and training purposes. It works well to give learners the cases in sequenced segments. They first see a "Chronology" section, then develop their own interpretations, and predictions of what will happen next. Then they receive the "Analysis and Commentary" section before proceeding to the next "Chronology" section, and so on.

The reader interested in general conclusions drawn from all five case studies should refer to Part IV of the Final Report.

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Introduction

Overview

Julius Appelbaum High School was built in Lakeport in 1975 with the intentions of utilizing the resources of local business and government agencies, and of experimenting with a number of innovations in vocational education. For a variety of reasons, these intentions were not wholly fulfilled. The school offers both academic and vocational courses to students of both sexes, with majors in secretarial science, accounting, marketing, computer science and legal studies. As of June, 1977, it had a staff of 53 (including four security guards) and a student body of about 1,000 drawn from all four city areas. The great majority are members of minority groups (black, Hispanic and Oriental), and are typically from working-class families. Female students (who predominate in the secretarial science area) outnumber males by about two to one.

The school is known as an "educational options" school for students who qualify for admission, which means that to some extent the students are a select group. This is a relative matter: about two-thirds of the students are reading at or above grade level, while only 25% of 9th grade students across the city are thus capable; 44% of the city 9th graders are two years or more below grade level.[1] While it is not devoted exclusively to students who will terminate their education upon graduation (and indeed, the majority of seniors this year will probably go on to college) it offers only a few programs for college aspirants beyond the usual degree requirements.[2] Nor could it be called a prototype

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This case study was prepared from field notes, documents and questionnaire data collected by project field staff between November 1974 and June 1977. It was distributed for correction and commentary to a limited number of school personnel. This version incorporates their corrections, and includes commentary both as footnotes and at the end of the study. Sieber was responsible for the basic draft and Miles for the final version incorporating participants' commentary. We wish to acknowledge our indebtedness to previous analyses of the school carried out by E. Wamboi Kironde, the primary field worker, and to suggestions from her, along with those of project staff members Ellen Sullivan, Beverly Taylor, Barry Gold, Bruce Dollar, David Wilder, and our visiting colleague, Rein van der Vegt.

1) See the College High School case study, p. 65, for more information on reading levels in Lakeport.

2) These include advanced languages, honors English and science, a state-accredited insurance course, computer math, and several college-credit business courses.

or pacesetter in vocational education, although this was its original ambition. In many ways it is typical of highly structured urban high schools that are subject to the constraints of a remote and beleaguered central bureaucracy, though the principal, Harold Lassiter, has been effective in gaining central office cooperation on issues such as student and faculty selection and the creation of new positions.

As of the end of the 1976-77 school year, the faculty seems to exhibit little identification with the school as a whole. Satisfactions are drawn from classroom activities and from interaction with peers in each department. The teachers feel that the administrators of the school maintain an aloofness from the teachers' concerns, and do not highly respect them. Thus, the union has become a vital mechanism for the expression of faculty dissatisfaction. The main sources of a chronic morale problem are inadequate curricular resources, work overload, and the principal's style of leadership. The doubling in size of the school in the past year does not seem to have reduced the principal's influence, although teachers enjoy an unusual amount of freedom in the classroom because of the newness of the school and uniqueness of certain of its courses in the Lakeport system (e.g., international trade, business economics). But by and large, the normative emphasis is on structured, orderly processes of instruction and organization.

Discipline is not seen by the faculty as a problem. Thus it seems that the students have apparently accepted this supervisory climate as a necessary means of achieving their job-oriented goals. Indeed, the school has one of the highest average daily attendance rates (about 86%) among high schools in the city, and many students feel that the teachers are making a sincere effort to teach well and to show an interest in their problems.

The most common teaching methods are lectures and class discussions, along with individual skill practice (data processing, accounting, typing). About two-thirds of the faculty report that students engage in "self-directed" study at least once a week. Permitting students to lead class discussions is a practice that is rarely followed, however, and small groups of students use audio-visual aids very infrequently. In short, teaching methods appear to be fairly traditional.

This very brief sketch of Appelbaum High School as of June 1977 gives a general idea of what the school had come to be since its opening in the fall of 1975. How did it happen that a school which began with highly innovative hopes emerged as not so different from its counterparts elsewhere in the city? The remainder of this case study examines the flow of events, from early planning through two years of implementation. Periodically, we pause in this flow to analyze why things occurred as they did.

Our view of the Appelbaum story is that of outsiders who tried to follow events carefully and understand them as clearly as we could. The view from inside naturally involves a different perspective. We have included comments from several key people at the school who have read the case--some differing with our views sharply, some concurring--as footnotes along the way and in conclusion.

Our Data Base

Our work with Appelbaum High School began in November, 1977 with a meeting with Ann Woodward, the designated planning coordinator for the school. As with our other sites, we explained that we would follow the planning and early implementation of the school without giving advice or evaluation, by attending planning meetings, interviewing people, and looking at available documents. We would maintain site anonymity and confidentiality of data from individuals. In return we offered occasional summary reports, and a modest amount ($1200) of consultant-supportive matching funds. This proposed contract would be renegotiated with a principal when one was appointed.

Woodward readily consented to the arrangement, and we began regular research contact. Early field work was carried out by Ellen Sullivan; beginning in July 1975, the primary field worker was E. Wamboi Kironde. Both were in their 20's and female, and seem to have had good access to the main planner, as well as to teachers and administrators when the school opened.

There were a total of 126 contacts with the site. Of these, 18 dealt with the early planning process carried out by Woodward; 32 with the final planning during the summer prior to the school's opening; 56 during the ten months of the first school year; and 12 during the first four months of the second year of school operation. There were 8 contacts in the spring of the second year, including those involving survey data collection. Contacts with the school, once it opened, were typically all-day visits. Detailed retrospective interviews were also carried out with Ann Woodward, her associate Marvin Lieberman, the new principal, a leading businessman who had aided with the planning, and Frank Parker, a consultant. Briefer informal interviews with a wide range of staff were typical whenever the site was visited.

Survey data were also collected from faculty, students and parents of the school at three points: December, 1975 (after 4 months of school operation); June 1976 (end of first year); and June of 1977 (end of second year). Finally, we collected a wide range of regularly-available school documents: progress reports, newspaper clippings, agendas, memoranda, minutes of meetings, handbooks, attendance reports--the paper any enterprise of this sort ordinarily generates and requires.

From time to time Miles, as project director, visited the site and/or interviewed participants, as did research associate David Wilder. Notes of all field visits were regularly discussed in research staff meetings, hunches discussed and cross-checked, and suggestions made for subsequent visits. We feel relatively confident that we have understood the main lines of the events described in the case.

Major Actors

Chart I lists for later reference the individuals who are named throughout the text; they are, of course, a selection of the total of 64 staff who worked at the school, and the many central office administrators and businessmen who were involved during planning and implementation.

The Historical and Political Context

Appelbaum is located in Lakeport, a large Great Lakes City. The reader should refer to the discussion of the Lakeport context in our case study "College High School: a case study of planning," pp. 6-13 and 15-17, to get an overview of the setting of our story.

The Early Planning Period

The idea of a new public school for business education in Lakeport originated with the desire of the Board of Education to replace the antiquated Central Business High School with two smaller schools. But the precise nature and location of the planned new school was the product of a different set of forces. The Downtown Renewal Group (DRG), an association of 200 business executives headed by a prominent financier, was seeking ways of "revitalizing" the area, the mid-continent center of finance, trade and commerce, and of turning it into a 24-hour community "as it used to be," in the words of a local newspaper. The association, founded in 1956, had been active in the development of new housing, a landfill project, and several new office skyscrapers, and was originally interested in the construction of a private school to meet their own work force needs, a proposal made by the Chairman of the Lakeport Committee on Business Education, who was also the Personnel Vice President of a major bank. And no doubt it was the prospect of incurring substantial savings by concentrating the training resources of the various firms in a single center that made the DRG embrace the idea so warmly.

When the association turned the proposal over to one of its members (an assistant to the President of local Sage University) for a feasibility study, however, it was decided that the projected cost was pro-

Chart I

INDIVIDUALS NAMED IN THE CASE

Central Office Personnel

Norman Stein	Superintendent of Lakeport Schools
Irving Haberman	Director, High School Division
William Newman	Director, Bureau of Commercial Education
Herman Fine	Acting Superintendent of High Schools, Area A
Judith Knight	Director, Division of Educational Planning

Planners

Ann Woodward	Project Coordinator
Marvin Lieberman	Assistant to Woodward
Thomas Harper	Consultant

School Administrators and Staff

Harold Lassiter	Principal
Robert Jamieson	Assistant Principal, Pupil Personnel Services
Marvin Lieberman	Assistant Principal, Administration & Organization
Laurel Brook	Assistant Principal, English, Language & Social Studies
Dorothy Mailer	Assistant Principal, Business & Secretarial Studies
Daniel Rosen	Assistant Principal, Math, Science, & Health Education
Roberta Feinberg	Coordinator, Math, & Program Scheduling Chairman
Beatrice O'Brien	Guidance Counselor
Ralph Snead	Teacher, Math
Arlene Barnes	Teacher, Music
Joe Steiner	Teacher, Business
Murray Schwartz	Teacher, Social Studies
Patrick Chan	Teacher, Social Studies

Others

Frank Parker, Consultant

hibitive for the private sector. Apparently the savings envisioned were not sufficient to induce some of the country's wealthiest corporations to invest approximately $25 million in the school--especially when there was the possibility of using public funds. The man from Sage next appealed to the Lakeport Board of Education to locate a business school in the area. Since the appeal coincided with earlier plans to construct a new commercial high school, the Board complied with the businessmen's wishes. Thus, the construction of the new school seemed to answer the needs of both the local business community and the city school system.

Plans for the school were soon widely reported in the local press, with full credit being given to the DRG. "The school will offer a unique program which was developed in cooperation with the Downtown Renewal Group," reported the First National Bank's paper in November 1974, in a typical write-up ten months before the scheduled opening.

> National is one of about 20 banks, insurance companies and investment firms who have executives available to serve on the advisory commission for the school under the Advisory Board for Business Education. . . / It/ will offer courses in banking, insurance, stock market operations and international trade and management technology. It will offer academic training as well, including courses in foreign languages, advanced mathematics, science, instrumental music, etc. In addition, many curricular and programming innovations such as cycles (nine-week and "mini" courses), simulation techniques and independent activities are being planned. Scholarship programs of major companies will be available to qualified seniors, and cooperative college programs are now under consideration with Sage University and the municipal university, which are located nearby.

Another major bank issued a similar story in its company newspaper, mentioning also that the bank had made a grant of $5,000 to hire consultants and to finance student recruitment. Further, a prominent brokerage firm persuaded several companies to cooperate in setting up a stock market trading room in the school. "The room would have a quotron, which has replaced the ticker tape, and a computer terminal, which costs $700 a month to rent," the Downtown News glowingly announced. Another firm agreed to underwrite the publication of recruitment pamphlets by using their own printing presses, and two firms promised to release top executives to discuss career opportunities with students. In addition, members of the DRG assented to the idea of placing selected students in local firms as interns.*

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*Some of these promises never materialized; after reading this account, the school's principal said he felt there was "never any real commitment." However, that is retrospective: the promises were real and energizing at the time they were made.

That the DRG was not solely responsible for pushing the new school, however, was made clear by the school system's director of the Bureau of Commercial Education, a member of the school's Steering Committee, who also played a key role. As he recalled some time later:

> The Board was committed to the idea of comprehensive schools. How do you justify creating a new school which is specialized? The way I handled that obstacle was a little like this: the theory of light, which on Monday, Wednesday and Friday you espouse one theory and on Tuesday and Thursday you espouse another theory; and this is what I did. Many a day I rewrote the program or the speech to fit the organization we were addressing. On some days we'd be a specialized school, on other days we'd be a comprehensive school.

The decision to create a business school with a strong academic program had a number of unanticipated consequences for planning and implementation, as we shall see. Here it is only necessary to note the implication that the student body would need to evince a higher calibre of academic ability than is normally found in vocational schools. Indeed, most of the former programs for business education in the city had been designed for students with poor motivation and low academic ability. One such program, sponsored by the Board and a large foundation, began as a pilot venture in five schools in 1966 and was expanded to four other schools in 1967. Students were deliberately selected for this program who were not eligible for college or for more selective vocational schools. Clearly, Appelbaum was planned as a departure from this model--mainly, one surmises, as a means of appeasing the Board's desire for a comprehensive school.

It is hard to state precisely at this point just how "innovative" a mandate the school had. The interested DRG members clearly wanted a competent, up-to-date, advanced program which would itself be "innovative," given the state of commercial education in the city. It is not clear whether the Bureau actually saw the school as an opportunity for experimentation and innovation. In any case, no one publicly disavowed the idea that the school would be a new departure in many respects (see discussion of key goals below).

And the brochure announcing the opening of Appelbaum for students said:

> for those students who are interested in college and an exciting career, a new comprehensive high school is offering a different approach to a special type of student...

and cited career paths including manager, actuary, owner of small business, and stockbroker, as well as secretary and clerk. The brochure also emphasized

certain major themes: "top-level academic training, innovative approaches to business education, business experience while in school, use of resources in the downtown /business/ community, flexible programs, athletics and recreation, instruction using latest technology, and college and graduate study" /involving advance placement and cooperative college programs/. So at least at the level of promotion, the school was clearly viewed by its planners, and accepted by the central office, as something of an innovative departure from the current state of the art in vocational education in Lakeport.

The P/I Group and its Meta-Plan

The planners. In April 1974, Ann Woodward was appointed by the Board as "project coordinator" for the new school. This was the first time this title had been bestowed in the city system. While Woodward fully understood the mandate of planning a comprehensive-cum-business school, the role itself needed to be defined. Fortunately, Woodward was a person with great energy, dedication, resourcefulness, and the ability to be self-critical--characteristics that helped her to carve out the new role herself. Her position at the time of her selection through a competitive interviewing process was Assistant Principal of Central Business High School. As a student, Woodward had originally been in business education, although, as she said,

> I was tracked into college prep courses when I was young because I was considered too smart for business education in spite of the fact that my father died when I was twelve, and I knew that I was going to have to work.

In short, her own early education exemplified the integration of business and academic interests that she hoped to foster in the new school. Her appointment was to run until the following spring when a principal of the new school would be appointed--and there was no formal guarantee (or even any mention of the idea) that the principal would be Woodward.

One of Woodward's first moves was to start working closely with Thomas Harper, a consultant with the city-wide Council for Economic Growth, who had been hired by the DRG Chairman. Harper worked with her through July, his main official contribution being a survey of employment opportunities and labor market needs of the downtown area. However, Harper's assistance was more wide-ranging than suggested by this specialized task. Woodward described him as a "catalyst" in the planning process, noting that he had helped her out of her "groping phase." She further said that he was a "dreamer with a lot of boldness" who was not "hamstrung" by long association with the central office. Indeed, it appears that Harper helped Woodward develop her political skills. For example, she said that

it was Harper who taught her "never to deal with anyone but the top." As a consequence, she claimed some months later, her reputation had slowly spread and she was being taken seriously.

Woodward was responsible to the Area A Superintendent of High Schools, Herman Fine, and to the Director of Commercial Education, William Newman. She also had a Steering Committee composed of members of the DRG and several administrators from the central office, but its function seemed to be largely legitimative, since Woodward appears to have been the prime mover. A recruitment committee was composed of DRG members with funds "for publicity and mailing to attract all city students because they want it to be a prestige school," said Woodward, referring to a goal that she herself had pushed (see below).

These organizational props did not automatically assure the legitimacy that Woodward needed for exercising a free hand, however. As she noted,

> I had a difficult time at first trying to get people to take me seriously...I had to convince people that I had a right to files and to certain documents, and to be able to get in to see people and have easier access than was being allowed me.

One means of gaining attention from the central office and the Board was "to send copies of things to people who really had no relation to /an/ event, but whose egos were involved." This may well have been a tactic suggested by Harper. Also, she cultivated relationships with the President of local Sage University, the press, the DRG, and the bureau heads at the central office. And no doubt the articles that appeared in company newspapers, the educational press, and even the widely read magazine, Lakeport Update, gave her stature in the central office.*

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*Beatrice O'Brien, a guidance counselor in the school after it opened, said after reading this:

> The political birth of this school and its continuing politically-determined connections will cramp its possibility of ever developing into a healthy, independent enterprise.

We might note here that footnoted commentary on the case appears from three sources: O'Brien, who was well respected by a range of teachers; Ann Woodward; and the school's principal. These three perspectives are often quite different, as might be expected. Several assistant principals and teachers were also invited to comment, but declined. For an overview of the case study feedback and commentary process, see pp.

Woodward seems to have been quite successful in eventually establishing the legitimacy of her role in acquiring the things she wanted. The contributions from the business community that she was able to muster, along with the generous equipment allotments, secretarial help, and concessions on student recruitment that she obtained from headquarters indicate that her strategy paid off. (In particular, she was able to acquire the administrative help of Marvin Lieberman, an accounting teacher at her former high school.) In fact, her exertions were applauded by administrators in the central offices, one of whom even commended her to Superintendent Stein. Such kudos, however, did not mean that Woodward had accumulated any more power than when she had been appointed to the post. Essentially she was still a staff rather than a line person; she had the authority and autonomy that flow from expertise, but remained without the power of an executive. Thus, her essentially one-woman show gained its legitimacy from her style of interaction and her ideas rather than from any formal power base--with perhaps the partial exception of her staunch backing by the businessmen of the financial district.

The meta-plan. The P/I group was thus essentially composed of experts (Woodward, Harper, and Lieberman) with connection to environmental gatekeepers (Newman, Haberman, the DRG) through an Advisory Steering Committee. No "clients" (parents, students) were included, and school "operators" were still to be decided on. This group, as we have noted, had a reasonable "right to plan."

The rough timetable included preliminary design work, and early implementation decisions (supplies, equipment) during the summer and fall/winter of 1974, the hiring of a principal in early 1975, summer training and planning with the faculty, and the opening of the new school for students in September of 1975.

Woodward's planning style tended to be highly pragmatic and manipulative rather than based on an abstract "plan-for-planning" on which there was consensus. The closest she came to a meta-plan was an "interim planning report" she prepared with the assistance of Harper, the consultant, about six weeks after her appointment. The report had been requested by the director of the High School Division, Irving Haberman. Although the report admitted that "the work of curriculum planning has just begun," it listed more than a hundred possible courses. Nor were there any guidelines or general directives for development of curriculum (partly because Woodward considered this to require the collaboration of the teachers). A "planning scheme" was presented that consisted of a flow-chart with the following steps: "Anticipate changing conditions in society and city, assess students and community needs and opportunities, adapt previously designed goals for a school, extend plans for curriculum, plan instructional modes, extend design of environment, and provide latitude for mission of school." At this point the flow chart reiterated itself. While the chart stipulated the principle of deriving curriculum from

goals, instructional modes from curriculum, and the organizational "environment" (facilities, staff program, etc.) from instructional modes, it did not reveal how the goals had been applied to developing the lengthy list of optional courses, nor how the other parts of the flow-chart were to be carried out. Further, since the building was already under construction, it seemed that curriculum and instructional development would not precede the design of the facilities, as stipulated by the flow-chart.

One segment of the flow-chart, however, recognized clearly the need for future adaptations during implementation: "Provide latitude for mission of school that will emerge from: influence of principal, qualifications and aspirations of students, staff contributions, development of community relationships, and operating experience." In short, a rigid framework of goals was not to be imposed forever in the planning phase. Also, the planning scheme was notable in recognizing the initial need to "assess student and community needs and opportunities--employment market demand, resources available, whole city considerations, BOE policies, other." So the environment of the school was to be carefully studied.

The data used to steer planning were largely technical (information, largely local, on business education programs) and political (the hopes and wishes of key stakeholders). The planners tended to work at a highly specific level, identifying particular courses, equipment, supplies, schedule for the school. As yet there were no mechanisms identified, other than planning documents, for linking the plans to implementation.

Key Goals of the School

The publicly-announced goals of the new school were fairly innovative. Although it was to be a business training center, emphasis was repeatedly placed on academic courses and their integration with business courses. "Whenever it's possible and profitable for the students, we'll relate courses in the academic fields to courses in the commercial area," said Woodward about a year before the school's scheduled opening. Moreover, the business curriculum was going to "reflect 'real world' expectations and experiences," according to an interim planning report. The planners envisioned an innovative ground-breaking school, at least as gauged by the oft-repeated notion that the school was to serve as a "prototype" for other city schools.

Originally, the DRG was interested in the recruitment of high school graduates for entry level jobs, a goal that continued to be featured in certain newspaper accounts after Woodward's appointment. Thus, the major bank's company newspaper began its story on the school as follows:

> Where does a student go to get a good foundation for a business career? To college, of course. And if that student doesn't want to go to college...

Similarly, a local neighborhood paper stated that the school was intended "to meet the growing demand for qualified office help." Woodward claimed, however, that she eventually

> convinced the business community that I couldn't supply a labor market solely for them, but we had to prepare kids for college and vocational extension of their education.

But whatever the expectations of the businessmen, the Project Coordinator was not going to be satisfied with terminal vocational education for all or most of the students. This theme was repeated by William Newman, the head of the Bureau of Commercial Education, at a later date:

> I would very much like to see this school develop a relationship like what Marquette High and Tech have with the state Institute of Technology, so that students would desire, and the colleges would want, graduates of this school...so that eventually this school would encourage students to go on to /graduate schools of business/.

This emphasis, of course, stemmed from the Board's insistence on strong academic courses. But it should also be kept in mind that vocational schools have suffered for years from an image of low quality, and the staffs of these schools have been acutely sensitive to this invidious image. Woodward's emphasis on academic excellence was clearly motivated by an effort to combat this widely shared stereotype. The view that business education was solely for women destined for secretarial jobs was explicitly attacked by her initial vision. As she stated in an interview,

> We'd like to have a substantial percentage of boys because there is a tendency for people to view business education as a woman's situation and we'd really like to get away from that prejudice. I have a bias here.

And in a press interview she said,

> If we have a mission in this school, it's to get more boys into business education and more girls to think of themselves in fields that go beyond secretary or bookkeeper.

Further, much of her recruitment effort was focused on alerting middle-

class white youngsters to the school's offerings so that a racial balance could be achieved. (She assumed, as it turned out correctly, that many black and Spanish-surnamed students would opt for this school rather than for Central Business High.) Her hope was that the minority students would benefit from association with more academically able youngsters;* and also that the resources and power of the school would be more assured if the student body contained a large portion of whites. Thus, she very much desired to recruit from all four areas of Lakeport rather than being restricted to Area A, and to be able to participate in the screening process herself. It was especially important to take the recruitment process out of the hands of the junior high school counselors, she believed:

> One of the problems that we're faced with in this area is the traditional view of business education -- that the less smart kids are tracked into it. Possibly our worst enemies in this area are the junior high school guidance counselors, and one of the things we'll need to do is reeducate them and their view of business education.

Another goal of some importance to Woodward was to foster an egalitarian climate in the relationships between staff and students. Thus, she proposed that the faculty and the students share rest rooms, and that teachers' desks not be used in the classrooms. "I want it to be a school that students feel good about walking into," she said.

In general, the school's innovativeness inhered more in the educational means that were planned than in long-range goals or an overriding vision. For example, when Woodward was asked whether a set of goals had been drawn up for the school, she replied, "No, not a set of goals, but a set of tasks." And it was these tasks that were given the major emphasis in newspaper articles and subsequent progress reports: setting up relationships with the local business community for work experience, independent study, modular scheduling, majors in international trade, banking, insurance, and stock market operations, and courses in Arabic and Japanese. In view of this emphasis on innovative means--not well knit together into an organic framework--rather than carefully drawn up objectives that the means were intended to achieve, it is not surprising that her joint planning efforts with her Steering Committee entailed some confusion. When one of the more active members of the Steering Committee, an executive of a major bank, was asked by a researcher about the basic assumptions and philosophy that had guided the early planning phase, he was unable to say what they had been. Moreover, he recalled that the Committee had engaged

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* Woodward said after reading this:

> This sounds racist. Who says minority students can't also be academically able? I hoped for a mix of all kids so that the school would not run with "white stereotypes" or "black stereotypes."

in many debates over curriculum and student selection, but that in the absence of a framework of objectives these debates had usually degenerated into arguments between businessmen and educators about the proposed program. (One of these debates also concerned the name of the school, for Julius Appelbaum had been a leading union official and the big business executives were not keen on memorializing his politics in their school.)

The emphasis on specific tasks did not seem to lead Woodward in the direction of designing clear organizational structures and processes to support them. Rather, she seemed to be assuming--perhaps sensibly--that the ordinary features of Lakeport high schools would simply fall into place. A principal, assistant principals, departments with heads, guidance counselors and so on would be the "natural" way to do things. As the Lakeport idiom might have it, "What's to design?" As we shall see, however, the absence of organizational features supporting particular goals would make it difficult to achieve them.

Brief Chronology

Data from the environment. Harper had conducted a study of employment interviews with a sample of personnel in the downtown area who were considered best qualified to answer questions regarding the job market in their particular company or agency; the major findings were as follows:

> Evidence of the importance of work experience gained during high school years; widespread availability of generous tuition benefits to finance the higher education of employees; a wealth of curriculum resources in the business community; a pronounced lack of feasibility in trying to provide regular group instruction for students at premises of nearby business and government organizations; surprisingly high proportions of entry-level office jobs (2-to-1) that do not require typing skills; and the many career opportunities in office work for young men as they graduate from high school.

Other notable findings were the large proportion of jobs that did not require college degrees (from 51% in city government to 80% in insurance, the overall proportion being 64%); a gradual growth in number of entry-level employees; a growing opportunity for women in supervisory and management jobs; the high value placed on previous work experience when recruiting new employees; and the willingness of the informants to cooperate in planning and implementing the new school. In sum, the initial step in the "planning scheme" flow-chart had largely been taken. Otherwise, the flow-chart seemed to have little bearing on what had taken place (e.g., construction of the facility before instructional modes had been decided) or what was to take place, as will become apparent. And Harper's data, useful as they were in mapping the environment, did not seem to generate

any specific organizational features in the emerging design (for example, specification of how work experience would be arranged, or how the "wealth of curriculum resources" in the business community would get into the school program).

Curriculum planning. As we have noted, curriculum development had not really begun. Woodward had gathered some materials from the major companies in the area, and obtained the promise of experts from the American Banking Council, the Lakeport Financial Institute, and the Institute of Insurance to sit down with the planners. (This seems never to have occurred, however.) And the central office supported one person to start work on an international trade curriculum. But in November 1974, seven months after the project coordinator had started to work, she explained that the "curriculum is in no way ready at this stage, and after the teachers are hired we are funded for Saturday writing projects." In short, a great deal depended not only on the type of student who would be recruited to this rather challenging high school, but also on the qualifications and commitments of the teachers. And as we shall see, neither of these conditions was under Woodward's control.

The major sources for whatever curriculum planning had taken place seem to have been experiences and "expert counsel" from Central Business High School, and the advice of persons located in the Bureau of Commercial Education and other parts of the central office, Sage University, and the municipal university. In addition, an "informal survey" of courses in other Lakeport high schools was described in the earlier interim report as "well advanced." Documentary sources mentioned in the interim planning report were the minutes of the planning group's meetings, papers prepared by a central office-commissioned consultant (which Woodward privately considered worthless), an article written by William Newman of the School Board's Commercial Education Bureau, a statement prepared by the Business High Schools' Principals' Association of New York City, and two articles by James S. Coleman. In short, all sources with the exception of the Coleman articles (which were not on business education) were local, and only one consultant from outside the district was used. Woodward's debt to the personnel in the city's central offices was reflected in her statement that, "I brought together the heads of the Bureaus and asked them, 'What do you see as being things you'd like to see being put in the instructional courses at Appelbaum?' And also, 'What kind of equipment would you want to see in your field?'" William Newman of the Bureau of Commercial Education, with whom Woodward conferred many times, was viewed as being especially influential because, in Woodward's words, "he produces the budget that will go into the school." Thus, there is at least the suggestion that political expedience might have played a considerable role in planning the school's program.

Locating resources. Publicizing the school among the junior high schools in the city and acquiring funds and equipment absorbed most of Woodward's (and Newman's) attention throughout the fall and winter months prior to the projected opening in September 1975.[3] Woodward's major strategy in acquiring equipment was to have the school classified as a vocational school in the Board's High School Directory, which qualified the school for special equipment allowances.

After being on the job for seven months, Woodward reported that virtually all furniture and special equipment orders had been submitted. She had spent a good deal of time persuading the budget chiefs that the special features of the school required careful examination of each request, instead of routine handling based on standard formulas applied to schools with ordinary classrooms and programs. For example, she was able to acquire an unusual number of electric typewriters on the grounds of individualization, and to make a persuasive case for a computer although the one computer allotted per area had already been installed elsewhere. (In this instance, she cunningly argued that she had saved money by suggesting the elimination of a communication repair room and the heavy equipment associated with traditional industrial arts and home economics classes. In fact, these features had been found inappropriate for the school.) The only major request rejected by the central office was $36,000 for a summer institute for the new staff. But this setback did not prevent her from proceeding to make plans for the institute,

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3) Another potential resource involved our research project. We first made contact with Ann Woodward in November 1974, proposing a research relationship; the benefits to the Appelbaum planning were outlined as occasional summary reports, plus matching funds available for consultants who could aid with planning processes and strategy. Woodward was positive; we began field work, and drafted a contract agreement in late December 1974 which was eventually approved by Herman Fine, acting Area A superintendent of high schools, on February 5, 1975.

Woodward was interested in the consulting provision, and suggested that Miles, the project director, explore the possibility of the central office's providing the matching part of the funds out of a special division of educational planning, headed by the innovative Judith Knight. When Knight indicated interest, Woodward wrote to Fine asking for a second "approval" of the study; he and Irving Haberman, the director of high schools, gave it with an addendum: "It is understood that the High School Division will not be able to fund this study in any way."

However, the funds from Knight never materialized, and Woodward did not press further or request consulting assistance.

for she realized that the innovative features of the school required intensive training and the fostering of special commitments in the staff of the school. Curriculum development was also to be a major goal of the institute--which, it should be noted, was to be held after the expiration of Woodward's appointment.

Student selection. But there was another set-back that did not involve funds. As already noted, the concept of a "prestige school" was predicated on the ability, first, to recruit students citywide, and second, to insure that the most academically qualified were selected. After great effort, the first goal of citywide (unzoned) recruitment was only partially attained by Woodward. While students anywhere in the city could apply for admission, a certain percentage was allocated for Area A, where the school was to be located. And the central office prevented her from realizing the second goal by adopting a process of random selection from an alphabetical list submitted by the junior high school counselors who, as we have seen, were Woodward's betes noires. But in spite of these constraints on recruitment, the plans for a challenging business and academic curriculum, and for placement in local firms in positions of responsibility, remained unaltered.

Woodward had proceeded to recruit students from the entire city before the decision had been made about the legality of this procedure, for she had learned that it was sometimes necessary to circumvent district regulations to achieve her goals. For example, because funds could not be accepted directly from the community, the businessmen agreed to participate on a voluntary basis in workshops for students. Another set of constraints was posed by the teachers' union. According to its regulations, a principal can select only one-third of the faculty of a new school, the remainder being transferred ton the basis of seniority. However, here too it was possible to "make a deal" with the union, if not to engage in outright circumvention of the rule. Woodward explained,

> If you give teachers four periods of teaching and one at the resource center, then you can have a fifty per cent choice of teachers.

Thus, Woodward was by no means a slave to regulations.

Selecting a principal. In February 1975 (ten months after Woodward's appointment as project coordinator), an ad was placed in the district newspaper for a principal of the new school. A screening committee for initial selection of the principal was to be composed of parents from the City Parents Association (CPA) together with two businessmen who favored Woodward for the job but who had no voting power. Three names were to be submitted by the parents to a committee of central office personnel to be

appointed by the Superintendent, who would then interview the three candidates and make the final decision. The Superintendent reserved veto power.

The CPA was a citywide organization whose interest in education was widely seen as predominantly political. Its involvement in selecting the new principal came about because of the decision to recruit students citywide. Otherwise the selection would have been made by the Area A Parents' Association, which was more oriented to substantive educational issues.

Woodward had originally said to a researcher that she would be satisfied with a position of assistant principal at the new school. But as she gained more experience, self-confidence and status, she grew hopeful that she would be chosen for the principalship. As she stated in an interview, "Professionally, I know I can't return to being assistant principal." As it turned out, however, Woodward was not even among the three candidates whose names were submitted to the central office selection committee.

Considering the tenor of the interview ten parents conducted with her, this outcome was not surprising. For it seems that the parents' interest in the program and goals of the school was nil. Instead, their questions focused on riots and homosexuality, and whether Woodward planned to install surveillance cameras in the halls. Taken aback by this line of questioning, Woodward responded at first by pointing out that these were not the kinds of problems that one normally confronted in a business school. But they pressed her to explain how she could hope to handle such problems,[4] and pointedly asked whether she would consult the City Parents Association when discipline problems arose. She replied that she preferred to handle such situations herself--which possibly lost her several votes on the spot. Although the parents virtually ignored the innovative features of the school program, Woodward did manage to assert that she wanted to continue with her planning and to be able to implement the programs that she herself had designed.

The failure of the parents to recommend Woodward raised a storm of protest. Letters and telegrams poured into the office of the Superintendent. A member of the Steering Committee divulged that Woodward's rejection was a major source of alienation for the business executives in the downtown area. "It was like one woman having a baby, and then you take it away from her to give it to someone else when it's born," he observed. When Superintendent Stein asked the screening committee why Woodward had been overlooked, they replied that she had not fulfilled the required three years

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4) Woodward found later that they thought she was too young to deal well with discipline.

of administrative experience. Woodward herself pointed out that only two years had been required until the committee itself changed the rule, and that in any case, she was only 30 days away from fulfilling the purported three-year requirement. But it seems that none of the district administrators who backed Woodward, including possibly the Superintendent himself, felt sufficiently secure to violate the will of the parents, and were reluctant to test their strength over an issue that was not of high priority. One person close to the planning commented, "No one will stick their neck out unless they're sure they're going to be backed up. Each one is out to protect his skin." And as Woodward herself realized, "These are 'professional parents.' They would take you to court."

One explanation for the decision not to recommend Woodward given by qualified observers was that the selection was dictated by political considerations. In particular, according to a member of the parent group, it appeared that the parents believed that Woodward was the Board's choice and resented the implication of being treated as rubber stamps. But whatever the true reason, Woodward was passed over in favor of Harold Lassiter, the Assistant Principal of English at Meyerson High School, a specialized school emphasizing commercial art and design.

While the new principal had the proper credentials for the job, he did not seem to enjoy a citywide reputation, and indeed was described by Woodward as a "traditionalist" who knew "nothing about business education." Woodward also saw the principal as "politically well-connected; his wife held a position on the Lakeport Board of Education.* Lassiter seemed to be somewhat inexperienced in organizational leadership, however, as suggested by the fact that he did not have any persons in mind to fill the five assistant principal positions in the new school. "What disturbs me somewhat," said Woodward, "is that all of us walk around with a retinue of people. He doesn't seem to have anybody."

Planning-implementation linkage. Despite the bitterness created by the appointment, the transfer of leadership was handled in a seemly manner. Woodward gave Lassiter a detailed status report with several recommendations for immediate action and turned over all of her files. She organized with DRG (who paid for it) a luncheon, attended by key central office people and businessmen, at which she introduced Lassiter to many of the people on the Steering Committee. Also, because Lassiter selected Marvin Lieberman as an assistant principal for Administration and Organization, a certain amount of continuity with Woodward's plans seemed assured. This appointment also made Woodward more receptive to helping the new principal, and she and

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*Woodward also believed that Lassiter knew "all the parents on the selection committee by name"; Lassiter said after reading this that he knew only the Meyerson parent association president, who "participated very little in the interview." He vigorously countered the "libelous" inference that he had been selected for reasons other than those of merit, citing his 27 years of service in the schools.

Lieberman also suggested some promising teachers for the new school. Further, within a few weeks, Lassiter had selected one other assistant principal, Robert Jamieson, suggested by Woodward; and soon a division of labor was worked out whereby Lassiter concentrated on hiring the new staff while Woodward took care of most other matters, such as publicity, curriculum, and business contacts.* Thus Lassiter seems to have been aware of the need for continuity between planning and implementation of the new school.**

Woodward's status report to the new principal covered such matters as admissions, the progress of the new building, correspondence, curriculum planning, equipment, supplies, printing, textbooks, and personnel appointments. Additionally, Woodward took pains to convey the philosophy of the school by attaching various reports and funding proposals. She then added:

> I would also like to suggest that you discuss with me some of the programs that were promised to the incoming students because it was on this basis that the students chose the school.

Woodward eventually became the principal of Emma Goldman High School in the Bronx, a girls' vocational school--an ironic denouement in view of her dedication to upgrading the image and functions of vocational education by enlisting male students.

Analysis and Commentary

Vision development. As we have seen, some ambiguity adhered to particular goals (e.g., the meaning of a "sound academic education"). The vision of the new school was not fully coherent. However, the major

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* Lassiter tended to minimize Woodward's role, saying that she only handled applications and "paper work," not publicity, curriculum or business contacts, and that both he and she had only 20 days of planning work available. Woodward, however, did not correct the statement of her role as outlined here.

** As we shall see, however, the actual implementation diverged in many respects from Woodward's advice. This may help to explain the curious fact that Lassiter, after reading this case, was at pains to say that there "was no such status report." We do have a copy of the document dated May 31, 1975.

latent conflict between the goals of a solid academic education and a vocational education was resolved conceptually in three ways: by envisioning an integration of commercial and academic subjects within courses, by focusing on recruitment of better-than-average students, and by seeking to overcome the stereotype of vocational education as being restricted to entry-level female clerical jobs (by seeking to recruit white males). The objectives of providing an academic and a vocational education will be referred to here as the terminal educational goals of the school.

Another set of goals concerned the adoption of novel instructional approaches. Here too the parts of the vision were fairly clear, but not well articulated: flexible scheduling was seen as necessary for the work experience program, simulated business situations were congruent with training for entry-level jobs, egalitarian relationships between teachers and students were viewed as congruent with normal office relationships, and so forth. And the desire to involve the local business community at several points was consistent with the whole intra-mural program. But there was little "tissue" connecting these various goals. And the emphasis on this set of task-oriented goals overshadowed the formulation of terminal goals, or expected long-range outcomes. And since there were at least three terminal goals--academic training for college, commercial training for entry-level jobs, and commercial training for business schools--there was perhaps a need to match each of these terminal goals with a particular set of task-oriented goals, e.g., office simulation mainly for business school aspirants, etc. But this form of articulation was not worked out, partly because the terminal goals were not made completely explicit, not clearly distinguished from one another, and not broken down into their component implications for the school's program.

But there was still another set of goals that remained even more implicit: the ideology, or value system, behind the idea of the school. Was it an ideology of advancing the dignity of the individual through making him economically independent, of fostering equal opportunity in the marketplace, of helping people to find gainful employment, of teaching usable skills rather than general concepts, of broadening vocational education to include commerce and finance and thereby overcoming negative stereotypes, of satisfying the demand of capitalist enterprises for better-trained and more compliant personnel, or what? Even if several of these ideological goals were envisioned, their articulation and prioritization were needed to help in the selection of terminal and task-oriented goals, and especially in preserving the original vision through future adaptations in the course of implementing the plans for the school.

In sum, there were three levels of goals in the vision of the school--ideological, terminal educational, and task-oriented goals--which varied greatly in degree of explicitness. Consequently, they were not linked together in a framework that showed their inter-dependencies. Lacking such a framework, the task-oriented goals (i.e., educational innovations) became

paramount and even gained a momentum of their own because they were more easily articulated, more comprehensible to various constituencies, and less controversial than the ideological or terminal goals. In short, they were saleable.

(There is also a fourth domain of "operational goals" such as order and status-security, but such goals can only be surmised from the actual implementation of activities. Thus, they are not discussed here.)

Here we confront an enduring dilemma in planning and implementation. On the one hand, goals need to be clearly formulated so that programs can be designed and monitored; on the other, they need to be left somewhat vague so that competing interests can be mobilized in their support and flexibility allowed in their enactment. The latter requirement is especially true when goals are inherently controversial, such as the allocation of educational opportunities to different ethnic, racial, or class groups. And since the major goals of Appelbaum High School were directly concerned with this issue, it is perhaps neither surprising nor lamentable that they were left somewhat diffuse, while the more saleable task-oriented goals were spelled out and emphasized.

Political stabilization. Since the idea of the school was partially spawned by the business community and local private educational agencies, which also had a continuing stake in its success, linkage with the local community of elites was very strong and the political stabilization task was potentially well addressed. And since there was a ready-made consituency of upwardly mobile, lower-middle class, minority group parents who were eager for their children to gain positions in commerce and finance, the idea of the school was bound to appeal to this constituency as well. The only failure of political linkage with the environment occurred with the sub-culture of highly politicized parents--the members of the City Parents Association. Perhaps because they were in a rebellious (or at least defensive) mood vis à vis the Board, they expressed their resentment by the symbolic act of rejecting the key planner as implementer. This action may well have had tremendous implications for the later development of the school, as we shall see.

Knowledge utilization. Linkage to the technical environment of educational R&D was limited by the common assumption that sufficient expertise existed locally in the central office and in other vocational schools. Also, the need to gain the support of the central office staff made it expedient to defer to their wishes about certain features of the new school. Thus, only two external consultants were engaged to help plan this $25 million enterprise and only one of these was regarded as helpful. (The intention of exploiting the training resources of local firms for curriculum development was not carried out during the planning phase, it seems, thereby forfeiting another source of external expertise.)

Conceivably, the public relations advantages of emphasizing the task-oriented goals, i.e., the concrete innovations, outweighed any inclination to seek expert advice about the quality and appropriateness of these innovations. Accordingly, only the most fashionable innovations, such as computer terminals, were planned for the school, with a heavy emphasis on technology. (The one exception was the egalitarian relationship between students and faculty, a social innovation that significantly enough was rarely mentioned by the key planner.) In sum, while the emphasis on local expertise served the purpose of sustaining political support,* it militated against a more enlightened understanding of the quality and suitability of certain innovations. (This seems to have been especially true of "flexible scheduling," as we shall see later.) This dilemma in choosing between external and internal reference groups as sources of specialized knowledge did not seem to be recognized by the planners, and therefore was not resolved in a way that served the interests of political support and a sense of personal security, on the one hand, and utilization of the best available expertise on the other. Consequently, the knowledge utilization task was not approached adequately.

Planning style. Although the key planner** had been officially alloted a certain amount of legitimacy to plan, the expansion of this mandate to give her access to files and top persons depended on her style of interaction and her personal qualities. Despite the novelty of the role, she was able to define it rather clearly and broadly (with the help of an external consultant). She never achieved true power, however, which accounted for her losing the battle over selection of students (a significant loss, as we shall see). But she nevertheless was able to maintain or elicit a high level of commitment to the enterprise by everyone from the clerk-typist in her former school to the financial elite.
She achieved these ends by keeping the top people informed and giving them a chance to participate in decision-making (cooptation), by stressing the unique qualities of the school (especially as being on the frontier of vocational education), by bargaining with the central office, by building publicity through the press, and by her personal dynamism in dealing

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*A comment from Woodward about her preferred strategy dramatizes this:

> First you build excitement about a school--people jump on the bandwagon--then you capitalize on strengths of individuals within the areas you seek to develop.

**After reading this, Lassiter objected to this label, saying that Woodward was only a "coordinator of plans made and to be made." He seemed to want to minimize Woodward's role--or perhaps to emphasize that her"plans" had little power to compel. However, regardless of Woodward's formal title (project coordinator), she did in fact serve as key planner, in our view.

with just about everyone. Also, she used formal data on the local job market both to legitimate her early goals and to make necessary adjustments in specific plans. And finally, when regulations stood in her way, she was sometimes able to circumvent them.

Perhaps it was the effective use of these tactics to gain freedom of action that diverted the key planner from seeing the need for a meta-plan, or plan-for-planning. Thus, with the exception of ordering supplies and equipment, and notifying students about the school, her planning seemed to be opportunistic, rather than following a definite timetable for achievement of tasks and sub-tasks. One consequence was that curriculum development was neglected; another was that the new facility was constructed without taking into consideration the planned instructional modes;* and another seemed to be that little thought was given to the kinds of teachers who ought to be recruited, a matter that one would think was as important as the kinds of students to be admitted. Nor were plans (e.g., for work experience) worked out in detail - or altered when it appeared that student selection would be random rather than specific, suggesting a failure to have contingency plans lined up. In short, the very success of the key planner in gaining legitimacy without having to produce a clearcut meta-plan might have reduced the scope and balance of planning. This suggests a dilemma between gaining the needed freedom of action to plan and being obliged to plan within a framework of set times, methods, and objectives.**

In this particular case, however, it must be acknowledged that even without such a meta-plan, planning efforts were reasonably sophisticated and successful. This was especially apparent in the approaches to bridging the gulf between planning and implementation created by hiring

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* Beatrice O'Brien commented that prior facilities and equipment decisions, in fact, tended to determine what innovations were actually carried out (e.g., courses on computing, duplicating, and word processing).

** Woodward's comments after reading this tend to minimize the "opportunistic" aspects of the planning. On the neglect of curriculum development, she said:

> It was never intended /to be/ (nor could it have been) done by one person.

She also said she was aware of the constraints on staffing posed by the central office and the union, and said:

> I know teachers can be inspired when they are part of the planning process and have real input. (cont'd)

someone other than the planner to implement the design. In a variety of ways, the key planner sought to establish continuity--through a status report and explicit instructions, through formal and informal introductions to the planning group, through personnel recommendations, through turning over all files and minutes of meetings, and through continuing to assist the new principal for a short while. In sum, as far as she was able, given the problems of explicitness in goals (see above), the key planner provided for continuity between planning and implementation. She was, in effect, attempting to compensate for the weaknesses in one of the planning styles typical in the Lakeport school system we have already described in the College High School case: improvisational planning, in which there is minimal linkage between planner and implementer, and much last-minute assembly of a school.

Key Decisions

The key decisions during this early period were: the decision to make the high school a comprehensive one with a strong emphasis on business education; the decision to proceed with the construction of the facility before instructional modes had been determined; the appointment of Woodward as the project coordinator; the decision that the school would be a "prestige school"; the decision to collect data on the local job market; the decision to select students randomly (overturning an earlier decision by the project coordinator to select specifically); a series of decisions about the innovations to be included in the school; and the decision not to hire Woodward as the principal.

These decisions required certain capabilities--to develop one's legitimacy ("the right to plan"), to select assistants with special skills, to keep informed about educational innovations, to bargain with district decision-makers, to circumvent regulations, and to gain the endorsement of the community. Legitimacy to plan was gained by co-opting community members (businessmen), exploiting local sources of information and assistance, collecting formal data on the job market, and demonstrating a knowledge of organizational and innovative needs of the school. Investment

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(cont'd)

She also noted that the work experience program did not really need to be worked out in detail, since students were entering in the 9th and 10th grades, and the programs were intended for students when they reached 11th and 12th grades.

So her view is not so much that the planning was incomplete because of a weak meta-plan. Rather, it was appropriately incomplete, to allow for teacher involvement: the dilemma of constraint vs. autonomy.

Her interpretation is reasonable in light of the typical Lakeport discontinuity between planning and implementation, but it does not reduce the force of our comments about weak meta-planning.

(commitment) was maintained by the planner's energetic endorsement of the school's more novel features, both in person and through the mass media. Thus, political skills were clearly in evidence.

Intermediate Outcomes

The end of the school year was approaching rapidly. What had been accomplished so far? The financial resources for the school had never been in doubt, though resources for the needed summer training had been cut from the budget, a potentially serious problem. It seemed that stakeholder endorsement of the school--especially in the business community--was strong. The quality of planning decisions must be counted as uneven. Though many technically good innovations were being contemplated, they did not seem to be well-linked to overall goals for the schools, which were themselves poorly articulated. Goal incoherence also made it easy to shift the student population decision away from its earlier form. And little had been done specifically to consider the organizational forms that would support the accomplishment of organizational tasks. The ownership of decisions was clearly strong for the key planner and her associates, though their lack of power in the environment meant that their enthusiasm would not automatically lead to the agreement and support of others. In fact, the enterprise could reasonably be regarded as quite vulnerable to traditional forces at this point. The business community wanted an effective and modern (not necessarily "innovative") school, and the central office officials involved did not seem to be highly committed to breaking new paths.

The Later Planning Period

Changes in the P/I Group

The only carryover from Woodward's planning group was Marvin Lieberman, who became Lassiter's assistant principal for administration and organization. The Steering Committee was no longer active, and the contract with Thomas Harper had expired. Clearly, there was to be a new regime.

Chronology

Planning tasks. Lassiter now undertook work on staffing, program planning, and locating an alternative site for the school in the event that the building was not completed on schedule. The main contingency was the possibility of a citywide strike of electricians and plumbers that was scheduled for July 1, 1975. When the strike materialized and the Lakeport World mentioned that the school could thus not open in the fall, the principal was "struck with terror," as he described it: "I had a vision

of our students reading that paragraph, and I feared that we might open and have no students to come at all." Lassiter now redoubled his efforts to acquire space in nearby Sage University, which he preferred to the old Central Business High School. (Lassiter's contact with the university had been made by Woodward.) Not only was the university in the same neighborhood as the new school, but it offered more independence, and eventually a cooperative program was to be worked out with the university. The disadvantages of this temporary facility were the lack of a cafeteria, a gym, and assembly hall, and instructional equipment. And, of course, it was not the modern, new facility that all had been eager to occupy.

Another early concern of Lassiter's was the establishment of a parent organization. A few weeks after his appointment, he held a meeting for all parents of the 500 incoming students and about 100 parents attended, a fairly good turnout for a vocational school.

Lassiter said that the goals of the school were three: "to equip a student for either continuing higher education or employment, or both"; to "create an awareness of the opportunity that exists for them in the business world in Lakeport; and to "develop some areas of saleable skill." 5) He then introduced the assistant principals, discussed the prospects of the building's being finished on schedule, showed slides of the structure to date and described functions of various portions of it, mentioned the summer workshop for the faculty, and appealed to the parents to establish an association and a constitution during the summer. He also encouraged the parents to complain to the city planning board about the failure to go ahead with a land-fill recreational facility for the school. Lassiter then answered a few questions from the floor concerning the school's program and the skills that the students were expected to learn. Only one parent raised the question of "chaos" in the school and how the principal intended to handle it. Lassiter dealt with the question as follows:

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5) Note here the substantial shift which has occurred from the goals originally formulated by Woodward and widely publicized to the public and the business community. The original goals had been to relate academic and business courses, to have the curriculum closely reflect "real-world expectations and experiences," to go beyond terminal vocational education, emphasizing excellence. This was to be accomplished in a racially-balanced, humane, egalitarian setting, using innovative means; Appelbaum was to be a prototype school.

Lassiter's formulation moved decidedly toward the routine: there was no mention of innovativeness--or excellence, for that matter. (See below for the even-more ordinary formulation Lassiter gave to the faculty at the beginning of the summer institute.)

> I don't think that children are basically chaotic. I think if you give children something productive and meaningful, and they're interested, I don't think you'll create chaos. Also, one other thing is that since they have opted to come to this school, there is a certain amount of commitment. We have a good staff and we have striven to choose a sympathetic staff that is interested in children. I hope that we can counteract any chaotic tendencies.

At about this time our project director met with the new principal to reconfirm the research relationship; he also offered matching funds for an organizational consultant. (This provision was made in our project to encourage schools to participate, and to give us the opportunity to study the work of consultants.) And it soon became very clear that, although Lassiter consented to continuing the relationship with the project, he was dead set against the kind of consultant that was offered. "I don't really feel the need for an outside consultant," he reiterated in a second meeting with our project director.

> There are many experts here at the central office with whom I've been very impressed these past few weeks and past years. What I'm looking for now is people who can really help me directly.

He did not seem to comprehend the distinction between someone who was skilled in planning human relations and organizational development, on the one hand, and a traditional administrative adviser, on the other.* Moreover, as he asserted, he was far more interested in "content and subject matter":

> School is much more than the administration or the organization. I can tell you about schools with rotten administrations and the school is still good.

Consequently, he felt that a planning and implementation consultant would be superfluous.

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*After reading this, Lassiter wrote:

> I certainly do /comprehend the distinction/.
> I meant what I said, and you don't comprehend.
> /And there was/ no money!

The claim of lack of funds is not wholly diversionary; the fiscal crisis in Lakeport was deepening. Still, had Lassiter valued the idea of consulting help, funds could have been located, as they were (see below) for the summer training institute.

In most other ways, however, Lassiter seemed appropriately oriented to the future. He realized that a parent group would be useful as a source of support (or at least as a neutral agent): that implementation of Woodward's plans required continuity of personnel and selection of persons recommended by Woodward, and that a contingency plan must be made in the event that the new building was not completed on schedule. Also, he looked forward to the summer institute as the major mechanism for socializing the new staff and developing curriculum, and accordingly made elaborate preparations with the help of Lieberman, and less frequent discussions with the other assistant principals.

The summer institute and the emerging organizational design. The summer institute was held July 28 through August 15, with meetings taking place every morning except weekends. Woodward's original proposal listed the major objectives as staff development, organizational development, and curriculum development; these were ostensibly retained. ward had requested summer salaries for a staff of 47 persons, but (as noted above) this request was not honored by the district office. Nevertheless, following an appeal from Lassiter, almost all of the staff expressed an intention to attend the meetings, and eventually about 35 did appear. The salary for one teacher unit ($17,950, the median annual teacher salary) was distributed among the participants.

Lieberman's potential importance as a link with the planning phase became apparent in the meetings, for he was always in the office or around the meetings and did everything to make the institute run smoothly. During the sessions it often seemed that he served as Lassiter's closest lieutenant. But he did not seem inclined to be an advocate for the school's originally-formulated goals, and essentially defined his job as that of aiding Lassiter. With one exception (Laurel Brook [6]) there seemed to be little interaction between Lassiter and the other four assistant principals.

Although Lassiter raised the question of goals at the first meeting, he immediately deferred it, saying "there are more immediate concerns for us." The goals he mentioned in passing were as follows:

> The primary objective of the school is the development of self...The objectives, as I see them, are three: to develop a sound general education; to develop awareness of a particular area; and to develop specific saleable skills and experiences.

It is noteworthy that this statement reflected little continuity with Woodward's intention of creating a "prestige school" with a select student

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6) Brook had served with Lassiter at Meyerson High School, his previous work setting.

body that offered preparation for elite business schools and regular colleges, and that was devoted to preparing men and women for managerial positions. (In fact, as Lassiter stated at a later meeting, "We do not want to be an elitist school, because the day for that kind of school has passed.") He also indicated that he hoped to have the same range of students as in his previous school: "a good mix which is really fair to the city." 7) Finally, at the first meeting, Lassiter said:

> What we can do is open up possibilities...give (students) the desire to go further, to achieve, to derive satisfaction out of working well.

This emphasis on achievement motivation is additional evidence of a non-elitist approach; it may also have reflected the assumption that the incoming students would be poorly motivated.

Instead of goals, the most frequent topics that emerged in both departmental and general meetings during the first week of the institute concerned such matters as class size, the bell system, scheduling, the need for a united front among the teachers on attendance and dress codes, and the need for administrative protection from parents. When the supervisor of one departmental meeting sought to discuss curriculum issues (i.e., the advisability of behavioral objectives), she was continually side-tracked by the security-oriented concerns of the faculty. To be sure, there was a great deal of technical information to be conveyed about the testing program, class offerings, modular scheduling, textbook regulations, and so forth. As one of the teachers pointed out:

> Some of these teachers are very traditional. They've had 15 to 20 years' experience in a different kind of system, so they may not take so easily to the new ideas.

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7) Lassiter was probably treading carefully between the fact that the central office's "random selection" decision had been made as a fait accompli, and the probability that faculty would lean toward preferring better-quality students. The "fair mix" he alluded to at Meyerson, his previous school, was actually above average (55% of 9th graders there were reading at or above grade level) and most of the experienced faculty, we believe, knew this.

But it appears that what passed for new ideas was mainly housekeeping matters rather than substantive concerns.*

During the first week of the institute, virtually nothing was said about a framework for curriculum planning in the general meetings, or even about the rationale for the many procedures that were being promulgated. It was not until the eighth day of the 15-day institute that a comprehensive list of objectives for the school was distributed and discussed by Robert Jamieson, the assistant principal for pupil personnel services. Whatever substantive thinking took place apart from Jamieson's talk was restricted to the departmental meetings and some individual library research at the Board's headquarters, but without the benefit of any orientation that might have been provided by the general meetings.

Jamieson's memorandum on goals was a striking exception to the procedural drift of the institute. He had been on the staff of an innovative city school, was a member of the union's Committee on Innovation, and was on the committee planning College High School. First, the memorandum stated that the school should try to capitalize on the variety of individual strengths that students bring with them, which called for "an individualized model of education." Further,

> The primary goal of the Julius Appelbaum High School is to enable students to develop the abilities, attitudes and talents through which they will find dignity and satisfaction as human beings and contribute to society.

(This goal is a sample of what we have called ideological goals.) With regard to terminal objectives, Jamieson stated in his memorandum:

> We will enable students, upon graduation, to pursue any one of several alternatives: to continue on to higher education in the field of their choice; to find immediate employment which offers opportunity for life work; to decide to return to the business field upon graduation from an institution of higher education; or to do all three if necessary and desirable.

To accomplish these tasks, Wilson's memo called for the following task-

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*After reading this, Lassiter took strong exception:

> The record shows, in general meetings: philosophy and goals, the nature of the students as we see in records; the building; tour of the building; the history of the development of the school (W. Newman). Department meetings: curriculum, texts. The items listed in the case study were minor matters.

A field worker was present at the majority of institute sessions, and her notes support the procedural, less-substantive emphasis.

oriented goals: to provide a "humane school" that developed a sense of identity and belonging through involvement in the decision-making process; to improve students' skills and self-concept through maximum use of local colleges and the downtown business community; to utilize resources beyond the school to enrich the curriculum; to establish external learning experiences; to maintain ongoing community and parental involvement in the school program; and "constantly to evaluate all phases of the Julius Appelbaum High School program."

Curiously, however, Jamieson skipped lightly over his memorandum in his oral presentation and moved rapidly into procedural matters of the guidance department. Nothing at all was said about "constantly evaluating all phases."

But what was most striking was the way in which details of grading, discipline, attendance and program selection were simply dictated to the faculty. The teachers had no opportunity to contribute to the plan, either before or after its presentation.

Not too surprisingly, then, the staff was quick to voice criticism of the plan. But all such criticisms were either deferred or summarily dismissed. For example, when a teacher asked why the faculty should not telephone parents when pupils cut classes, the principal replied, "Because it should go through the /department/ chairman." "Yes," Jamieson hastened to affirm, "because this sort of communication should go through the assistant principal for the department or through the guidance office." Another criticism was that the dean of students had been cast in a strictly punitive role, a role to which the dean herself objected. And still another criticism was that it appeared as if the teacher's right to counsel students was being abrogated by the guidance department.

The lack of input by the staff raised both confusion and hackles, not only with respect to Jamieson's plan for guidance but regarding many other aspects of the program that had been presented to the faculty by the administrators as inviolable. Subsequently, one teacher requested that a meeting be set aside for the faculty to discuss organizing a local union chapter. "And another thing," he added privately, "the administrators can't give all the directions on how to run this school." "Right," another teacher agreed, "there's got to be some give and take."

The source of Jamieson's detailed and lengthy plan, incidentally, seemed to be his own experience:

> From my own experience with innovative schools and College High School, and at Benjamin Hall as a consultant, I have been able to devise a number of innovations in the way a guidance program should work. Now I get a chance to see if my ideas really function by designing them for Julius Appelbaum.

(On two public occasions, he absentmindedly referred to the new high school by the name of his former school.) Only one other source of expertise was cited in his talk: a study that purported to show that the fewer adults the students had to deal with in school the better off they were. This study served as the basis for his assignment of the same guidance counselor to students throughout their four years.

Only one other staff member made a presentation at the general meetings. Roberta Feinberg, the chairman of the math program, had taught in a school with modular scheduling and taken graduate level courses on the subject, and so she was given the full responsibility for this feature of the program. On the seventh day of the institute she made a highly technical presentation of the school's scheduling system.

Personal experience as the prime source of ideas seemed to be the norm for the staff as a whole, perhaps owing to the absence of adequate prior planning for curriculum. While some teachers might have sought new curricular approaches in their personal research, during the departmental meetings that were observed by field workers the dominant model of planning was to select and reorganize portions of textbooks with which the teachers were already familiar. To a large extent, then, curricular planning consisted of reshuffling one's prior practices. A list of about a dozen community resources in the local downtown firms was not distributed until the eighth day of the institute, and a talk on local resource centers was not given until the seventh day of the institute.*

This tendency to rely on familiar materials seemed to block innovations that were proposed. For example, in one meeting a health teacher requested the supervisor to order copies of a new book, Male and Female. But another teacher in the department said,

> We never used that at my school, and I don't think it's really necessary. The other book is standard. I know that it will work, and if we have enough copies of it, we don't need Male and Female. We can just go from our own experience.

Male and Female was eventually ordered and put in use, according to Lassiter, but the incident is prototypical of many others that occurred in department meetings.

Student population. Another, more equivocal influence on curriculum was the anticipated calibre of the incoming students. The prevailing expectation was decidedly pessimistic. The staff had been informed at one meeting that the median reading level was the 8th grade (for 9th and

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*After reading this, Ann Woodward commented:

> I would have had the "wheels" from the firms we dealt with in right from the beginning, to impress on the teachers the unusual role they could play in building a unique school.

10th grade pupils), and in some cases was as low as 5th and 6th grades. In at least one instance this knowledge prompted a teacher to be more innovative to deal with a low level of talent and commitment by proposing a longer shorthand course, but more often it seemed to stifle innovation. One teacher observed with exasperation: "I can't see developing plans until we know what level of student we'll really be dealing with." And then added, with cosmic resignation: "But I'm just doing what I'm told." Another teacher said to a friend, "It's a new school and we've all got to extend ourselves a little more than usual." The friend rejoined: "But, look, we can't make gold out of clay. What do you expect with the kinds of students they are sending us?"

The administrators strove to minimize the low test scores of the students. Two assistant principals said at a meeting that the marks of the pupils were either higher than their test scores (in English) would have suggested or completely unrelated to their test scores (in math). The principal's response to the report of low test scores was designed to minimize the expected problem of motivation. He observed that the students themselves had selected the school and that the prospect of a new building would generate enthusiasm for their studies. He then said that in any case it was the faculty's primary responsibility to push the students to higher levels of aspiration. A brief presentation by Irving Haberman, the Director of the High School Division, contributed even more perplexity--and once again, the responsibility for handling a bad situation was simply thrust back on the faculty:

> I'd like to talk now about the kinds of students you'll be having at Appelbaum. Should you have selected students, or representative students? That decision was made earlier, that your students should be representative. The point is we're moving in the direction of only a few schools having a selected population. You were designated as a comprehensive high school, that is, you're really an academic high school with a strong vocational component. Now the direction that you take as a school will be where you push it... You're limited in this system by your own intellect.

Here we have a classical instance of the man in power assuring his underlings of their freedom--freedom to struggle with the obstacles that he himself has imposed.

The issue of student quality emerged rather sharply during the presentation by the vice president of a major bank. This gentleman, who had been on the original Steering Committee and was a strong advocate of the school from the beginning, was still enthusiastic about hiring students as interns. And there was no question that he had the power to

see that it was done throughout the business community:

> The way it really works is [our bank's chairman] can call up five of his cronies and get a promise from each of them for 10 jobs for students...If you come to me with 12 kids who need job experiences, I can create jobs; it doesn't matter what they're doing, but they'll be on the payroll.*

It may have been at this point that the implications of the low quality of the incoming students began to sink in. One teacher turned to another and said, "It's going to be our fault if we don't make it work." The other teacher replied, "Yeah, but if we got a kid with a fourth grade education, then would you trust him in your business? I mean, c'mon."

Lassiter asked the vice president:

> Can this program be put into action for ninth and tenth graders? Because that's all we'll have this first year.

V.P.: Sure.

Teacher: But what about students who have poor language ability and poor reading skills? What kind of work will there be for them?

V.P.: Just the grunt work of any organization, and that's not what we want these students to be channelled into...I should hope that I could motivate a kid to become a manager of a bank, and not a machine-tender, because if you're going to make it at a bank, you've got to be on that upper level.

Ironically, this gentleman had long been opposed to making Appelbaum an elite school when the issue had been debated in the Steering Committee. What seems to have escaped his attention is that an elite vocational school in Lakeport simply means a school in which the student body is

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*After Woodward read this, she could not resist this exclamation:

> What other school would have had an opportunity like this one? Poor kids, even with good skills, are afraid to tackle the better job, the fancy office, because they are intimidated by the surroundings. Make it a part of the school curriculum--let these kids see the opportunities first hand. It should be noted that Harper's report did stress the number of tuition programs for higher study available in the business community.

performing somewhere near the appropriate grade level.* It did not seem that this was going to be the case with Appelbaum High School, no matter how hard the administration tried to conceal the fact or minimize the consequences. Also, since there were twice as many black or Spanish-surnamed students as "other" students in the city (the official designation for white students), a representative student body would contain few whites. And yet, Woodward had planned on a "balance" of white and black students so that blacks would benefit from their academic association with (presumably middle-class) whites, and the school would be adequately supported by headquarters.

The fate of innovations. Other innovations in Woodward's projections seemed only partially retained. Modular scheduling was laid out in detail (but no unsupervised time was allowed for students to be engaged in work experience or other activities); independent study was offered as one of the instructional options on Fridays (but student packets for individual study were not developed); placement of students in local firms for on-the-job training was endorsed (but procedures were not worked out); and resources in the firms were identified (but not incorporated into the curriculum).** Further, it is doubtful that the staff understood the rationale for those innovations which they did "adopt," since none was given by the administration. For example, two days after the presentation on modular scheduling, a teacher

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* When Pat Woodward read this, she bridled somewhat, asking if the generalization really applied to such elite vocational schools as Meyerson Aeronautics, and Frederick Watson. The 9th-grade reading scores for these schools in the spring of 1976 were as follows:

	Reading scores		
	2 or more years below grade level	Up to 2 years below grade level	At or above grade level
Meyerson	22%	22%	55%
Aeronautics	19%	27%	54%
Frederick Watson	47%	29%	24%

So, if anything, our generalization is too generous.

** Woodward said in extenuation after reading this that it was too early for work experience, and that teachers would have to do the curriculum-building to use the external resources.

finally summoned up the courage to ask in a general session: "Why is it better to have modular scheduling?" The brief answer that was given by the assistant principal for pupil personnel services was that starting new cycles every few months supposedly regenerated the enthusiasm of students. Nothing was said about the flexibility afforded by the 20-minute modules, or what was to be done with this flexibility.

A department supervisor had no idea why class sessions were 36 and 45 minutes on alternate days. "Why didn't they make it an even 40 minutes?" a teacher in her department inquired. "I don't know," replied the supervisor, "they want to be innovative."

Nor does it seem that the rationale for work experience was any clearer. Thus, while some thought it should simply expose a student to the range of job opportunities, others viewed it as the beginning of a career, and some saw it as a means for poorer students to help support their families.

In sum, a superficial commitment to these practices resulted from the failure to convey any rationale for them. What was carried over from planning was the mechanics, not the meaning, of an innovation. The teachers were not imbued with the original vision, but simply informed about operating procedures and expected to comply.

As mentioned earlier, the autocratic manner of the administrators had prompted a teacher (Ralph Snead) to call a special faculty meeting. He and another teacher, Arlene Barnes, had been outspokenly critical at the general meetings, and were perhaps viewed as mavericks as a consequence. For when they tried to gain support for a union chapter that would take up the administration's arbitrary style as an immediate issue, they were met with apathy.* The following interchange is illustrative of the faculty's wait-and-see attitude:

> Arlene: ...Now on the issue that I'm concerned about and that I'd like to know how others feel about, is on compensatory positions.[8] I think that Harold appointed certain people from his own viewpoint and he didn't really consult others on it.

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* Beatrice O'Brien noted after reading this:

> The attitudes at this point were conditioned by the fact that the school was very new. The full impact of autocratic administration was not yet felt.

8) Compensatory positions are special appointments, such as those of dean of students, or program (scheduling) chairman. Teachers appointed to these jobs by the principal are released from a certain portion of their teaching load.

Joe: I think it's too nebulous. Everyone is in turmoil and we don't have any premises to work on. [Perhaps that should have been the issue.] How can we have an attitude to start off with complaining and organizing for a chapter, when we don't know how things will work out? I think we're asking for trouble if we take that attitude.

Ralph: There may have been things you heard in your department or just at general meetings that you don't like or you question in some way, and these are the kinds of things that we can organize around. For example, my chairman just announced a decision to us about how we were going to handle certain issues in the department and we all disagreed with him. But he still railroaded this decision through. I'd like to see the minutes of that committee meeting, to make sure that he registered our disagreement on the issue. Because later on we might want to change our policy on it.

Murray: I came from the other extreme of schools. There was an average of three or four complaints filed each week. It got so that the chairmen were filing complaints against the principal...

Joe: I don't think we have to go looking for trouble, and looking to complain. We're just beginning.

The only decision that the teachers reached at the time was to form a steering committee. None of the criticism was taken up with the administration or even discussed further in the faculty meeting.

Other major events of the summer institute were a site visit to the new school building (at which several teachers discreetly voiced criticisms); a visit to various firms in the area to inquire about available materials, receptiveness to student interns, working hours, and so forth; a presentation on the "humane school"* by a university professor (poorly received by some of the faculty because of its emphasis on a permissive, non-competitive atmosphere); and a brief pep talk by the head of the Bureau of Commercial Education (received with either indifference or ridicule).

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*Beatrice O'Brien noted:

> The interesting fact is that we had this talk at all, in light of subsequent developments during the first year; the idea of a humane school was so far removed from our experience. But all of our experiences have been in this vein--/discrepancy between/ talk or words and actual practice.

The faculty's goals. The one event in the institute that seemed to prompt the teachers to enter into a serious discussion of the school's goals was the distribution of questionnaires on school goals by our project, immediately preceding the presentation on humane schools. After the meeting broke up, for example, an argument between two teachers centered on the issue of the merits of a permissive environment that promotes mutual trust versus those of a disciplined environment that rewards goal achievement. But neither seemed to appreciate that this was a basic and enduring dilemma that could only be resolved by deliberately focusing on the issue in professional meetings. Once again, the yearning for a mission-oriented framework that was occasionally evinced in the institute was not exploited by setting up the appropriate mechanism for collective deliberation.

The results of the survey of staff goals at this time suggests several conclusions that both confirm and extend our observations thus far. First, the goals that were regarded with least favor were "to give parents a substantial role in setting policy"(10%) and "to give students a substantial role in setting policy" (13%).[9] Clearly, the professionals intended to retain control. The third-least favored goal was somewhat more surprising: "to provide special curriculum and programs for ethnic or racial groups" (27%). This goal was played down despite the fact that the great preponderance of students were to be from minority groups. But even more provocative are the only-moderate ratings allotted to the following goals: "to experiment with new educational programs and structures" (54%), "to be different from traditional schools"(50%), "to provide a model for other schools"(60%), and "to provide personalized and individualized programming and instruction" (63%). All of these goals, which ranked in the bottom third with respect to the proportion of staff who "strongly agreed" to their being "important and worthwhile," had been espoused by Woodward and her associates. Even the maintenance of "clearcut procedures and rules for student discipline" (67%) was more strongly endorsed than these goals. In short, custodialism slightly outshone a desire for educational innovation.

At the high end of the goal spectrum, we find a distinct possibility of goal conflict between the two strongly-endorsed objectives of providing "a vocational education that is just as important as college preparation" (80%), on the one hand, and maintaining "high standards and academic excellence" (80%), on the other. (This possible conflict, of course, had been implicit in the philosophy of the school from the very beginning.) These goals could be consistent, if based on the premise of a highly able student body. But another frequently-mentioned goal was inconsistent with this assumption: "to provide a good learning environment for low-motivated kids with poor basic skills" (90%). Here

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9) Percentage refers to proportion who "strongly agreed" with the goal.

we detect once again irresolution about how to come to grips with the dilemma of a school with high aspirations that was faced with a student body of possibly low aspirations.

It is noteworthy, however, that the goal of fostering "an atmosphere of trust between adults and children" (97%) was also very strongly endorsed, as was the goal of making the school "a place where students would like to be" (100%). Thus, the vision of a "humane" school that was advocated by Woodward, Jamieson (the assistant principal for pupil personnel services), and the professor who spoke at the institute was at least given lip service. (Recall, however, that the goals instrument was filled out immediately after, or even during, the professor's talk.) That so few members (13%) strongly agreed with the importance of giving students a substantial role in setting policy, however, signified that trust between teachers and students was by no means going to be pursued by the strategy of sharing power.

Another set of strongly endorsed goals was: "to teach students how to get along with others" (94%) and "to break down the barriers between racial and ethnic groups"(97%). And still another set included: "to provide students contact with the reality of the world around them" (90%), and "to provide a variety of learning environments and activities" (87%)--which reflected the school's orientation to the community. Finally, all but one staff member strongly felt that providing "special counseling services" constituted an important objective.

Facilities issues. Our short questionnaire also asked the staff: "What practical problems do you expect will be of most concern during the first year of operations?" And here we confront the anxieties aroused by the recent news that the new building would definitely not be completed in time for occupancy in the fall. By far the largest number of anticipated problems fell into the category of "physical plant or materials." Interestingly enough, few mentioned the problem of adjusting to new practices and patterns of operation; and only one recognized a cardinal issue in new organizations: "The struggle for positions of power within a new organization by ambitious people." In sum, apart from the physical setting, there would seem to have been considerable complacency and acquiescence regarding the school's program and organization.

Another set-back in implementing the physical plan was the failure of the city's educational construction agency to build a recreational dock for the school in the nearby river. The loss of the outdoor recreational area was a major disappointment because now, with the temporary facility, there was to be no gym available either.

Effects of the summer institute. In spite of all this, a luncheon attended by the staff at the close of the summer institute was marked by

a good deal of cheerfulness and easy-going interaction. It seems that one clear-cut effect of the institute had been to foster cohesion among the faculty, although this mainly occurred within departments. In those cases where staff members had worked together previously, of course, cohesion developed in pairs or small groups.

The decentralized style of the institute, with most work being done at the department level on technical issues of the program, had certain consequences. It used the existing skills of faculty well, and tended to "compartmentalize" anxieties about starting the new school. But it also meant that very little attention was given to the whole system of the school, or to various innovative aspects of it (such as the work experience program). And there was little shared sense of the school's goals, of the methods to be used (note the confusion about modular scheduling), or of the problems that might be encountered during start-up and how they might be solved.

Following the luncheon, the staff resumed its vacation and did not reconvene until about two and a half weeks later--five days before the opening of school in the temporary facility at Sage University.

According to our survey of the staff three months later at the end of the first school term, only 24% of the faculty felt that the summer institute had had a "strong positive effect on the school." Thirty-three percent indicated a "moderately positive effect," another 33% indicated "a small positive effect," and 10% "little or no positive effect." The assessment of the institute's effect on departments, subgroups, or working teams was somewhat less favorable. What effect the institute did have was mainly in the realm of social relationships. Out of 13 "positive effects" described by the participants in response to an open-end question, only four were related to substantive issues--setting up curriculum guidelines, new approaches in teaching, etc. The remaining nine "effects" concerned group relationships, such as getting acquainted, working harmoniously, etc. One teacher even claimed that too much time had been spent in the general sessions on goals and resources. Another pointed out that curriculum planning had been unrealistic because of the low academic ability of the students that eventually confronted the school:

> Our expectations were built up regarding quality of the student body and lesson planning was done with these expectations in mind. The student body, academically, is city average, and has difficulty coping with our lesson planning, etc.

In short, whatever substantive effect was traceable to the summer institute might well have been a negative one.

Clearly, one of three goals for the institute that had been presented in Woodward's proposal to the Director of High Schools--curriculum

development--was only partially achieved. As the proposal had stated, "with the promised cooperation of top business leaders and college personnel, development of actual courses and material for the school is planned." But only one business leader and one professor attended the institute, and their appearances were symbolic rather than task-oriented. And indeed, at the end of the first school term, the faculty responded to a questionnaire item on how much influence each of several groups should have on "determining the concepts and information to be taught" by allotting only minor desired influence (on the average) to local business groups. But even as early as the summer institute, it seemed that the school had begun the process of closing itself off from the very environment that had spawned it and had offered to nurture it through its early months.

Final work before school opening. When the staff of the school met again it was at Sage University, the temporary facility, just five days before the opening of the school year. The principal, who had by now received a detailed report from the research staff on the goals survey, said that the first order of business was to present the "philosophy of the school": "If there is agreement on the why's and wherefore's, then the nuts and bolts, our immediate practical concerns, can be worked out." What followed, however, turned out to be a reiteration of the three terminal goals he had briefly mentioned at the first parents' meeting at the institute:

> to give a strong basic education which will enable our students to go on to either higher education or to employment,... to give them an awareness of the diversity of opportunities in our city,..to give them a specific ability and specific skills in one area.

The possibility of goal conflict was not raised, and no cognizance was taken of the wider range of goals that had been endorsed by the staff as a whole in response to the questionnaire, nor of the low priority given to innovativeness. And when Lassiter turned to the assistant principals to state the objectives of their departments, their statements were virtual carbon copies of his stated goals. During these presentations, little attention was being paid by the audience--until one performer quipped apologetically about "having left my piano and fiddle at home." Thus, the ritual was duly performed: data from the questionnaires were unused, and the staff listened to the statements of their superiors with only half an ear.

The principal then turned to matters that seemed to interest him more than goals, namely, his "philosophy of supervision." He explained to the faculty that supervisors would observe them in their classrooms and then sit down with them on a "peer level" to discuss "pedagogical method and various issues you confront in the classroom." He described this approach as a "framework of understanding and cooperation." He then warned the staff about the importance of complying with rules about smoking, drinking, and eating only in designated areas, rules to protect school property

("never leave equipment exposed, even if the door is locked," "never leave a room unlocked, unless you are in it," etc.), rules for supervising students, and proper attendance procedures. End-of-the-period buzzers and the location of rest rooms for staff and students * were also covered.

The latent competition for power among the principal, his supervisory assistants, and the faculty was revealed in a discussion regarding the notification of substitute teachers. A teacher suggested that the faculty member who was to be absent should notify the substitute herself, as had been done in her former school. The principal immediately said "No, no, that would never work. We couldn't have that. That would be chaos!" An assistant principal proposed that the assistant principals be notified of impending absences. Before this proposal could be discussed, someone proposed that the principal's office connect a tape-recorder to the telephone overnight so that the principal himself would learn about absences first thing in the morning. "That's an excellent idea, that's really ingenious," the principal responded enthusiastically. And so, once again, the threat of dispersed power was met with vigorous leadership.

Following the general session, the faculty held a union chapter meeting to elect their representatives, including a delegate to the central assembly. No criticisms of the administration were voiced at this meeting, possibly because a much bigger issue loomed on the horizon: the prospect of a city-wide teacher strike in the next few days. Ralph Snead, who had initiated the first meeting of teachers to form a union chapter, was nominated for chapter chairman, but came in a poor third in the voting. He declined any further nomination to office, presumably out of pique. Otherwise, spirits ran high at the meeting. Clearly, the teachers now felt quite relaxed with one another and delighted with the opportunity for tension-release among peers. The contrast between the free-and-easy camaraderie of the chapter meeting and the climate of bored acquiescence that prevailed in the general meeting with the principal and other administrators was striking testimony to the emergence of two distinct cultures within the faculty: the official culture of educational "philosophy" and bureaucratic ritual, on the one hand, and the informal peer culture on the other. The latter culture was clearly the arena where personal commitment was invested.

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*Woodward had wanted the students to share rest rooms with the faculty, but this radical proposal was never actualized. She commented:

> It's unfair /to expect this/ at this juncture. You have to develop trust and support from faculty /first/.

Analysis and Commentary

Vision development. The new principal seemed to adapt the original objective of creating a "prestige school" to the type of students that were imposed upon him, while not seeming to consider that certain innovations in the original design might no longer be appropriate. (The goals of achieving an integrated student body and raising the status of vocational education were set aside.)* Thus he continued to speak of innovations in scheduling and instruction that were geared to a more academically qualified student body. But his promotion of these innovations was ritualistic, as indicated by his failure to offer any rationale for them. Consequently, they were dictated to the new faculty without reason or opportunity to discuss their implications, which seemed to create confusion, resentment, and only the most superficial plans for their implementation. Indeed, the terminal educational goals of the school were rarely mentioned and never discussed. Nor was any conceptual framework--other than vague general statements of "philosophy" established for curriculum development, which in effect decentralized such efforts among the departments--desirably, Lassiter felt.** With the strong emphasis on procedural rules that was emerging, it seemed that operational goals of maintaining order and obedience to authority were taking precedence over ideological, terminal, and even task-oriented goals. The demand for predictable action was displacing substantive issues.

We have noted from time to time how central Lassiter's role had become, and how power largely accreted to him. This centralization was not in itself necessarily a weakness in implementing the school. Had Lassiter's leadership been closely tied to a mission-oriented framework, and provided strong supports for a complex implementation process congruent with the mission, it is quite likely that more of the original

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*Lassiter said after reading this:

> They weren't /set aside/. They were very much part of our plans, but we had to deal with the group we had while planning for the future.

**Beatrice O'Brien's view, expressed after reading this, was that the lack of goals and framework had encouraged:

> ...a rabid competition among departments for bodies--i.e., the best pupils, and a rejection of pupils whose needs require special concern.

vision could have been started into place. But administrative action seemed more concerned with procedures and routines, and was largely unconnected with innovative objectives. Put another way, Lassiter's power base was largely that of position, rather than drawing on shared values, or professional expertise.

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the linkages between early and later planning which existed--Lieberman's role and Woodward's advice in the status reports, primarily--were not powerful enough to insure good continuity.

Political stabilization. The new principal seemed to enjoy a good deal of security, despite the conflict over his appointment. He had received a mandate from the parents' association and the central office, was married to a Board member, appeared to be committed to carrying out the original objectives of the school, and gave a public impression of equanimity and control. The only possible weakness in his relationships with the environment occurred with the local business executives, who may have continued to feel alienated by his selection as principal. In any event, their influence (and the need for their support) seemed to be waning now that district resources were fully committed and the new principal had taken over. Clearly, there was an increased shift of reference from the business community to district headquarters as final plans for the school proceeded. This shift, together with the transition from substantive goals to administrative procedures, created the potential for a wide gap between early planning and later implementation, especially with regard to the use of local business community resources.

Knowledge utilization. There was an even greater emphasis on past experiences and familiar resource materials than had characterized the early planning period, perhaps because of the absence of prior planning by Woodward and time constraints. Lacking a rationale for innovative curricular or instructional approaches, the faculty saw no reason to abandon past practices, demoting "innovativeness" to low priority in their scheme of things. (Moreover, ambiguity about the type of student admitted to the school eliminated any clear-cut stimulus from that quarter.) The principal's background in English did not provide him with knowledge of new developments in business education, and his autocratic style of leadership, his lack of experience with the development of a new organization, and possibly his desire to prove himself in the new job prompted him to reject our project's offer of organizational expertise to help him through his most trying period. Nor did he seem concerned about using the information from the goals questionnaires that had been administered to the faculty.

Social-architectural design. Because of all the factors mentioned ere, the emerging design for the new school was less coherent than it had

been originally. The sharpest new features were not substantive or even educational, but procedural: the centralized style of administration and the emphasis on maintaining order in the school. In short, operational goals became preeminent. The emphasis on procedures was allowed to become paramount because of the degeneration of the original vision* and because of the ambiguity about student quality. There was also the not-insignificant factor of uncertainty about the facilities that would be available to the staff, especially during the first months of school. In sum, the original social-architectural design was being buffeted from many quarters into a rather shapeless image--or rather, into a number of images that existed privately in the minds of the anxious participants.

Another outcome of this period was cohesion among the faculty, although they were not ready to resist the administrator's style with a united front. This cohesion, however, did not arise from a joint endeavor to create a truly innovative learning environment that would be a showcase for business education. Rather, it was a cohesion born of common defense against the unknown. Indeed, setting up mechanisms to cope with, or at least to protect themselves against, the unknown was the activity that now engaged the attention of the participants and overwhelmed almost all concern for creating a unique educational experience.

Early Implementation: The First Months of School

Chronology

Opening day. The first day of school--as often was the case in our research sites--tended to be viewed by the participants as a success. The students were welcomed by the principal and introduced to the assistant principals, and then the President of the Downtown Renewal Group addressed them about the importance of being neat, clean, and honest, and about the availability of jobs in the area.

The students then went to classrooms where the teachers took up the most traditional housekeeping concerns. No problems of discipline were observed. The principal seemed relaxed with the faculty, and they in turn showed their appreciation of him. In a general meeting of the staff after the students had been dismissed for the day, one teacher suddenly said, "I do want to say one thing," and then paused dramatically.

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* Beatrice O'Brien suggested that the vision had also deteriorated because of:

> ...the inability to create the climate and the procedural substance to make the vision materialize. It takes a great deal of comprehension and know-how to be able to take the original ideas about this school and to project them into a viable institutional form.

> I have been around the school system for years and never before have I heard such a gracious, poised, and sincere welcoming speech by any principal. I'd like to commend you, Mr. Lassiter, on your wonderful speech this morning.

The principal was deeply touched as the group applauded their affirmation. That the compliment was paid by Arlene Barnes, who had been outspokenly critical at the institute, meant that the entire staff was enjoying a day of rare cohesion, possibly as a defensive reaction against the barbarian horde that had passed through their gates.

But the first day of school was also the last--at least for a while. For a city-wide teachers' strike was called the following day. The central issue in the negotiations was "productivity." Having laid off thousands of teachers as a consequence of Lakeport's fiscal crisis, the Board was still worried about pressure for pay increases from high school teachers. From the striking teachers' standpoint, the issues were the Board's effort to reduce "free time" periods and the number of sick days, extend the work day by 30 minutes, and increase class size. The last issue became paramount as teachers from various schools told reporters about being faced with classes of 50 or 60 students on their first day of school.

Since Appelbaum's pupil-teacher ratio was only about 30 to 1, class size was not a severe problem in the new school. But the strike was almost universally observed. Five days later, the schools opened again, and once again the staff of the new school girded its loins for the onslaught of students.

The student population. The main problem that now arose was that the students were found to be predominantly black and Hispanic. Some white parents were already pulling out their children. In addition, some black and Spanish-speaking parents were dropping out because they objected to the temporary space and the lack of a gym.* Jamieson, the assistant principal for pupil personnel services, himself a black, was distraught by this

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*Beatrice O'Brien's view was that the attrition rate for the first year's group of students was also high because:

> ...where there were complaints, the individuals making them were written off as "unbalanced"...these challengers /pupils or parents/ left the school.

She felt the remaining group was unusually passive, and that administrative withholding of information encouraged such passivity. O'Brien also doubted that the withdrawals had racial reasons:

> Most of the withdrawals were due to the failure of the school to be what they had been told it was going to be. (cont'd)

turn of events. He spoke forcefully of going to the Board to gain a more selective recruiting system. As a matter of fact, not too long thereafter, the procedure that Woodward had originally desired for selecting applicants was accepted by the district in an almost casual manner.

One day, Irving Haberman, the Director of the High School Division, the man who had originally opposed a more selective school, dropped in for a visit to Lassiter, who told him that random selection had failed to produce a "diverse" student body. Haberman agreed, without further ado, to "try it this way /selectively/ for a while," allowing the principal and the pupil personnel services administrator to select the applicants for the coming year. Thus, the end that Woodward had sought for months on the basis of her prognostication was won by Lassiter in a few minutes on the basis of cold reality.*

In the ensuing weeks, the faculty felt increasingly that discipline was a major problem. Whether this perception was founded in fact or on a defensive reaction to the large proportion of black and Hispanic students is difficult to tell. (Only two of the teachers were black and one Hispanic.) In any event, according to our survey of the staff in December, 44 per cent of the faculty felt that discipline was a "moderate" problem and another 20 per cent that it was a "serious" one. A special teachers' committee met in November to study the issue, and the proposals they presented to a faculty meeting were quite harsh.

For example, one recommendation was to make a student's grade reflect not only his academic work, but his conduct as well. The principal pointed

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(cont'd)

Also, special needs were truly not met. Many of the youngsters from the first recruitment were not comfortable in the school climate and structure that began to emerge with the many new emphases that were stated. The racial factor would have been at most an oblique factor.

*After reading this, Lassiter backtracked, saying that Haberman had only agreed that "we should take a look at it." The field worker's notes of a February 15, 1976 conversation with Lassiter do, however, document the original text. Perhaps the principal was attempting to minimize the extent of his successful influence over a politically delicate issue: who would come to the school.

Lassiter also noted that the new selection procedures were the regular ones used by all "educational options" schools--as if to emphasize that the change from random selection was somehow minor.

out that this was prohibited by district policy.* (One staff member told our field worker that the white teachers were discouraged by the small number of whites and therefore behaved resentfully. He also felt that the principal was tacitly abetting what he regarded as "creeping racism.")

The state of the emerging system. Our surveys of students, parents, and faculty in December[10] provide a fairly clear picture of the social system that had emerged during the first months of school. By and large, the attitudes and behavior of parents seemed to be typical of those in working class schools--namely, supportive, passive, and uninformed. Nine out of ten parents believed that teachers and the principal "worked hard to make this a good school," and eight out of ten felt that "it means something to graduate from this school." Further, only a third thought that parents should have a lot of power in influencing the school's activities, and about the same percentage felt that they did have such power. Overall, the parents felt that the school was better than their children's former school. However, only a little more than half had had any contact

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*Lassiter's comment after reading this was more virtuous: he preferred the statement to read:

> The principal feels strongly that this is unethical and therefore not allowable by district or school.

10) Copies of a 39-page questionnaire for teachers were placed in mailboxes with a note requesting voluntary response. Sixty-six percent of the 45 staff members returned filled-out copies.

We drew a 25% sample of parents, and mailed them a 6-page questionnaire, along with a 6-page questionnaire for their son or daughter. Hispanic parents received a questionnaire in Spanish. 44% of the 127 sampled parents returned questionnaires, along with 46% of the students. Later waves of questionnaire data were collected at the end of the first school year (June 1976), and from a 15% sample at the end of the second school year (June 1977). The returns were as follows:

	June 1976		June 1977	
	Total N	Return %	Total N	Return %
Teachers	43	72%	64	56%*
Parents	127	33%	171	37%
Students	127	39%	171	39%

*For this testing, teachers were paid by the research project at substitute rates ($8) for one hour's work.

with the school, and these contacts were almost invariably initiated by the teachers. Fewer than one out of six had attended a school meeting where teachers were present.

The main reason parents gave for sending their children to Appelbaum was that it had a business curriculum (70%), while its image of being "different from other schools" was of much less importance to them (19%). The aspect of the school program that they favored most was the opportunity for work experience. However, a slight majority also felt that as much emphasis should be given to academic subjects as to business subjects. Thus, the parents were not interested only in narrow vocational preparation; indeed, the desire for the school "to aid the personal development of students into mature, healthy and stable adults" was endorsed as strongly as was the goal of providing work experience. In sum, many of the parents held relatively high aspirations for the school, especially with regard to vocational training, and were thus far pleased. However, their information about the school seems to have been skimpy.

To a certain extent, the students reflected the attitudes of their parents: they were mainly attracted by the business curriculum, and they tended to be pleased with their teachers and with the school as a whole. To be sure, their level of enthusiasm was not as high as that of their parents: while 89% of the parents thought that the school was better than their children's former school, only 66% of the students themselves felt this way. Nevertheless, a majority of the students seemed to like the school (54% said it was "my idea of a good school").

When we examine students' reports of their teachers' behavior, however, we discern what might appear to be grounds for displeasure. Slightly more than half (53%) said that the teachers never allowed them to help plan lessons, a fifth said that the teachers yelled at them "always" or "most of the time," more than half (56%) agreed that "teachers are always reminding students about the rules," and only a fourth said that "in class when I finish a lesson before others are done, I usually can start a new lesson without waiting for the others." These responses suggest a custodial atmosphere in which efficient management and discipline are the order of the day. It should be noted, however, that the students often acquiesced to this climate. More than half (53%) agreed that "the rules are fair and they make sense," and 47% disagreed that "the rules here are too strict." Further, almost all (88%) felt that teachers "'always' or 'most of the time' try very hard to teach students something"; and almost half (47%) felt that what teachers were looking for was "good quality work," while only 24% thought that they were looking for students to be "polite and well-behaved."

The emphasis of teachers on efficient management, however, seemed to have squelched more flexible, individualized approaches. Not only were students infrequently allowed to work at their own pace (only 23% said this was the case), but just half of the students reported that teachers

"always" or "most of the time" used "different techniques to make class more interesting." Perhaps at the base of this strategy of interaction with students was the teachers' failure to "trust students on their own" --19% of the students said that teachers "never" acted this way, and 37% said they acted this way only sometimes.

Whatever the explanation for this custodial, distrustful atmosphere, it was clearly not part of the original plans as envisioned by Woodward:

> The stratification between teachers and students is not something that you have in everyday life...I would also remove all the teachers' desks and get everybody on the peer level.*

The traditional status-gap between teachers and students seems to have been well preserved in Appelbaum High School.

When we turn to the faculty's attitudes, we find considerable dissatisfaction with working conditions--the physical plant, the availability of materials and staff services, and work load. These grievances were no doubt the function of the temporary facility and the typical problems of acquiring services from the central offices. With regard to morale and interpersonal relationships, however, there was an interesting polarization of attitudes. Thus, when asked if "staff morale" was a problem in the school, the proportion who indicated that it was a "moderate" or "serious" problem (52%) was about the same as the proportion that said it was "not a problem" or "only a minor one" (48%). Similarly, roughly the same proportion felt that meetings were typically open and productive as felt the opposite way.

Attitudes towards the authority structure of the school were similarly divided. On the whole, the teachers respected the principal as a professional--his integrity, his ideas, and his support. But they were less inclined to approve the monopolization of power by the administration. For example, half disagreed that they had "been given sufficient opportunity to discuss and define our school's goals," and an even larger proportion felt that "goals are set by a minority and passed on as orders." Further, it was clear that the faculty wanted more say in such matters as textbook selection, standards of pupil behavior, and assignment of teachers to classes, with less authority vested in the administration in these matters. By far the greatest amount of time in meetings was perceived as being devoted to "giving out information about roles, administrative details, etc." Information on policy, the faculty's expression of problems, making decisions, and in-service education occurred far less

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*Ironically, as Lassiter pointed out after reading this, there were no teachers' desks during the time at the Sage University temporary site because there was no room for them. "It has great practical disadvantages," he observed.

frequently, according to the faculty's reports. To some extent, this manner of handling meetings may have been dictated by the union's rule restricting meetings to only one 30-minute session per month. Thus, a good deal of business had to be conducted in a short time.

Less than half (46%) of teachers felt that they were "told what you needed to know to do your job in the best possible way," and only 26% thought that they received "adequate information about changes which will affect you or your work." In sum, it seems that information was mainly rule-oriented in the interest of efficiency and control, rather than directed to the daily classroom concerns of teachers. It seemed that, in many ways, the administration treated the faculty in the same manner as the faculty treated the students.

Bureaucratic order seems clearly to have taken precedence over innovativeness. When teachers were asked if certain practices had been used before and during the current year, it emerged that the following practices had been utilized considerably more frequently by the teachers in the past: independent study, non-graded classes, team teaching, teacher aides, and programmed instruction. And perhaps most striking of all, 54% said they had utilized "work experience programs" in the past, while only 23% said they were doing so in the present. In short, this ostensibly innovative high school was becoming a setting in which teachers were operating more traditionally than they had in other high schools.

The faculty seemed divided on the importance of being innovative. When asked why they had chosen to teach at the new school, the modal response (66%) was "the prospect of participating in a new, innovative school." On the other hand, only 46% agreed strongly that "an important, valid, and worthwhile goal for our school" was "to experiment with new educational programs and structures." With regard to frequency of strong endorsement, this goal ranked twelfth in a list of fourteen goals, which was roughly the same position that it had occupied in the responses to the goals questionnaire at the summer institute. Thus, many teachers seemed content to give a low priority to innovative practices. Moreover, the administrators, and a few teachers as well, claimed that school district personnel changes that were beyond the teachers' control were the main reason for coming to the school.

The principal said to a researcher that work experience, independent study, and field trips could not be introduced because the Sage facility prevented supervision of large groups of students in study halls during the absence of a teacher on a field trip or during independent study. While there is a certain amount of truth in this contention, it seems likely that the emphasis of the administration on bureaucratic regularity, which was reinforced by the fear of discipline problems, was also an inhibiting factor. In any event, the temporary facility provided a ready excuse for inaction toward innovative goals.

The turn of the year. Christmas and New Year's followed closely on the surveys. At the first faculty meeting after the holidays, Lassiter announced that the new building might be ready for occupancy in early March. The one remaining obstacle was the unfinished heating and ventilation system. (Some teachers felt that life would be better in a poorly heated building than in the cramped, ill-equipped building they now occupied.) The faculty was also informed that the administration would have some say in the selection of next year's students so that more whites and more academically-able students would be enrolled. As mentioned earlier, the Director of the High School Division had agreed to this new recruitment policy during a brief visit to the principal. Since more than 3,000 applications had already been received for the second year, there were 4½ applicants per vacancy, as Lassiter pointed out. Thus, according to him, with the new selection system more than 40% of the students would have a reading level two years above their grade, 40% would be on grade level, and the rest would be below.[11] Lassiter still faced a fight with the central office over the rejected applicants, but he was optimistic that he would prevail. "If we can stay with what we've got," he said, "we'll have a good student population next year." Further, he promised that all disruptive students would be returned to their original school (a policy that was eventually applied to 25 students over the course of the current year).*

Six weeks earlier the morale of the faculty--already shaky, given the fiscal crisis--had been depressed by the central office's lay-off of several teachers because enrollment turned out to be smaller than anticipated. One of the teachers laid off had been an informal leader of the faculty, according to our sociometric data, and a major source of new educational ideas. Thus, a "natural leader" who could link the faculty to the world of educational R&D was eliminated.

Analysis and Commentary

The political environment of the school seemed to remain stable with the exception of the brief city-wide teachers' strike. Parents were quite pleased with the school and not inclined to become involved in

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11) Recall that as of March 1976, 33% of 9th graders in the city were reading at or above grade level. The figure for Appelbaum for next fall would be 80%; it would have an "elite" population compared to other city schools.

*After reading this, Lassiter pointed out that "redirection is possible only on the basis of lack of academic success," and said he had never made such a promise.

decision-making, and the principal continued to receive support from the central office. The problems that arose during this phase were primarily internal.

The first months of school were dominated by two problems that gave little opportunity for long-range planning, and probably discouraged the formulation of a meta-plan; the use of a temporary facility that was small and ill-equipped, and the discovery that the students posed problems of discipline, motivation, and academic ability because of the random recruitment procedure. The temporary facility posed severe problems of space, working conditions, and availability of resources. Teachers sought to cope with this situation as best they could, often by acquiring resources from other schools. The character of the student body prompted the principal and administrative assistant to request a more selective procedure for admission, a request that was readily honored by the central office. Meanwhile, the principal decided to postpone the implementation of major innovations. Thus, it would appear that the administrators were trying to take appropriate steps, even if these were somewhat regressive, to cope with obvious difficulties.

The rule-oriented leadership of the principal, which may have been fortified by the stresses and strains of the first few months, and the problems of student control and working conditions, seem to have distracted the faculty from innovative approaches in the classroom--to which they were not especially committed to begin with. And of course, all these factors undermined their morale. Meetings continued to be devoted mainly to the dissemination of rules and administrative details, while many teachers felt that they did not receive the information they needed. Only rarely did teachers have an opportunity to express their problems in these meetings. Thus, the distance between faculty and administration seemed to be growing.

The dilemma posed by the need for strong leadership during times of stress versus the need for participation in decision-making to maintain commitment and ownership was apparently resolved in favor of central control by the principal. Further, the conflict between innovation and traditionalism was resolved in favor of the latter.

The major decisions during this phase were rather regressive ones: to postpone implementation of planned innovation, to deny the faculty an opportunity to express complaints (excapt through the union chapter) or to participate in decision-making. The period was dominated by unanticipated outcomes of the earlier decision (now reversed) to recruit randomly, and the decision to use the facility at a nearby university.

Later Implementation

Chronology

The new building. The new facility--a spacious, modern structure--was occupied in March with only minimal confusion. But while it had seemed to the staff that many of the problems experienced in the temporary facility would be magically dispelled, in fact, some of them were exacerbated. Control of students became a bigger issue because the layout and size of the building made it harder to keep students under surveillance. The principal even expressed worry that the school might be closed if order were not maintained.* For its own part, the faculty felt that the administration was not heeding its demand for tighter control, and in addition was displeased with arrangements for the faculty lounges.

Having gained the right to select next year's students, Lassiter set about planning several new programs, including work experience, free time for independent study, and flexible scheduling. Thus, it appeared that he at last felt able to implement some of the original plans for the school. His reason for not doing so earlier, he said in an interview, was because the students would have been unable to cope with these innovations. (Earlier he had attributed his inaction to the drawbacks of the temporary facility.)

Teacher-principal relations. Lassiter felt that his major problem at present was inducing the faculty to devote more time and energy to the school. Owing to cut-backs in personnel,** he was obliged to apply a good deal of pressure on the faculty to assume extra duties. One assistant principal said, "He can't afford clockwatchers," amplifying on this theme later:

> Our staff should be special. But instead, they're clockwatchers. I'm a union man myself, but they won't go an inch beyond what the union says.

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*After reading this, Lassiter wrote:

> Never. A possibility always exists that the direction and orientation of any school may be altered.

This denial does not square with the field worker's notes (Apr. 12, 1976):

> Site meeting on security. Lassiter said a number of schools would be closed down due to financial problems, and if they didn't handle themselves well, /Appelbaum/ might be one of them. He was referring to security problems--student control--discipline.

**The layoffs were city-wide: the Lakeport fiscal crisis was at its (cont'd)

The teachers, for their part, felt that it was the administration that was shirking its responsibilities: several complained that assistant principals did not do as much teaching as administrators did elsewhere. One said,

> There's a real lack of communication. There seems to be a wedge between the administrators and the teachers. The principal is inaccessible. They just set themselves apart...And then [when a teacher's problem requires their attention] they call us complainers.

Another said,

> The administration is shut off from reality. They don't want to know reality. The only thing I care about at Appelbaum, the only ties I feel, are with the kids and my paycheck.

An anecdote told by one of the teachers expressed her view of administrative behavior. The principal had run into the teacher in the hall and asked to see her. The teacher immediately began to worry about what she had done wrong and repeatedly tried to see the principal for several days. But Lassiter was always too busy. Finally the teacher was admitted to his office, whereupon the principal asked why music had been omitted from the teacher's schedule next year. The teacher explained: "You told me there was not time for music, that the kids had to have social studies instead." And the principal said, "Oh, yes, that's right."

During planning for a second administration of our project's questionnaire (to be given in June), Lassiter voiced objections to items that might reflect unfavorably on the fact that the faculty was not much involved in the decision-making process. Thus he felt that asking them whether goals were set either by a minority or a majority might lead to unfair conclusions because the goals were in fact set by the central office which he felt was as it should be. He noted that Appelbaum was an "options school," and therefore "they shouldn't come here if they can't accept the goals as they have been set by the central office." Lassiter's criticisms of the questionnaire are worth quoting here because they afford a useful glimpse into the perspective of school administrators in a rigidly bureaucratic system.

(cont'd)
height. Woodward noted:

> It's unfortunate: some of the bright young people Lassiter hired (Woodward and Lieberman had recommended some of them)...were laid off because they did not survive the budget cuts.

> In this day, the name of the game is participatory democracy. Everyone always raves about wanting to be involved in all the decision-making. The teacher will sense that she should answer that goals are set by the majority, or in the problem-solving section, that everyone is involved in problem-solving, because that's what the right answer is supposed to be. But if they're feeling happy in the school, they'll write what they think is the right answer. And if they're feeling unhappy in the school for any reason at all, even some reason that's personal and not remotely connected with the school, they'll write what they sense is the bad answer. To be very truthful, when I was at Meyerson, I didn't want to be involved in a lot of decisions. I had more than I could handle. A teacher doesn't really want me to ask them how much paper should I order.

These comments contain several themes of importance. First, Lassiter seemed to feel that his faculty might be unhappy: since he also seemed to be deprecating the "rave" of participatory democracy, he was probably primarily concerned about the interpretation of "bad answers," and such answers to his mind were the natural consequence of being unhappy. Second, he wanted to believe that the faculty's unhappiness was not necessarily the school's fault--many could have personal problems that colored their attitudes toward the school--and he minimized the gravity of the issues that might concern them by reference to trivial decisions ("how much paper to order"). In short, at this point he was prepared to rationalize any implication that he himself could be contributing to low morale. Third, he defined his role as primarily gaining compliance to orders that were passed down from superiors, and because he himself had been prone as a teacher to accept authority without question, he expected the faculty to behave the same way. And, fourth, by referring to an "educational options school" to legitimize his demand for non-participatory compliance, he revealed his image of the school as operating in a rigid framework of rules set by the central office that allowed no leeway for revision or reassessment of goals.

Changes in the state of the system. Perhaps it is not surprising that the second survey of the faculty, which was conducted at the end of the first school year (six months after the first survey), reflected an even more impoverished social climate. For example, while only 30% had indicated that the school climate tended to be "suspicious" (vs. trusting) in the first survey, 48% responded in this fashion in the second survey--an increase of 18 percentage points. And while 63% had originally felt that the climate tended to be "fair" (vs. arbitrary), now only 38% felt this way. Similarly, while 44% had felt that the climate tended to be "sure," (vs. tentative), now only 21% felt this way. Curiously, the older the school, the less "sure" it felt!

The shifts in attitudes and opinions during the intervening six months also suggest the consequences of an impersonal, rule-oriented style of leadership. There was a difference of 22 percentage points between the two periods in the proportion who indicated that they frequently felt like "a cog in the machinery of the school" (30% vs. 52%); and a difference of 20 points in feeling that information they received about other parts of the school was adequate (52% vs. 32%). And not only did the faculty more often feel isolated from one another, but they felt more distant from the administration as well. Thus, while 69% had signified that they felt free to discuss problems with their immediate superiors at the earlier time, only 51% felt this way now. Further, while 48% had disagreed that goals were "set by a minority and passed on as orders to the rest of the faculty," now only 19% disagreed with this statement. The faculty was reaching the conclusion that the school was a rule-oriented bureaucracy with little sharing of power.

The faculty had also become less pleased with the educational achievements of the school. Thus, smaller percentages at the later time felt that the school had achieved the goals of providing students "contact with the reality of the world around them" (79% vs. 61%), maintaining "high standards and academic excellence" (50% vs. 32%), and providing "a variety of learning environments and activities" (70% vs. 48%). On the other hand, they more often felt that the teaching of basic skills was being achieved (50% vs. 61%).

Apparently the faculty had shifted from an emphasis on actualizing the students' capacities for learning to a more limited, though probably necessary, objective of providing them with basic skills. This shift can be seen quite vividly in the responses to a question about the teacher's "style" of teaching. Styles that stressed creativity ("the aim is for the learner to make something new, original, unique"), discovery of knowledge ("to figure out something or discover something on his own"), and reorienting values ("to help learner examine and reorient own attitudes and values") all dropped markedly--from 32% to 5%, 68% to 50%, and 37% to 15%, respectively. "Transmitting knowledge" and "practicing," however, increased somewhat (from 58% to 70%, and from 79% to 85%, respectively). In short, the qualities of the students as perceived by the faculty, prompted a shift from emphasis on student self-actualization to adult control and didacticism. Further, this increased control may have been accompanied by greater personal remoteness: earlier only 5% of the teachers reported using programmed workbooks, but 33% reported this practice later. In fact, programmed instruction was the only innovation out of a list of ten that was used more frequently in the second term of school than in the first term. The reported use of flexible scheduling dropped from 61% to 29%, mini-courses from 36% to 10%, and multi-graded classes from 38% to 26%. Thus, our innovative high school was not only less innovative than the schools where the teachers had formerly taught, as reported earlier, but was becoming increasingly

traditional as time went by. Nor were the teachers themselves unaware of this trend: according to the responses to one of the scales in our questionnaire, the proportion of teachers who felt that the "climate" was innovative (vs. conservative) dropped from 66% in December to 33% in June.

These shifts in attitudes cannot be readily attributed to a hard core of "clockwatchers" who resented being pushed into assuming greater responsibility--as is suggested by the case of guidance counselor Beatrice O'Brien. A thoughtful and candid person, O'Brien was clearly an opinion leader according to our sociometric analysis, and also appeared to be one of the most committed staff members. But O'Brien felt strongly that the administrators were promoting innovation for its own sake, without giving due regard to consequences. As a result, she felt, because of the constant pressures to "work the bugs out of the system," the needs of students were sorely neglected. Further, she felt that Lassiter and his aides made decisions and forced them on people, and then were surprised and resentful when these decisions did not bear fruit. Lassiter, she said, was the chief violator--perhaps because he was insecure as a new principal and therefore reluctant to admit weaknesses or to appear indecisive. The excuse of being a new school, she felt, was rapidly becoming obsolete as a justification for centralizing decision-making and neglecting the needs of students in deference to tinkering with mindless innovations.

By no means could it be said that all aspects of the school had declined in quality. The availability of instructional materials had improved markedly, the physical plant was evaluated much more favorably than the temporary facility had been, and faculty overload was somewhat lightened. These improvements might account for the fact that despite the centralization of power, the increased sense of isolation, the feeling that academic goals were not being achieved, and the retreat from innovative classroom practices, the teachers less often felt that staff morale was a "serious problem" than formerly (32% vs. 13%). Apparently most teachers had acceded to the new rules of the game without great distress. The maintenance of order in the environment, whatever its cost in terms of professionalism and a healthy climate of social interaction, was apparently a welcome development to many staff members--at least now one knew what was expected and what one could get by with. Indeed, while 68% of the faculty had felt that "lack of clear goals" had been a problem earlier, only 8% felt this way six months later. It seemed that the world had taken on a welcome measure of predictability.

From the very outset, as noted earlier, there were a number of teachers who were not especially interested in the innovative features of the new high school. A few had been assigned to Appelbaum after having been laid off elsewhere, and several had chosen the new school primarily because it was more convenient to their residence. (The

principal was allowed by union regulations to choose only a third of his staff.)* As Lassiter acknowledged, "I can't hold it against people if they came to Appelbaum because it was closer to their home." One assistant principal believed that the school had turned out to be so traditional because it had been forced to accept so many routine teachers with many years of experience in the school district. In the absence of a special monetary incentive, he believed, the commitment to innovation would be secondary in any Lakeport school. Given the principal's staff selection rights, a substantial minority were presumably chosen for their special interests and skills. But a selective teacher recruitment process had been unavailable as a means of gaining commitment to a high level of effort throughout the school. (Since funds were not made available for a resource center, the prerogative of choosing 50% of the staff in exchange for allocating resource center time--a union provision--was not applicable.) This restriction would seem to have shifted the responsibility to the principal to evoke the commitment of teachers in whatever non-remunerative ways were available, such as making them feel a valued part of the enterprise by giving them some say in decision-making. But this was precisely what Mr. Lassiter seemed unwilling or unable to do. His dedication to a centralized style did not permit him to adjust to the demands of the situation. And even some of those staff members who seemed most committed to making Appelbaum a good school were offended and alienated by this style.

Staff selection for next year. By monopolizing power within the administrative group and treating the faculty as subordinate personnel whose main task was to receive and follow orders, the principal seems to have atomized the staff and undermined whatever commitment they brought with them. And since it seemed difficult to elicit their cooperation, to make them be more than "clockwatchers," administrators' resentment only increased. One means of exercising greater control over faculty selection that occurred to Lassiter was to avoid advertising for next year's teachers through official channels, for if he did so, he would be bound by the union's rule that he could hire only a third of the new teachers. As early as April, therefore, he and his assistants were scouting for the new staff through word of mouth and personal contacts in the hope of recruiting individuals who would be more responsive to his demands.** As

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*As Lassiter pointed out after reading this, the practical restrictions were not small:

> In year one only, the principal could reject the applications of one third applying for transfer, and substitute for them others who were qualified, licensed, and contacted in that short time.

**Lassiter's comment is:

> The objective was to get people who could fill in the gaps in curriculum, especially business (data processing), but also real estate, finance, drama, legal studies, speech, etc.

it turned out, assistance in achieving this goal came from an unexpected quarter.

Many teachers were to be laid off because of the city's financial plight. The union therefore exercised its prerogative of refusing to extend the privilege of selecting a third of the new staff in the second year of the school. Lassiter waited for the list of "surplused" teachers, who were much younger and less experienced than his present staff, and selected those whom he felt would be committed to working in the new school. In this way he was able to acquire teachers who were not only less experienced but who were somewhat desperate for employment,* and who were therefore more malleable than the first year's faculty.

Analysis and Commentary

Political stabilization. The principal continued to enjoy a mandate from the community and from the central office to implement the design of the new school. Thus, in spite of much environmental turbulence, he was still operating from a relatively stable political base. The major external pressure on the system was the Lakeport economic crisis which entailed cut-backs in personnel and made it necessary to press the faculty to assume heavier work loads. Because of alienation from the administration, both at the school and district level, the faculty refused to comply. Even classroom innovations that had already been introduced were being dropped.

Actualization. Virtually none of the innovative features of the original design seemed to have been enacted in the first year. Although a work experience program was initiated with a very few students, such features as independent study, a stock market room, a simulated office,

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*Lassiter denied the validity of this statement:

> No one surplused is "desperate for employment," though they were desperate to come to Appelbaum-- they had already heard it was a good school to be in.

This denial is perhaps understandable for an administrator. But at this point in the fiscal crisis, any "surplused" teacher with less than 11 years of experience in his or her own specialty was subject to layoff, and in any event would have to be trasnferred to another school. Over 2000 teachers were laid off during this period. So being "surplused" was a real, anxiety-provoking threat.

computer terminals, integration of business and academic courses, and use of curricular resources in local business training programs were not realized.* Also, egalitarian relationships between teachers and students, though contemplated by the planner, were not supported by any particular rules, procedures or policies. In general, according to the faculty's reports about their own practices, the school had become more traditional as the year progressed. Structurally, power was concentrated in the principal and his assistant principals, a situation to which the faculty objected and which contributed to the strengthening of the local union chapter.

The principal continued to make plans for new programs, but because of the characteristics of students, the resistance of the faculty, and his own preoccupation with day-to-day operations, he by-and-large failed to actualize these plans. Nor does there seem to have been any greater effort to seek external resources or assistance from the business community or the field of educational R&D beyond the central office. The mechanics of the original innovations were focussed on, not their rationale or the possibility of adaptations and alternatives. The school seemed to be operated as a non-adaptive enterprise that was primarily concerned with maintaining order. Insecurity in launching the new enterprise, together with scarce resources, a poorly committed faculty, and a student body with deficient academic skills and problems of discipline had led to retrenchment.

The Second Year

Chronology

During the summer months after the first year of school, Lassiter seems to have made little progress in basic planning. He mainly dealt with day-to-day crises in hiring or retaining personnel, coping with building contractors about repairing the air conditioning system, and acquiring different sorts of equipment for the new data processing course.**

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*Ann Woodward said she felt many of these were impossible to accomplish in the first year.

**Lassiter objected, saying:

> The work of this summer was essential to the development and progress of the school. The writer clearly has no perception of what a school needed.

In an interview with Miles later, he stressed that the work on physical plant and equipment was crucial.

Consultant involvement. But he was also beginning to think about the problem of field experience for students. This would require more flexible scheduling, and Lassiter decided to meet with a university expert on flexible scheduling for advice.[12] This consultant, Frank Parker, had been brought to Lassiter's attention by Roberta Feinberg, the teacher with scheduling responsibilities who had tried to transplant the modular scheduling plan from her former school. Parker, according to Lassiter, also wanted his son admitted to Appelbaum and had discussed that matter with him. The consultant, who told a researcher he wanted to think carefully about the whole organizational context, not just the specific of flexible scheduling, was conservative. In talking with Lassiter, he stressed the importance of looking at the whole picture, and cautioned him against a full-scale flexible scheduling program for two reasons. First, the school was new, which meant that there was no established clientele or set of norms and procedures yet. Second, the fact that 20 to 30% of the students' time would be unscheduled under a full-scale program meant that many students' time would be unscheduled under a full-scale program meant that many students would be "running around unsupervised," and the students of Appelbaum High School did not impress Parker as the kind that could use this privilege productively. "It's an open school where anyone can come in," he pointed out to an interviewer. Apparently Lassiter had not persuaded Parker that next year's student body would be a highly select group because of the new selection procedure that had been adopted. (The carry-over of the first-year students, of course, would mean that the effect of more selective recruitment would be somewhat diluted. Thus, Parker's appraisal was understandable.)

The consultant was not the only person who criticized Appelbaum's scheduling plan. The teachers had been dissatisfied with those aspects of modular scheduling that had been introduced in the first year. They

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12) The research project's interest in making consultative help available was driven not only by the hope that the schools being studied would be successful (hence, more instructive to others), but by a wish to see consultants in action. Accordingly, Miles had rechecked with Lassiter during the summer about his possible interest in consulting help, and even offered to pay the complete fee (rather than only supply matching funds) for up to 11 days' work.

When Lassiter proposed Parker in the fall, Miles discussed the matter with Parker, mainly to assure himself that Parker would not take a narrowly technical approach to helping the school, and told Lassiter the project would pick up the costs as agreed on.

were afraid that recycling four times a year would make for a disorganized curriculum, since it was possible that some subjects would be covered in detail while others would not be covered at all because of variation among teachers. Part of Lassiter's new scheduling plan, incidentally, was to eliminate the "official classroom" and use the time for teaching about different attitudes and skills, such as punctuality, that would be needed on the job.* But his planning efforts continued to be sidetracked by operational crises:

> There is a need for time to plan and set up a new school, but there are also a lot of routine things that come up every week and take away time from long range planning. That's the one thing I see standing in the way.

A coordinator for work experience. A second decision that Lassiter made during the summer months was directed towards resolving this problem. He created a new assistant principal for activities and development whose main task would be to develop liaison with the business community for work experience. Lieberman, the assistant principal for administration and organization, was shifted into the new post. When asked where the idea originated, Lassiter said:

> A recognition that I was not going to get the time, the dedication, nor the commitment from anyone in a compensatory time position. With the job becoming an assistant principal position, that means it will have two necessary elements to insure that our school objective is accomplished: status and commitment. Also, [Marvin's] background is in business education, and this strengthens the position.

Another reason for creating the position may have been Lieberman's performance as assistant principal of administration and organization: teachers had complained about his inefficiency during the first year of school. (Note that Lieberman was the only carry-over from Woodward's planning team.) Lassiter planned to replace Lieberman with Daniel Rosen, the highly able supervisor of Math, Science, and Health Education. But one week after school began, in the fall of 1976, Rosen was placed in charge of allocating funds for all high schools in the city system.

This change was announced to the faculty at the first meeting of

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*Lassiter said after reading this that there never was a "new scheduling plan." The option of eliminating the official class was aimed at increasing instructional time, he said. The option, one of several, was dropped because "the faculty in committee and in conversation did not want this."

the new school year. Lassiter also pointed out at the meeting that half of the staff was new (the school had doubled in enrollment) and that many of the newcomers had been "surplused" from elsewhere because of city-wide cutbacks. He made the usual bid for extra effort, especially in the area of art because separate art programs had been eliminated, and emphasized the importance of student punctuality and attendance. He justified the emphasis on attendance, both in terms of maintaining good student records for job hunting, and in terms of increasing the state's allocation of funds to the school district. "So then there are three general goals for the school: punctuality, attendance, and basic skills," he concluded.

The principal's external power. Lassiter seems to have had a good deal of latitude in such matters as student recruitment and the creation of new administrative positions. At one point he staunchly denied that the Lakeport school system was a cumbersome bureaucracy that was slow to respond to requests for assistance, asserting that Lakeport was quite different from the sort of picture which David Rogers, for example, had painted of the New York City central office in his book (110 Livingston Street).

We have alluded to the fact that Lassiter's wife was a Board member. Our researcher never saw or heard of any instance in which the principal tried to use this to his advantage.* Still, it is hard not to speculate that others may have responded to his initiatives more positively than they might have to some other new principal's.

On one occasion, several teachers who had been teaching a short time at Appelbaum, after having been surplused from another high school, were told to report to still another school in the city. The man in charge of assignments at the hiring hall assured them that no exception would be made. When Lassiter was informed, however, he promptly got up from his desk, went to the hiring hall, and spoke to the man in charge, whereupon all three teachers were permanently assigned to Appelbaum. One of the three admitted that he liked the idea of being assigned to a school whose principal was married to a Board member because he wished to move up into supervision "and it helps if the people at the top know who you are." Mr. Lassiter certainly did nothing to create this response, but it illustrates how power can reside in the eye of the beholder.

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*Even Ann Woodward, who had criticized the parents' original decision to recommend Lassiter as not being based on merit, said it was "absolutely true" that Lassiter had not tried to exploit the fact of his wife's position.

Student population. As a result of the new student selection procedure, the proportion of black students was reduced from 55% to 42%. The proportion of Hispanic students also decreased (40% to 26%). The main increase was in the number of Oriental students (2% to 19%), which was, no doubt, due to the proximity of the school to Chinatown. White students also increased (from 3% to 12%). Females still outnumbered males by more than two to one (68% were female in the second year). It seemed that the limited athletic program had initially been responsible in part for reducing the number of male applicants to the school. In the course of the second year, this program was expanded.

According to a report by an assistant principal,

> Their families are, in the majority, middle- and lower middle-class[13]--recently arrived at these levels but with a sense of upward mobility which sees itself being challenged by rising inflation and the current state of the nation's economic crisis.

The assistant principal also noted that he expected more white students to apply:

> ..when more find out that the racial conflicts at Appelbaum are virtually non-existent and that the school provides a very safe atmosphere. White students have had success going back to local junior highs to let other students know about the school.

Consultation terminates. Frank Parker, the consultant on flexible scheduling, after a few conversations with Lassiter, was invited to meet with a group of teachers and administrators in late February. (The group had met only twice since its organization by Lassiter in the fall.) He had assumed that the meeting would give him an opportunity to learn about the teachers' concerns, but Lassiter "threw me a curve," he said. The principal introduced him formally and said that the topic was flexible scheduling, although he had tried to persuade Lassiter earlier that the issue was much broader. Parker recalled:

> I wanted to hear from them, but it didn't come off. They've got potential, but something is missing. Morale, maybe.

Parker also felt that Lassiter had been sidetracked by the idea of scheduling as such, rather than just proceeding with the work experience program. Among other things, Parker suggested a "teaming concept" whereby

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13) The "middle" and "lower middle" labels seem to have been more reassurance than reality. For example, as it turned out, nearly half of the students during the second year had free lunch passes, a feature available only to students with family income at the welfare or poverty level.

groups of teachers would develop "schedules within schedules" so that the work experience program would be easier. All in all, Parker felt that the afternoon meeting was fruitless, that he had dropped many ideas in the principal's lap but that he didn't pick them up. He felt that the desire to do something constructive was present, but that there were "some real psychological blocks." Parker's account of the meeting reflects several themes that we have already detected:

> Something about the whole set-up disturbs me. Harold Lassiter talks a lot about what he wants to do innovatively: he wants to use the business community resources, to get the kids out there in job situations. But he was saying exactly the same things last summer when we met, and I see no movement in that direction from then to now...He had sent me a memo of the notes of their meetings, so that I'd be current on what they had been discussing. That memo let me know how uncommitted they really are, it supported my hunch. The teachers' requests during the earlier meetings were for conventional scheduling.
>
> Then, as soon as the committee meeting started, he said I was there to talk as an expert on flexible scheduling. I thought that instead of talking specifically about flexible scheduling, I'd talk to them about what their committee had been doing....I figured that it was a Freudian slip, that he wanted to divert or sidetrack the meeting onto the topic of flexible scheduling, so that there'd be no chance to discuss the real issue of scheduling alternatives....Harold Lassiter is scared of having independent study for kids, and that's what modular scheduling demands....But I think that's an exaggerated fear.
>
> It's a question of how much leadership he could provide, how much risk he is willing to take in order to advance something that he believes in...It usually takes three to four years to really implement modular scheduling. I wouldn't fault Appelbaum for not achieving that implementation. It was a poor objective in the first place....The attitude is such that if we're going to start a new school, it's got to be different--and that includes modular scheduling. But I doubt that Appelbaum will, or even should, implement it.

The consultant's warning that flexible scheduling was difficult to implement seems to have relieved the principal of the burden of adopting any form of it and of spurning independent study altogether. Thus, as Lassiter said later in an interview:

> His experiences with flexible scheduling had led him to be not quite so dedicated to it as he had been when it originally began. He assumed that it could work, it could have very specific advantages, but that it also could be either unnecessary or undesirable...It calls for a great deal of time and effort, and effort is money...You need commitment on the part of the faculty if you're going to do something of this sort. And to generate that commitment one has to have certain prerogatives. One of these is the opportunity to educate teachers...we had no time. Teachers are teaching five classes a day. We did have a summer institute...but after that, nothing was funded... /_The consultation_/ relieved us of the question that had been hanging.

Consequently, the school reverted to regular class periods in the ensuing year.

Parker was the only consultant outside the city system whom Lassiter engaged. Lack of funds and the availability of expertise at district headquarters were the reasons given by Lassiter for not going outside the district for assistance. (Parker's consultation fee was covered by our project. Otherwise, the principal said, he would not have engaged him at all.)*

The work experience program. For several months prior to Parker's meeting with the teachers and administrators, Marvin Lieberman, the new assistant principal for activities and development, had been making plans for an internship program in the spring term. By the end of the school year, almost half (48%) of the teachers indicated in our questionnaire that they were "using work experiences which are successfully exposing students to the business world." But oddly enough, when a sample of students were asked in our survey at the same time what they liked most about Appelbaum, their answers covered everything from the air conditioning to the shorthand courses, but only one mentioned the opportunity for work experience in the business world. This apparent contradiction might be due to the fact that only a small proportion of the student body (8%) was in the program, although they were spread out in the classes of many teachers. Further, the great majority of those in the program were assigned work activities within the school. Thus, the students may not have viewed this arrangement as a unique or valuable part of their education.

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*Lassiter also made it very clear after reading this that "at no time did I seek a whole organizational review" from Parker; he wished to restrict the consultation to flexible scheduling as such.

The State of the System

Students. The attitudes of the students at the end of the second year were more favorable toward the school than formerly, however. Thus 59% now indicated that the decision to come to Appelbaum "was worth it--it's my idea of a good school," compared with 43% a year earlier. And 64% said it was "much better" than their former school, compared with 50% a year earlier. Further, the students more often felt that the teachers were considerate (44% vs. 22% formerly), helpful with their work (75% vs. 65% formerly), and honest with them (73% vs. 51% formerly). On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the students less often reported opportunity for independent work in the classroom. For example, whereas formerly 37% had said that it was true that "if I think of something to do that is important to me, my teacher will usually let me work on it during class time," now only 16% said that this was the case. Also, whereas 81% had said earlier that teachers always expected them to "take an active part in class discussions," now only 56% said that this was the case. Further, marking or checking work every day in the classroom was reported more frequently (82% vs. 60% formerly.

These shifts in the attitudes and experiences of the student body suggest that the second year's atudents were more appreciative of the teachers, even though their work was more structured. The explanation for this apparent paradox may lie in the different composition of the second year student body: the increased control over student recruitment brought more academically-able students, who were more responsive to a task-oriented, adult-dominated learning environment. This conclusion is supported by a striking shift in motivations students reported for choosing to come to Appelbaum. At the end of the first year, only 24% signified that they had chosen Appelbaum because "it has a business curriculum," while a year later, fully 59% re ponded this way. On the other hand, whereas formerly 39% had said that they had chosen the school because "it is different from other schools," a year later only 9% so responded. Clearly, the innovative bloom had worn off the rose, and both the teachers and the students now meant business.

Teachers. The social climate of the faculty (which had almost doubled in size) also seems to have improved somewhat. Thus, whereas 52% of the teachers had reported feeling like "just a cog in the machinery of the school" always or almost always at the end of the first year, only 28% responded this way a year later. Similarly, the percentage who indicated that they felt "as if I am on an island by myself" always or almost always dropped from 42% to 15%. They also felt more often that the school was maintaining high academic standards, providing a variety of learning environments and activities, and was a place where students wanted to be. And finally, they seemed to find it easier to discuss their classroom problems with their immediate supervisors. (At the end of the first year, 57% had said they

always or usually felt free to discuss problems with supervisors in the first year, while 84% responded this way a year later.)[14]

But apparently these shifts of attitude were not sufficient to compensate for a general decline in faculty morale. The proportion who indicated that staff morale was either a "serious" or a "moderate" problem increased from 32% to 63%, which was even higher than the level during the early months of the new school in its temporary quarters (52% had then felt that staff morale was either a "serious" or a "moderate" problem).

Since the teachers rarely reported that student discipline was a problem (none said it was a serious problem), and since they were relatively satisfied with their own departments and immediate superiors, we must look elsewhere for an explanation of the morale problem. There seem to have been three sources: inadequate curriculum, work overload, and the principal's style of leadership. With regard to curriculum, 79% of the faculty cited "inadequate curriculum" as a serious or moderate problem (contrasted with only 20% a year earlier). With regard to overload, 55% regarded this as a serious or moderately serious problem (contrasted with only 26% a year earlier); similarly, the proportion who felt that "inadequate numbers of staff to supply needed services" was a serious or moderate problem jumped from 48% to 71%. And with regard to the principal, the proportion who felt that the "climate" was arbitrary (vs. fair) increased from 34% to 50%. Similarly, there was an increase in the proportion who felt that the faculty did not have the opportunity "to discuss and define the school's goals (from 32% to 49%).

But even more striking is the decline in respect for the principal's ideas and assistance, as shown in the following table derived from our sociometric analysis. When asked at three points in time to indicate the persons in the school who had the "best ideas to contribute on educational matters," whom they found themselves "talking with most on a casual, informal basis about the things that go on here," who "turn out to be most helpful to you," and who were "most interested in new ideas on education," the principal's status was found to decline steadily. His "influence on what happens,"

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14) We might speculate that these positive shifts stemmed from a more fully stabilized school, with larger departments whose members had had time to form predictable working relationships with each other and their supervisors and deliver better instruction.

however, remained high, and increased in the second year.[15]

	Per Cent Who Named Principal		
	Dec.'75	June '76	June '77
Best educational ideas	44%	28%	19%
Talked with casually	11	14	3
Most helpful	11	0	5
Most interested in new ideas	37	24	17
Has the most influence	63	55	78
N	(26)	(29)	(54)

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15) It is of some interest that from December to June of the first year, the principal's influence declined slightly, while that of assistant principals rose: the average A.P. was mentioned as having "most influence" by 34% of the faculty in December, and 41% in June. This lends credence to the idea that the principal was at that point vesting more power in his aides. However, the picture a year later is quite different: though the principal is mentioned by 78% of faculty, the average A.P. is mentioned by only 25%. (only one teacher was mentioned by as many as 11% of teachers as "having most influence," and he was not even mentioned by June of 1977.)

Some of the decline in the table above comes from the fact that in the second year the faculty size doubled, so that a given number of choices was less impressive percentage-wise. Compiling and averaging the nominations received by frequently-chosen faculty members gives these results:

	Dec. 75	June 76	June 77
Best educational ideas (N=7)	18%	24%	16%
Talked with casually (N=12)	18	12	9
Most helpful (N=8)	8	6	5
Most interested in new ideas (N=5)	15	17	12

Seen this way, the principal's status declined during the first year relative to that of more-visible faculty members on "best ideas", "most helpful" and "new ideas". During the second year, however, his decline in status was generally comparable to that of frequently-chosen teachers--though his influence had increased substantially, while that of key teachers had dropped.

In these observations we detect an amplification of problems that were mentioned earlier: a neglect of curriculum in favor of procedural mechanics, a faculty that felt over-burdened by cut-backs in resources and personnel and that was uninterested in innovation for its own sake, and a principal who was unable to inspire their efforts by justifying the needed changes in the school or by coopting the teachers into the decision-making structure. (Only a small proportion of teachers, for example, had been personally involved in setting up the internship program for students.) As one teacher remarked,

> From what I understand, a lot of people resented the things that they had to do last year and now they are trying to see whether or not they can be required to do those things.

Arlene Barnes, for example, had done a great deal of after-school work with the chorus, but felt that she had not received any support or appreciation for her efforts, and that if Lassiter really wanted a chorus he should schedule it as part of the school day. The principal told her she might be "surplused" when Barnes balked at running the chorus the second year, and eventually carried out his threat.* Thus a policy of weeding out rather than motivating the non-compliant may have been adopted. And as the year progressed, the union chapter took a stronger stand against the principal's demands for more work and his arbitrary methods of control.** It seemed that the school had settled down to a situation of institutionalized conflict between employee and manager that bore little relation to the education of youth.***

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*Lassiter commented here:

> We had no music program and the allocation was reduced. I could not keep a teacher out of license; it is illegal and subject to suit and damages.

**Lassiter said that the "union throughout the city was taking such a stand." His comment applies to "demands for more work," but not to "arbitrary methods of control," which was not a city-wide issue.

***Lassiter's view was that the survey data (pp.69-70) "indicate the opposite." Furthermore, he said:

> Unrest and conflict were a city-wide phenomenon. /And/ no cognizance has been taken by the writer of conflict between faculty groups. The questionnaire does not define the arbitrary climate as one generated by administration. To what extent has the writer explored conflict of views among the teachers?

The line of argument seems rather sinuous: (1) the data show that no conflict existed; (2) there was city-wide conflict (so the conflict would naturally be in Appelbaum too); (3) the conflict is not assignable to administrators, in any case.

Implementation success. Of the original innovations that were planned, few were implemented two years after the school's opening. In particular, the features that were so enthusiastically reported in the press during the early planning phase--a stock market room, a simulated office, computer terminals, use of training resources in local firms, use of executives to run workshops, courses in Arabic and Japanese, independent study, and integration of business and academic courses--never came about.* Other innovations, such as a cooperative program with Sage University and the internships in business and government agencies, were implemented on a very limited scale. And still another innovation (flexible scheduling) was tried but eventually phased out. The failure to implement most of these innovations was attributed by the principal to the financial problems of the city, and to some extent to the "dollar crunch" on the local corporations as well. In addition, the lack of outdoor recreational facilities and open spaces within the school building where students could be supervised while engaged in "independent" study were claimed by the principal to have stemmed directly from the planning period, as were a course in calculus

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*Ann Woodward wrote:

> In fairness to Lassiter, they are now (Dec. 1977) coming about. The central office's slowness in delivering items was a major problem. However, I have heard that the students can now get insurance broker's training leading to certification (a good contact made during planning was the president of the Insurance Institute). The computer courses seem to be particularly well developed. Lassiter did a lot of hard work in filling whatever gaps he may have had in the field of business education. The school is moving and developing a personality. In fact, one staff member I recommended does not like Lassiter personally, but does admire him for his dedication to maintaining a high-quality school.

Curiously enough, Harold Lassiter himself reacted to the same statement in the text by a retrospective redefinition of the school's goals:

> Few specific innovations were ever stated, save the desirability of liaison with business and the need for an unusual curriculum.

Thus the school (and implicitly he) could not be blamed for not introducing innovations which had never been contemplated in the first place. The reader should refer to pp. 4-8 and 11-14 to see how substantial a redefinition of history was involved.

and two courses in computers. In addition, there was the possibility, according to the principal, that workshops by local executives would be provided to the first graduating class during the coming (third) school year. Thus by our first general criterion of implementation success, (goal-congruent implementation), Appelbaum fares only moderately well. Much of the original version was lost.

On our second, "problem-coping ability", the school must be assessed as functioning fairly smoothly and well: Lassiter steered the school along a stable path in the midst of considerable environmental turbulence. Our third criterion was stakeholder satisfaction: student attitudes were relatively positive, and (though we did not report it) parent satisfaction remained relatively high. Though teachers seemed well integrated and satisfied when the issue was their departmental working relationships, there were some serious dissatisfactions with the work overload, with the curriculum itself, and with the principal's leadership style--particularly his exercise of power. So the primary operators of the school were less than satisfied.

Finally, what was Appelbaum's operating impact on student outcomes? We cannot assess that from our data, but it certainly was not doing more poorly than other city vocational schools, and may have been more effective. But the question remains moot.

On balance, implementation success should probably be counted as partial. Much depends, naturally, on how one weights the fact that a number of hopes were not realized and teachers' reactions to the school were mixed against the facts that students and parents were satisfied, and that student learnings were probably present at an at-least normally-expected level. The researchers were more interested in the first two criteria; the principal (and to some extent the planner) tended to focus on the idea that the school was a good, well-managed one with much promise developing.

Analysis and Commentary

What might account for the degree of implementation success noted by the end of the second year?

Political stabilization. The principal continued to be politically secure in his environment, and the relationship with the business community seems to have been revived somewhat through the work experience program. Further, effectiveness in obtaining needed resources from the central office continued. So one answer is that the school occupied a reasonably secure ecological niche in the political environment of Lakeport schools.

Knowledge utilization. Once again, we can assign little explanatory power to the idea that expertise had helped the school to be as successfully implemented as it was. It was not until the summer after the first year of school that the principal first sought external assistance in implementing a new scheduling program, but he failed to use this

assistance wisely. Instead of engaging in a diagnostic assessment of scheduling needs and permitting the teachers to express their sentiments, he seems to resist general organizational analysis, and to have used the consultant's reservations about flexible scheduling to justify dropping it altogether.

Social-architectural design. Improvements in the school's set-up, and the student population appearing,aided implementation to some extent. The creation of a position to supervise the internship program also helped by eliminating one of the faculty's complaints, since the assistant principal for administration and organizations was shifted into the new post. Thus, albeit on a very limited basis, an internship program was formally launched. The faculty evaluated the program favorably, but the attitudes of the students themselves were not clear.

The earlier decision to recruit students more selectively did alter the ethnic distribution of the student population somewhat (more whites and Orientals were admitted, though males were kept away by the weak athletic program); it also succeeded in admitting more task-oriented and compliant students. Presumably these students had a narrower vocational interest than had been envisioned for a "comprehensive" school with an emphasis on preparation for college. Thus, despite an increase in structured, adult-dominated teaching methods, the students were more pleased with the school than formerly.

Actualization. It did appear that there were many forces during the second year militating against the full realization of the original vision for Appelbaum. We have noted in particular the increased work load imposed by cut-backs in city resources, the principal's apparent non-responsiveness to the faculty's dissatisfactions, the emphasis on procedural mechanics rather than substance, and the faculty's lack of commitment to the school as a pacesetter in education. Thus, the teachers and administration settled for a sort of institutionalized conflict: a stabilized (and undoubtedly comforting) situation in which neither side needed to change.

In the final analysis, few of the innovations that were originally proposed for the school were implemented. While a certain amount of responsibility for this failure is due to the fiscal crisis of the city, the principal's style of leadership seemed not only alienate his faculty from the school's goals, but to entail a retreat from innovations that presented any problem at all in implementation. Maintaining an orderly, accountable structure seemed to displace all other objectives. This emphasis (which many faculty members shared) rose so early in the life of the organization (i.e., at the summer institute before the opening of school), that the fact that the school was a new enterprise did not afford any greater flexibility than occurs in an older organization, and the principal's insistence that all of the school's goals were set from above may have created even less flexibility than in older schools. The unanticipated problems of dealing with a temporary facility and a

poorly qualified student body reinforced the stress on day to day operations in the early months of the school, and the fiscal crisis served as a ready excuse for inaction during the ensuing year.

Summing Up

So, on balance, Appelbaum High School became less than its planners had hoped for it, while being judged by its manager (and even by the original planner) as being a reasonably good school. That it was not as innovative a school as originally conceived seems quite clear, in spite of the principal's later claim that no real innovation had ever been intended.

What reflections do we have at this point, thinking back over the enterprise?

The early planning period at Appelbaum was characterized by a good deal of success in acquiring money and other resources,* and in mobilizing support for the new school among the business and educational communities of the city. However, the key planner failed to acquire the power to select a student body that was most suitable to the goals of the school, and did not pass on a fully developed plan for curriculum, organization or instructional modes.**

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*Lassiter said this was not so.

**Woodward noted:

> You criticize Lassiter for being too authoritarian. Aren't you trying to cast me in the same mold /i.e., suggest that authoritarian action might have been appropriate in this case/ ? NOTHING succeeds unless you get the support and commitment of the people you work with. My style is totally different from Lassiter's. The school I head now is trying all sorts of things, new offerings, because the responsibility is the teachers'! I set the tone and work on the relationships to make things happen. Teachers approach me with ideas.

We believe that Woodward's view--that specifying a more coherently developed instructional framework would be "authoritarian" and result in less teacher involvement--while natural, is not necessarily a good prediction of what might have happened had the design been more developed. There are many grounds to believe that such a structure could have aided collaborative work around actualization of a clearer vision for the school. The absence of the structure laid the basis for a "business as usual" implementation.

And because the planner was unable to continue as the implementer, the strong value commitment and tacit conceptions underlying the school's vision, and perhaps also the support of the local business community, were forfeited. (In effect, the planner's goal that the school become an elite institution was largely set aside.) Owing to the loss of ideological drive, the socialization of the new staff by the administrators emphasized routine procedural matters rather than the school's original vision, which reinforced the tendency of the highly experienced faculty to fall back on prior experience. In addition, many of the faculty were not primarily interested in the experimental nature of the school to begin with.

The gap between planning and implementation was exacerbated by the inadequate temporary facility, the paucity of instructional resources in the first months, and the wave of teacher militancy that arose as a reaction to city-wide staff cut-backs. In this crisis-oriented climate, day-to-day administrative demands preempted attention to innovative educational goals. All of these circumstances reinforced the inclination of the principal to pursue an aloof and somewhat arbitrary style of leadership, which he explained in terms of the lack of flexibility of the school's goals which were ostensibly set by district headquarters. This posture created further stress for the faculty, and caused them to resist the extra demands on their time required to launch a new enterprise. The upshot was that morale slumped, and the school became even less innovative than schools in which the faculty had formerly taught.

While adjustments were made in the recruitment of students and faculty for the second year, skepticism remained among faculty members who had been with the school from the start. New students and new faculty members were more receptive to the principal's demands, but had little awareness of the school's original, innovative vision. In particular, they were more narrowly focussed on entry-level vocational education than originally envisioned.

The principal's ability to get along well with the central administration may have reduced pressures for him to implement the original plans, the details of which had stemmed largely from outside of central headquarters. Thus, his almost exclusive use of district experts (owing partly, no doubt, to the lack of funds) and his failure to maintain strong relationships with the local business community insulated him from the wider world of educational R&D -- including the expertise in the creation of new organizations that was offered to him by our project -- and perhaps also from the educational needs and opportunities of the metropolis. Cut-backs in resources for staff development also hampered the school's realization of goals, but may also have served as an excuse for not giving the staff more autonomy in attacking the school's problems and proposing their own solutions.

In sum, while many of the barriers confronted by the school were imposed by external circumstances, the planners and implementers were

unable to take full advantage of the opportunities that did exist. The key planner's neglect of substance and the key implementer's neglect of human relations, together with the numerous structural constraints imposed on the enterprise, led to an outcome no one had really hoped for: a potentially innovative school regressed toward the norm of big-city vocational education. Whether Appelbaum can actualize more of the original visions its planners and implementers had for it remains to be seen.

Concluding Comments from Participants

We have included much commentary by participants as footnotes to the text. Two also wrote general comments, and they appear below.

Ann Woodward. This study documents the problems of creating a new high school in which the planner (project coordinator) has no real authority and the implementer (principal) is confronted with a "vision" that was not of his creation.

Woodward, the planner, and the Director of Business Education of the central office shared the view that it was possible to build a prestige high school focusing on business education which would operate in a similar manner to the city's already top-rated specialized schools. This "vision" was not shared by certain central office administrators because the prevailing attitude was, and continues to be, that schools with specialized requirements decrease the overall quality of the network of high schools in Lakeport.

Woodward felt that the central office had a unique opportunity because of the school's location to draw from business resources. Despite setbacks, the school is beginning to emerge as one of the "better high schools" and is starting to capitalize on its assets.

To consider the matter of Woodward's lack of curriculum planning is to fail to understand that in planning an interdisciplinary approach, it is necessary to have teams of teachers with varying talents write the curriculum. The "skeleton structure" and business resources were given to Lassiter, the principal. In fact, personnel had been promised from one of the major corporations (which runs a successful nationwide training program) to develop programs co-operatively for the students.

In all fairness to Lassiter, he had selected some top-notch people as teachers. Woodward and Lieberman had recommended some of these, who in addition to superior knowledge in their subject matter, were either multi-lingual or possessed special talents. These people were lost to the system when the budget crunch came about. Also, to open in Sage University, with its lack of facilities, severely handicapped Lassiter. Many of the courses planned were for upper-term students--not the opening register of 9th and 10th year students.

Suppose that Appelbaum did not have this preplanning. Let us compare the school with its nearest competitor--a brand new vocational school in a prime real estate area which was a replacement for an established commercial high school. Appelbaum has a female/male ratio of 2 to 1, school X, 5 to 1. Appelbaum tops this school in attendance with a figure of 90 per cent, and two-thirds of the school reads at or above grade level (note--comparison with my current school in which 75 per cent of the student body are two or more years below grade level).

Appelbaum is developing a personality. The work cycle as a requirement for graduation, as suggested by the planner based on the DRG research report, is working out very well. The school won city-wide honors in computer science. Appelbaum is the only school in the city which prepares its students for the insurance brokerage's certificate (another member of the original steering committee was the president of a major insurance company). Also, it is important not to overlook the "good-ol-boy" network which is a fact of life the study brought out so clearly in quoting the vice president of a major bank, ("I can create jobs"). The students in the school will benefit from everything from jobs to scholarships, JUST BECAUSE the school, the principal and the students are known to the power people downtown.

I have faith in Lassiter. It is true the school cannot conform to the "vision" that Newman and Woodward had. Central office interests and union constraints work against it. It is developing, however, into a top school which gives students a fine education--and that's what is really important.

Beatrice O'Brien. The report is on target. It has an extremely effective style devoid of "pedagese" but accurately descriptive of attitudes and climate.

There is no doubt that the original ambivalence about the nature and purpose of this new school has continued to be a recurring dragon for the first two years. This uncertainty has contributed greatly to the indecisiveness and anxiety about expectation which is reflected in the low faculty morale described in the report and also in the extremely high attrition rate with the first class.

The administration still regards the school as highly "innovative".. because the structure is predicated on computerization and cycles. To the thoughtful observer this is merely a structural description, and a really incorrect use of the term "innovative". While the course offerings carry new titles, the substance is very similar to courses in traditional settings.

Just what is expected of us? This is the $64 dollar question which is still with us. Directive after directive has been issued to answer this question but with a variety of answers. There is a continual changing of mind which has been devastating to young people who are interested in planning rationally for future goals. Currently there have been a series of policy statements and publications (such as Curriculum Patterns) which are supposedly settling the unanswered questions. However, few believe that this is it because the policies to date have changed so frequently and so radically. Even where certain policies have begun to root such as in the curriculum area there are still changes of these policies dictated by concerns about numbers, curriculum materials, and overall concerns to have certain fashionable,

publicity-worthy programs continued. The conclusion to this is that while the format of structure, procedure and orderliness has been developed in words, the substantive implementation is still missing. It does seem that the overall aims for the design of this school are coming from some other place, devised by minds that are not really identified with the body of the school nor too concerned either with the ways in which children learn but rather concerned with "how does this look on paper?"

An interesting observation to me is that to the outside observer the emphasis in the early stages of this developing school appeared to be on orderly procedures of organization and instruction, which in a surface manner was exactly so. However, while there was this emphasis on forms, procedures and routines there was at the same time a constant changing and very little establishment of procedures that were thought through to conclusions. An enormous amount of time and effort has been spent by the administrators and supervisors developing and explaining these procedures. Yet if you ask several administrators what is a particular procedure about any matter now, you will get as many answers as people questioned in almost all but a few areas.

Another really interesting twist on the use of words has been the rigid embracing of the word innovative and the equally rigid despisement of the word traditional. No ideas are tolerated if somehow they are associated with a traditional pattern. Yet the school is laced into a structure that seems to have no give. No one has made the effort to look at what is good, what works best for the pupils we have. If anyone makes such a suggestion he is regarded out of order and just not cut out for the brave new world of the computer and its way of doing things. This emphasis on computerization and its answers to all questions takes precedence over common sense. No ideas are tolerated that do not fit in with preconceived notions. This is such a twist on the authoritarian school that it defies description.

No large institution can flourish without procedure but such procedures must have purpose to the people they are designed for. They must also be efficient and productive and have observable purpose. This is basic to continued development and growth. Procedures must also meet the needs of the people the institution serves. It would seem that some ongoing evaluation and open review is needed to keep procedures flexible and adapting to new conditions. The idea of open review and ongoing evaluation has not been part of our experience.

Thanks again for providing the means for some thoughtful review of what has been for me a very interesting experience.

Harold Lassiter. (The principal did not write any overall memorandum, though we repeatedly invited him to do so. However, he gave his general reactions in a meeting he requested, which is discussed below.)

Reactions to Feedback of the Case

In late November of 1977, we began the process of case feedback to Appelbaum participants. We decided to involve a wide range of people in different positions, including Ann Woodward as planner; the principal, Harold Lassiter; two assistant principals (Robert Jamieson, Dorothy Mailer); a guidance counselor (Beatrice O'Brien); and a teacher (Patrick Chan). We wrote them, asking if they would be interested in reading the case, making factual corrections, and writing a two-page memo of commentary "indicating any reactions, agreements or disagreements you have"; the commentary, we explained, would be included along with the case.

All said they would be interested, and we sent a copy of the case to each, asking for a reply within one month (December 28).[16]

In the first week of January, we received marginally-corrected copies, with commentary, from Beatrice O'Brien and Pat Seabrook. (These have been incorporated in the final version of the case.) However, no one else except Harold Lassiter responded.

Mr. Lassiter called Miles, saying that he thought the case was a "travesty," and asked who the author was, doubting that someone who had not visited the site could understand the events that had taken place.[17] Miles, who would be leaving the country on February 2 for a five-month period, suggested that he and Lassiter meet to discuss the case and the principal's reactions in more detail.

Lassiter agreed, and said he would prepare a memo of commentary as well. On January 6 he phoned, asking for added information about the survey: when the second wave had been administered; whether there was a

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16) This was one of the first cases in our study fed back to participants. In retrospect, we made several errors. Sending the case to all commenters at once left lower-status persons feeling more vulnerable. And our letter did not explain who else was receiving copies, adding to participants' uncertainty.

17) Sieber is a sociologist with over twenty years of experience in doing and managing field research. As a project staff member, he had discussed Appelbaum events at several staff meetings, and with the primary field worker (E. Wamboi Kironde). He wrote the first draft of the case directly from the complete file of site contacts, documents, and preliminary analyses by Kironde: he also used both waves of the survey data from staff, parents and students. A good case can be made for the fact that his distance from the Appelbaum site actually fostered objectivity.

summary of results (none had been fed back); the N of teachers responding to the second and third waves; and even whether secretaries had been included in the results. Miles provided the information.

Lassiter came to Miles' office on January 30. He made it clear he was extremely angry. The discussion lasted for 2 1/2 hours, with Lassiter registering detailed objections to many aspects of the case. Lassiter was most upset in particular about the following:

1. The identifiability of the school, and himself.

   He said:

   > There are only 32 high schools in Lakeport, and only one with a principal that's married to a Board member. You deal with that, or we forget the whole thing.

2. The issue of his appointment.

   Lassiter was furious at the implication that his appointment had been made on any other grounds than that of merit:

   > It ignores 27 years of a professional life, and makes me into a non-person. I won't buy it and it's libelous.

3. The implication that the school was not a success.

   He said:

   > The school is different from what you expected. But innovation was not a goal. No money was set aside for that. Appelbaum was to be an educational options school, with a major in business education, and liaison with the business community. Anything else is in the mind of the writer. What this writer seems to want is Horace Mann High School.
   >
   > There is the implication that the school is a failure, and that /the principal/ is a villain, unable to recognize his own deficiencies and correct them.

Lassiter went on to justify the limited provision for student work experience in the business community:

> The first kids were 9th and 10th graders. They had few skills to offer. /Besides/ business was affected by the fiscal crisis too. The small number of students was deliberate. We would have gone out of our

minds if we had worked heavily on this. We kept the Downtown Renewal Group posted and developed models for use later....We're beginning to get to it [work experience]. Two years is not a reasonable time to expect it to happen.

But then he returned to the "innovation" theme, alternating between the idea that no innovation had ever been intended, and the paradoxical assertion that the curriculum and instructional methods were in fact innovative. He concluded:

> There was no clear original vision. Besides, the innovative specifics proposed [by Woodward] are not that new.

4. The idea that the state of the school (if less than successful) was connected with the principal's actions.

He said:

> There is a deliberate creation of character. The case shows Ann Woodward as a hero; me as a villain.
>
> Climate is not just affected by the principal, but by the environment. The morale of teachers in general throughout the city was low in June of 1977.

Throughout the discussion, Lassiter criticized the study's methods and focus, saying that "it was a waste of the taxpayers' money"; that there was "a lack of attention to curriculum and methods of instruction"; that the impact of the fiscal crisis was minimized in the text; that Dorothy Mailer, the "single person most crucial to the school" had never been interviewed;[18] that the survey answers (e.g., on scheduling, discipline, climate) were confusing and invalid because "teachers don't read"; that the writer was ignorant of what the realities of a Lakeport High School were. And he felt the writer had "preconceptions" (e.g., that the school should be "innovative," or have free electives, or that an outside consultant was the best way to improve the school's functioning).

Lassiter concluded by suggesting that Irving Haberman, the Director of High Schools, be interviewed to confirm his (Lassiter's) view of the limited goals of the school (as well as to confirm that Ann Woodward was not really a "planner").

Miles, who felt somewhat taken aback by Lassiter's onslaught, proposed that Lassiter put his detailed reactions and corrections in a memo, which would immediately go to Sieber for his attention during revisions, and

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18) The field worker had talked with her informally on several occasions.

that he also write a general commentary with his interpretations. Miles would write back with reactions before going to the final version of the case, and would also suggest ways of disguising the school more fully.

At Lassiter's request, Miles gave the names of people who had received the case. He also noted (perhaps incautiously) that Beatrice O'Brien had, in general, found the case an accurate description.

Miles also said he would send a letter to the other readers of the case, countering the implication that Lassiter had gotten his job on grounds other than those of merit.

With this, Lassiter left, agreeing to Miles' suggestions. However, the next day, Lassiter wrote to Sullivan, Miles' associate, saying:

> I am deeply concerned that such a document should have been circulated both within and without the school without my having had an opportunity to read it first. It contains substantial errors of fact and insupportable inferences which have now had wide publicity. To repair the damage will not be easy.
>
> Dr. Miles spoke yesterday about sending a letter to all who received the report acknowledging specifically that the statements about my /job/ interview are untrue. On consideration, I realize that this may well imply that all other assertions are true, which, as you are aware, is not the case. Therefore, no such letter should be sent unless I have seen it. I must give careful thought to the matter. My material will be ready shortly; I will be in touch with you.

Lassiter's memo, labeled "Errors of fact," ran to seven single-spaced pages, and arrived the next day. (Corrections have been made to deal with all of them in text and footnotes, though, as we have seen, some of the "facts" did not correspond with documentation and field notes.)

Miles drafted a letter to the other case readers acknowledging an error which Lassiter had singled out (the case had stated that he knew all the selection committee members by name) and saying:

> The incorrect statement in the case could, of course, have been interpreted by readers as lending weight to the idea that the new principal was appointed on grounds other than those of competence. We are glad to have this error pointed out, and will of course revise the case to correct this and other errors of fact.

A phone call to Lassiter's office on February 10 received the message that he "has not forgotten /about the commentary memo/ but work load is tremendous." The secretary also relayed the message that the corrective letter Miles proposed should <u>not</u> be sent out.

Sullivan decided to wait a while for further initiative from Lassiter. On March 10, with no further word, she sent Lassiter the draft corrective letter from Miles, along with a February 28 letter from Miles explaining the measures he proposed to take to disguise the case and protect identities; they cannot of course be detailed here. The letter also asked for Lassiter's comments by March 15. And Sullivan sent notes to the other readers inviting their comments; no more had yet come in.

One reader called Sullivan a few days later, saying:

> I wanted to call and tell you why /people/ haven't responded. I don't know whether or not anyone else told you the situation, but back in November when we were first asked for comments, Harold Lassiter came to us and asked us not to respond, and that he was thinking of initiating a lawsuit. We were hopeful anyway, then, and agreed.

The staff member than explained the allusion to "hopefulness" as follows:

> Contrary to what he had promised, he has not done anything to get the four original A.P.'s licensed as supervisors. Thus, they will all have to go back to the classroom as of June.

The staff member claimed that Lassiter was in effect trying to get rid of the A.P.'s, who were "demoralized." Lassiter had already hired two new supervisors and gotten them licensed.[19]

The staff member went on:

> I'd like this story to be known, but at the same time, recognizing how the central office works, knowing that he and his wife are powerful people, I feel it's too risky /to comment on the case/ at this moment.
>
> I've talked to others and we asked ourselves if we should put out something in writing, but we're worried. I still have /quite a few/ years left in the school system.

More than a little alarmed, Sullivan sent notes of this conversation to Miles, and waited to hear further from Lassiter.

On March 31, Lassiter and Sullivan spoke on the phone. Lassiter was still angry, and began immediately:

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19) We do not have any independent verification of these assertions.

> Quite frankly, I'm appalled at the whole thing. I've tried to be objective, to get it away from the personal. I find this the most appalling substitute for research, and an incredible waste of the taxpayers' money. To have had something like this written by someone who never even saw the school, never even visited the school--and for it to be slanted this way by someone who was never here....To conclude the school is a failure is totally crazy. It can't be all bad if we had 4,200 applications for 700 places.
>
> In terms of research, what was collected was gossip. There was nothing on the total background. And the understanding of the public school system is appallingly bad.[20]

He went on to reiterate his view that "Ann Woodward was never a planner; she was a coordinator," and said he had sent a copy of the case to Irving Haberman, who "said he would be happy to meet with you to discuss this."[21] Lassiter said that Haberman's "immediate reaction was that Ann was not a planner," and continued to outline his view that (in effect) since Ann Woodward did not have legitimacy as a planner, he could hardly be blamed for not having carried out her plans.

Lassiter was also still upset about the issue of his appointment:

> I think the contention is very clearly made that I got where I did because of my wife. This is pure conjecture--hallucination. Did it ever occur to you that my appointment was extremely difficult for the Superintendent, and that my wife worked against me in the situation rather than the opposite? Or why there was not an uproar when the husband of a Board member was appointed a principal? Because I was qualified, and there was no question about that. I know the reporters who raise questions /and they did not/.

And he returned to the idea that no real "plans" had been made:

> I think you should have a statement from Irv Haberman about the orientation, planning, and design for the school. Nowhere were there any specific plans. There was no construction of curriculum. There was a vague curriculum bulletin which Marvin had written. There were no specific plans, beyond the level of things

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20) The case as seen by readers did not have the present section on the historical and political context in Lakeport.

21) We do not know if the case was actually sent to Haberman or not. It seems unlikely, given Lassiter's view of it as so damaging. In any case, Haberman never initiated to us.

> like "you should tie in with business." We've implemented this. The assumption that business was willing to give was an incorrect one. God forbid I should send them illiterate children....So in terms of plans, there were none. There were some generalized ideas.

Finally he said,

> There are an incredible number of questions which should have been asked before statements are made about something this fragile. We have a good school.

And he reiterated his view that:

> What horrifies me is the vast amounts of money being spent on this sort of project which could be doing so much more somewhere else. What seems to be passing for objectivity is appalling. Vast quantities of money are being spent on things like this which at best are of no value, and at worst are damaging.

He concluded:

> Where do we go from here? This report must not be released. You probably want something in writing from me. I'll have my secretary type it up.

But neither Sullivan nor Miles, after his return in July, ever received anything further from Lassiter. We decided not to press the matter, believing that the corrections and footnotes we had inserted throughout the text were responsive to Lassiter's concerns; that we had effectively de-identified the school and its participants; and that the perspectives we had gathered from Woodward, O'Brien, and the staff member who spoke with Sullivan in March, both confirmed our analysis, and extended it in useful directions.

Comment from the Authors

Lassiter's concerns--and his various threats--gave us pause. Even though Sieber was an experienced researcher, could his working at second hand from the field notes and comments have weakened the analysis? We doubted it: Kironde had reviewed it in draft form and made a number of suggestions; so had Miles. Both suggested some reanalysis of data, and some tempering of conclusions, which Sieber carried out before the case was sent to readers. But we still felt nervous, especially when someone as irate as Lassiter was alludes to "wasting the taxpayers' money," says he has sent a copy to a top central office administrator, and tells his assistants he is considering suit. The analysis of qualitative data is not a well-defined methodology, and we could have been wrong.

On balance, however, we do not think we were. The vehemence of Lassiter's attack seemed to be generated out of three issues. First, he

resented the implication that he had gotten his job politically rather than through competence. This implication was held by some actors in the case, but not by us.

Second, Lassiter did not want to be held responsible for (a) not having implemented a legitimate plan; (b) not being "innovative." He thus attacked Woodward's official status, said there were no plans, and that there never had been any innovative goals in the first place. A review of the case shows, we think, that though Woodward's legitimacy was weak, there were in fact many innovative hopes for Appelbaum, both in the business community and in the central office. Our research interest was in the planning and implementation of innovative schools. Thus, we tended to focus on both continuities and slips between plans and the actualized school. Lassiter, as principal, was naturally far more interested in what Appelbaum was like from day to day, and did not judge his performance--nor want researchers to judge it--on the basis of its congruence with an initial vision with little official power over him. We and he were using quite different lenses as we looked at the school.

Third, Lassiter did not want anyone to say that Appelbaum was less than successful as a school. This motivation must, we think, be counted as genuine, not self-serving. A number of people, including Ann Woodward, commented on Lassiter's dedication and drive. And Woodward, too, counted Appelbaum as functioning well--better than most vocational schools in Lakeport. We do not question that assessment, which is made with the benefit of a good deal of experience and comparative data which we do not have. Once again, the question is one of the perspective we were taking. By <u>our</u> criteria of implementation success, Appelbaum was not fully effective. Its implementation was not wholly congruent with the original vision for it, and by the end of the second year there was evidence of staff dissatisfaction, though students and parents were relatively pleased. Problem-coping abilities of the school were strong. The question of Appelbaum's impact on student learning is an open one, as far as we are concerned.

Was Appelbaum a "good school," as both Lassiter and Woodward said it was? Quite possibly. But that is a somewhat different question than the question we were trying to answer: how can we understand what happens along the way from innovative vision to reality in the life of a new school? That the answers we found were distressing to the man in the principal's office may have helped us understand things a bit more.